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SUMMARY 
 
This dissertation deals with the incorporation of non-market ecosystem services into the 
national accounts from a theoretical and empirical point of view. The overall purpose is 
to show that it is possible to estimate the economic value of these services in a 
consistent way with market goods and services. This requires the use of exchange 
values (prices times quantities).  
Terrestrial ecosystems, and more specifically forests, provide goods and services 
that are relevant to society because they generate human well-being. Significant efforts 
have been made during the last decades in order to extend national accounts to integrate 
ecosystem services. The System of Environmental and Economic Accounting –
Experimental Ecosystem Accounting has been recently presented. Some research 
projects have also been launched in order to apply ecosystem accounting in several 
countries. However, some of these research efforts are not linked with theoretical 
literature on green national accounting.   
Valuation of non-market ecosystem services has been done traditionally using non-
market valuation techniques, which mainly focus on the demand side. The demand 
function is interpreted as the probability that individuals would be willing to pay a given 
amount of money for the consumption of an ecosystem service. This allows Hicksian 
variations to be estimated. These measures are mainly used in cost-benefit analyses, but 
conventional systems of national accounts reject the use of any welfare measures, 
proposing the use of exchange values instead. Thus, if we seek to integrate non-market 
ecosystem services into the national and ecosystem accounting, we need to distinguish 
the part that could be internalized in terms of exchange values. Indeed, theoretical 
studies also point out the need to focus only on this part.  
The theoretical model that we present in the third chapter of this dissertation 
confirms that non-market values can be incorporated into national accounting using 
(simulated) exchange values, and not consumer surplus or any other Hicksian variation. 
We propose the Simulated Exchange Value (SEV) method and detail the implications of 
these results for applied accounting. It is precisely from this empirical perspective that, 
in the fourth chapter, we compare aggregated recreation values for stone pine and cork 
oak forests in Spain obtained by using compensating variation (a type of Hicksian 
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variation) and by using simulated exchange value (maximum benefits from a potential 
market) measures. The latter measures account for 35 to 51% of the former values. This 
is because when a price is set, only part of the population would pay that price. We use 
a choice experiment in order to estimate the demand function of public recreation in the 
above-mentioned forests, and we test for construct validity of willingness to pay values 
as the estimation of compensating variation and the simulated exchange value relies on 
the validity of the experiment. Results show convergent validity between a choice and a 
ranking recoded as a choice format in an experiment with three alternatives plus status 
quo. We also find significant differences between two payment vehicles (increased trip 
expenditures and entrance fee) that are included simultaneously in the choice sets.  
Biodiversity conservation is another example of non-market ecosystem service. In 
the fifth chapter we also determine aggregated values for the conservation of the Iberian 
Lynx in Spain. Again, we compare the compensating variation measure associated with 
a program for the conservation of this endangered species with the results obtained from 
the Simulated Exchange Value method for the same program. Unlike in the previous 
chapter, here we use a contingent valuation analysis to estimate the demand function 
and analyze whether the existence of different and possibly conflicting preference 
orderings affects the valuation function of the respondents’ WTP and the estimated 
aggregated values. Results show that simulated exchange values account for 55 to 64% 
of the compensating variation values.  
From another angle, another contribution of the dissertation is the valuation of net 
accumulation of forest capital. The theoretical literature on green accounting identifies 
the Net National Product measured by the national accounts as by far the most relevant 
indicator of social welfare and points out that this indicator can be measured using 
information for the current year as forests are made up of a single species whose growth 
is instantaneous. We show that, in the case of the forestry sector, the results previously 
obtained only hold true if there is a single species whose growth can be approximated 
by an exponential function with constant decay. If there are different types of species, 
the information of the year does not suffice, as there are future values. The 
demonstration of this result requires the application of Volterra integral equations, 
which have been traditionally utilized in the well-known ‘vintage’ models.  
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RESUMEN  
 
La presente tesis doctoral trata sobre la incorporación de los servicios del ecosistema de 
no mercado a la contabilidad nacional desde un punto teórico y aplicado. El objetivo 
principal de esta investigación es mostrar que es posible estimar el valor económico de 
estos servicios consistentemente con la forma en que se valoran los bienes y servicios 
de mercado. Esto requiere utilizar valores de cambio (precios por cantidades).  
Los ecosistemas terrestres, y en particular los bosques, ofrecen bienes y servicios 
que son relevantes para la sociedad en la medida en que generan bienestar. En las 
últimas cuatro décadas se han venido realizando importantes esfuerzos con el objetivo 
de ampliar las cuentas nacionales para integrar a los servicios del ecosistema. El 
Sistema de Contabilidad Ambiental y Económica –Contabilidad Experimental de los 
Ecosistemas ha sido presentado recientemente. Igualmente, se han puesto en marcha 
algunos proyectos de investigación con el objetivo de aplicar la contabilidad de los 
ecosistemas en determinados países. Sin embargo, algunos de estos esfuerzos de 
investigación no están vinculados a la literatura teórica en torno a la contabilidad verde.  
La valoración de servicios del ecosistema de no mercado se ha realizado 
tradicionalmente mediante técnicas de valoración de no mercado, es decir, centrándose 
en el lado de la demanda. La función de demanda se interpreta como la probabilidad de 
que los individuos estén dispuestos a pagar una determinada cantidad de dinero por el 
consumo de un servicio del ecosistema. Esto permite calcular diferentes variaciones 
Hicksianas. Estas medidas son principalmente utilizadas para la realización de análisis 
de costo-beneficio. Sin embargo, los sistemas de cuentas nacionales convencionales 
rechazan el uso de cualquier medida de bienestar, proponiendo el uso de valores de 
cambio. Por lo tanto, si el objetivo es integrar los servicios de los ecosistemas de no 
mercado en la contabilidad nacional, necesitamos distinguir la parte que podríamos 
internalizar en términos de valor de cambio. De hecho, los estudios teóricos señalan la 
necesidad de centrarse únicamente en esta parte.  
El modelo teórico que presentamos en el tercer capítulo de esta tesis confirma que 
los valores de los ecosistemas de no mercado pueden ser integrados en la contabilidad 
nacional utilizando valores de cambio (simulados) y no el excedente del consumidor u 
alguna otra variación Hicksiana. Proponemos el método del Valor de Cambio Simulado 
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(VCS) y detallamos las implicaciones de estos resultados en lo que se refiere a la 
contabilidad aplicada. Es precisamente desde esta perspectiva empírica desde la que, en 
el cuarto capítulo de la tesis, comparamos los valores agregados para el uso recreativo 
en bosques de pino piñonero y alcornoque en España. Para ello, utilizamos dos medidas: 
la variación compensatoria (un tipo de variación Hicksiana) y el valor de cambio 
simulado (es decir, los máximos beneficios que se pueden obtener en un mercado 
potencial). Las medidas obtenidas utilizando este último método representan entre un 35 
y un 51% de los valores obtenidos utilizando la variación compensatoria. Esto se debe a 
que cuando se establece un precio, únicamente una parte de la población estaría 
dispuesta a  pagar dicho precio. En este ejercicio, utilizamos un experimento de elección 
para estimar la función de demanda del uso recreativo de los bosques mencionados. No 
obstante, la estimación de ambas medidas depende de la validez del experimento, por lo 
que también realizamos dos análisis de validez convergente de los valores de la 
disposición a pagar. Los resultados muestran convergencia entre un formato de elección 
y otro de ordenación recodificado como una elección en un experimento con tres 
alternativas más el status quo. Por otro lado, se identifican diferencias entre dos 
vehículos de pago (pago de una entrada e incremento en los gastos de viaje) incluidos 
simultáneamente en el mismo escenario de elección.  
La conservación de la biodiversidad representa otro ejemplo de servicio del 
ecosistema de no mercado.  En el quinto capítulo de la tesis se determinan los valores 
agregados para la conservación del lince Ibérico en España. De nuevo, comparamos la 
variación compensatoria asociada a un programa de conservación de esta especie 
amenazada con los resultados obtenidos al aplicar el método del Valor de Cambio 
Simulado para el mismo programa. A diferencia del capítulo anterior, en este caso 
realizamos un estudio de valoración contingente para estimar la función de demanda. 
También analizamos si la existencia de motivaciones diferentes, y posiblemente en 
conflicto, a la hora de pagar afecta a la función de valoración de la disposición a pagar 
de los encuestados y a los valores agregados estimados. Los resultados muestran que los 
valores de cambio simulados representan entre un 55 y un 64% de los valores obtenidos 
utilizando la variación compensatoria.  
Desde otra perspectiva, otra aportación de la tesis es la valoración de la 
acumulación neta del capital forestal. La literatura teórica sobre la contabilidad nacional 
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verde identifica el Producto Nacional Neto medido por las cuentas nacionales como el 
indicador más relevante del bienestar social y señala que dicho indicador puede ser 
estimado utilizando únicamente valores del año en curso, ya que los bosques están 
formados por una única especie cuyo crecimiento es instantáneo. En esta tesis, 
mostramos que, en el caso del sector forestal, los resultados previamente obtenidos 
siguen siendo válidos si existe una única especie cuyo crecimiento puede ser 
aproximado por una función exponencial con un decaimiento constante.  Si existen 
diferentes tipos de especies, la información del año no es suficiente, ya que hay valores 
a futuro. La demostración de este resultado requiere la aplicación de ecuaciones de 
Volterra, las cuáles han sido tradicionalmente utilizadas en los conocidos como modelos 
‘vintage’.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
A large body of research has been concerned with the issue of the appropriate use and 
design of the national accounts over the last decades (Repetto et al., 1989; Hartwick, 
1990; Mäler, 1991; Aronsson and Löfgren, 1998a,b; Nordhaus and Kokkelenberg, 
1999; Perrings and Vincent, 2003; Aronsson et al., 2004; Lange, 2007; Dasgupta, 2009; 
Atkinson, 2010). The growing interest among economists in environmental matters has 
manifested itself in the application of economics to the environment. The field of 
environmental economics has gone a long way in that regard, but it still has important 
contributions to make. Mainstreaming the value of natural capital into policy decision-
making is vital, as the consumption and enjoyment of goods and services that nature 
provides contribute directly and indirectly to human well-being.  
There is recognition that natural resources and associated ecosystem services 
should be incorporated into the national accounts from an economic standpoint. Natural 
capital accounting therefore will help giving a more complete picture of economic 
activity and the interactions between agents. However, the fact of setting a price on 
nature has often been criticized. Just because some ecosystem services are not traded in 
the marketplace does not mean that their monetary value cannot be estimated. Their 
economic valuation has indeed been subject of debate in recent decades, and several 
non-market valuation techniques have been developed. 
From a theoretical point of view, there is also a large body of literature on how 
national accounting should be modified to accurately measure the income generated by 
a country in a year. One of the most relevant results is that, under certain assumptions, 
Net National Product (NNP) is the appropriate indicator of economic progress and 
social welfare, as it summarizes the necessary information to move the economy 
towards the optimal path. The need of expanding this concept to take into account 
natural resources has resulted in what is known as green NNP (GNNP).  
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Accordingly, whatever perspective – accounting, valuation or theoretical – we take, 
the assessment of the natural environment leads to a better understanding of its role in 
the economy. Still, there are fundamental differences between them when it comes to 
the valuation principles and criteria applied, especially for the case of non-market 
ecosystem services.  
If the goal is to include these services in the national accounts in a consistent way 
with market goods and services, exchange values should be calculated, as recommended 
by the System of National Accounts (SNA). However, most applied non-market 
valuation studies fall under the scope of the cost-benefit analysis (CBA) and calculate 
consumer surplus or any other Hicksian variation measure; while theoretical 
frameworks and conventional systems of national accounts point out that these 
measures must not be used
1
.  
The general purpose of this dissertation is to demonstrate the possibility of 
consistently integrating market and non-market ecosystem services into the national 
accounts, regardless of whether we are dealing with purely theoretical models or with 
practical applications. With a few exceptions, the task of knitting both perspectives 
together lay ahead. This research aims to offer an approach in this regard.  
One specific objective consists in expanding conventional optimal control models 
in order to incorporate non-market amenities in the same way as market goods and 
services and to adequately measure the stock of natural capital. From an applied 
perspective, the main focus is on showing that it is also possible to estimate exchange 
values for two of the most common non-market ecosystem services, which are public 
forest recreation and biodiversity conservation.  
Overall, biodiversity valuation may be tacklet by using either dynamic bioeconomic 
models (or ecological economic modeling) or preference-based methods. The former 
are charactetized by combining biophysical and economic components, namely 
population dynamics and economic mathematical models
2
. Most applications have been 
                                                          
1
 Thus, although using CBA would be, ideally, the most appropriate, we cannot use it if we wish to be 
consistent with the proposal of national accounting systems, as we will see below.  
2
 Economic problem is constrained by the population dynamics of exploited species, which are described 
by the equations of motion of the system (Perrings, 2001). This involves integrating Lotka-Volterra 
equations, as dynamics of biological systems are nonlinear (see also Pascual and Muradian (2010)).  
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designed in the context of fisheries management and agricultural policies (Larking et al., 
2011; Mouysset et al., 2011, 2015; Pereau et al., 2012; Doyen et al., 2013; Cissé et at., 
2013). On the contrary, preference-based valuation methods rely on the assumption that 
values arise from individuals’ preferences and their expression through actual or 
hypothetical markets. In this dissertation, we will use the latter approach in order to 
estimate the economic value of a program to conserve the Iberian lynx in Spain. 
 
1.1. Background 
 
At the end of the 17th century, W. Petty developed what might be considered the early 
version of an accounting system at national level. He supported the use of statistical 
techniques for measuring social phenomena and began analyzing the method of political 
arithmetic. As early as in the 18th century, physiocrats, and fundamentally F. Quesnay, 
advanced in the understanding of the interdependence between economic sectors, as 
reflected in the Tableau Économique. Nevertheless, the increase in foreign trade since 
the Industrial Revolution in the second half of the century laid the foundations for the 
future transformation of the national accounts.  
This progress notwithstanding, the major advances went hand in hand with 
Keynesian economics after the World War II. J.M. Keynes developed detailed estimates 
of national income and expenditure in Great Britain, giving rise to the ‘modern’ national 
accounts. R. Stone later worked on double-entry bookkeeping methods and conducted 
several studies on the measurement of income and consumer demand in the UK for 
which he received the Nobel Prize in 1984. He also focused on socio-demographic 
accounts, developing the social accounting matrix. 
Based on the double-entry bookkeeping method, national accounting systems 
emerged around the efforts to measure aggregated economic activity. Although the first 
formal national accounts were published in the United States, soon there were also 
important advances in Europe. That is why the United Nations began preparing the 
groundwork for the future development of the SNA. 
National accounts consist of two sets of accounts: current accounts and assets 
accounts (capital balance). The former provide information on monetary transactions 
related to the production and use of goods and services and on the distribution and 
redistribution of income from productive activities (ISWGNA, 2009: 3). Gross 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
6 
Domestic Product (GDP) is the main aggregate measure in these accounts. Asset 
accounts describe the changes in the stock of an asset, as well as the monetary 
information on stocks of productive assets (ISWGNA, 2009: 331). Both accounts 
contain two common concepts: consumption of fixed capital (depreciation) and gross 
capital formation (gross investment). Thus, subtracting them from GDP yield 
conventional Net Domestic Product (NDP).   
Even so, as regards ecosystems, the SNA only measures the commercial net value 
added (NVA) generated by a forest, i.e. the value of commercial extraction, net of 
intermediate and man-made capital consumption. Differences experienced during the 
period by non-redeemable man-made capital and natural capital are thus left out 
(Caparrós et al., 2003). This measurement is at odds with the definition of income 
issued by J. Hicks: "the maximum value which a person can consume during a week, 
and still expect to be as well off at the end of the week as he was in the beginning" 
(Hicks, 1946: 172). That is, the maximum amount a person can consume while keeping 
overall capital intact because "as long as net investment is kept non-negative, the capital 
remains intact" (Aronsson and Löfgren, 1998a: 211). A precedent to this concept can be 
found in I. Fisher: "the income from any instrument is thus the flow of services rendered 
by that instrument. The income of a community is the total flow of services from all of 
its instruments" (Fisher, 1906: 101)
3
. The correct measurement of total income therefore 
involves measuring Hicksian income. Advances have been made toward achievement of 
this goal over the last two decades, but there is still some way to go. The Agroforestry 
Accounting System (AAS) (Campos, 1999; Caparrós et al., 2003) is, as discussed 
below, an example in this sphere.  
Although GDP is the best-known indicator of aggregated economic activity (this 
concept coincides with Gross National Product (GNP) in a closed economy), the 
theoretical literature recommends the use of NNP, a concept closely related to Hicksian 
income. The goal of theoretical models is to determine the changes that should be made 
to the national accounts such that they can appropriately measure NNP, as well as its 
contribution to social well-being. This has resulted in what has come to be called ‘social 
accounting’ (Turner et al., 1994; Aronsson et al., 1997).  
                                                          
3
 Lindahl advanced Fisher's concept understanding income as the sum of consumption and net increment 
of wealth over a period (Weitzman, 2003). 
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The welfare interpretation of NNP comes originally from the seminal paper by 
Weitzman (1976). He also derived the result that the Hamiltonian for a general 
equilibrium model could be interpreted, under certain assumptions, as equivalent to the 
NNP measured by the national accounts. The corollary is that the economy needs to 
maximize NNP in order to follow the optimal path
4
. Subsequent developments of the 
Weitzman’s approach have extended NNP to cover natural resources (Solow, 1986; 
Hartwick, 1990, 2001; Mäler, 1991) and the negative effects of pollution (Brock, 1977; 
Hartwick, 1990; Tahvonen and Kuuluvainen, 1993). Terrestrial ecosystems, ans more 
specifically forests, have also been addressed, albeit to a minor extent (Vincent, 1999a; 
Cairns, 2001, 2003; Matero and Saastamoinen, 2007; Caparrós, 2010). 
Apart from these theoretical studies, there are also many applications oriented 
towards estimating the economic value of ecosystems at national or international level 
(Repetto et al. (1989) pioneered this approach for Indonesia's forests), and different 
research projects put into practice. We do not wish at this point to go so much into this 
issue, as we will explain it throughout the second chapter.   
Nevertheless, this brings to the forefront, in what ways and to what extent, the 
value of natural resources can be estimated in monetary terms. Monetary valuation of 
environmental goods has become the subject of a large body of research over the last 
few decades. In this sense, economists interested in environmental management have 
been developing a range of techniques to assign monetary values to the environment. 
Considering that economic valuation techniques are intended to assess whether the costs 
of certain project or policy are justified in terms of the benefits generated, the main 
purpose of environmental valuation consists in including environmental concern in the 
CBA
5
 from a monetary point of view.  
                                                          
4
 There are, however, some authors (Dasgupta and Mäler, 2000; Arrow et al., 2003a,b; Dasgupta, 2009) 
criticizing the use of NNP to evaluate social welfare. As the economy does not follow an optimal path, it 
is better to implement an economic program so as to make sure that the economy keeps evolving. 
5
 CBA arose during the late 1930s from an intense debate between economists L. Robbins, Hicks and N. 
Kaldor. While it seemed a well-accepted principle that the capacity of enjoyment was equal for all 
individuals, Robins argued that it was not possible to make comparisons between their utilities. Kaldor 
claimed that, even if this were true, it was not the relevant point. The key was to know whether the 
implementation of a policy increased total real income so that it was possible to give a Pareto optimal 
allocation (Zerbe, 2013). Hicks agreed this approach, giving rise to the Kaldor-Hicks criterion.  
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In this context, two concepts emerge: willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to 
accept (WTA). The former represents the maximum amount of money that an individual 
is willing to pay for a marginal change in the provision of a good or service (Atkinson, 
2010). The latter is the minimum amount of compensation that an individual is willing 
to accept to forego a marginal change. At all events, both measures are monetary 
measures of welfare changes and reflect individuals’ preferences (Kriström and 
Johansson, 2015). Considering that preferences are represented by utility functions, the 
economic value of a good or service may alternatively be defined as the change in the 
utility derived from a marginal change.  
Hicks (1941, 1943) proposed two WTP measures in order to estimate welfare 
changes in monetary terms: Equivalent Variation (EV) and Compensating Variation 
(CV). The former determines the change in consumers’ income that would lead them to 
the same utility level as that generated by a change in market prices. The latter estimates 
how much consumers’ income need to increase (or decrease) in order to get them back 
to the same utility that they had before a change in market prices (note that, 
compensation takes place after the price change, so CV uses the existing prices after the 
change). Another tool for measuring welfare changes is consumer surplus, i.e. the 
difference between consumers’ WTP and the price they actually pay. It is closed to EV 
and CV if the wealth effect is small (in this case we would refer to the Marshallian 
consumer surplus), and an exact measure of EV and CV if the utility is also quasilinear.  
An important point to bear in mind is that individuals not just derive utility for the 
mere fact of using the good or service at the current moment, but for knowing that they 
will have the possibility of using it in the future. This means that total economic value 
(TEV)
6
 consists of use values and passive use values. Use values are divided into direct 
use values, indirect use values and option values; while passive use values are divided 
into existence values, altruistic values and bequest values (Pearce and Turner, 1990). 
Non-market valuation techniques, a matter to which we will devote an important part of 
this dissertation, appear as a tool for estimating these values. Roughly speaking, these 
techniques consist of revealed preference methods and stated preference methods. The 
former only capture use values, while the latter capture use and passive use values. 
 
                                                          
6
 In environmental economics, TEV is refers to the aggregated value of the benefits provided by 
ecosystem services in a given state (Pascual and Muradian, 2010).  
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1.2. Motivation 
 
The main motivation behind this dissertation is the need to bridge the gap between 
theoretical analyses, applied studies and standards proposals of accounting systems, 
especially when it comes to forests. This requires setting down clear guidelines.  
A first important difference concerns valuation rules. While one should be able to 
measure the economic value of nature as if it were other form of capital, some 
ecosystem goods and services are not traded in the marketplace, thereby not making it 
possible to directly observe market prices. In those cases, central normative national 
accounts frameworks themselves aim at using market price equivalents as the first 
option. But for certain ecosystem amenities, such as public forest recreation or 
biodiversity conservation, there are no similar markets. In these circumstances, the first 
temptation is to use consumer surplus (or more precisely, Hicksian variations) obtained 
with non-market valuation techniques. Nevertheless, national accounting systems 
oppose the use of consumer surplus and theoretical studies on forests also take it out 
when relating the linearized current-value Hamiltonian to GNNP. While Hicksian 
variation estimates are relevant in CBA, for national accounts one needs to distinguish 
the part that could be internalized in terms of exchange values. Cairns (2003), in fact, 
proposes focusing on this part, as this is the only one consistent with current estimates 
in the conventional SNA.  
An interesting proposal that is linked up with the above-mentioned idea is the 
application of the Simulated Exchange Value (SEV) method. It was initially proposed in 
Caparrós (2000) and later empirically applied in Caparrós et al. (2003), Campos and 
Caparrós (2006) and Caparrós et al. (2015). This methodology is intended to obtain the 
(simulated) economic value of ecosystem services for which there are neither 
observable market prices nor similar markets. In doing so, it simulates the whole market 
(demand, supply and competitive environment) in order to estimate the (simulated) 
market price that the forest owner would set for the service if it were internalized.  
We do believe that, for the time being at least, it is the best method to estimate the 
economic value of non-market ecosystem services. Being coherent with the guidelines 
laid down by accounting systems, it also makes it possible to integrate market and non-
market ecosystem services uniformly from the theoretical point of view. Interestingly 
enough, this method also guarantees this consistency when it is empirically applied.   
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Another issue to which we need to turn out our attention in this dissertation is the 
treatment of future values when estimating the stock of natural capital, which is by no 
means negligible. Most theoretical literature on forest accounting assumes that forests 
are made up of a single species whose growth is instantaneous (Cairns 2001, 2003). 
That is, the age-class of the forest is ignored, thus obtaining the result that it is enough 
to use information of the current year for calculating the current-value Hamiltonian and 
GNNP (Vincent, 1999a). However, this result only holds for strong and probably 
unrealistic assumptions.  
Vincent (1999b) and Caparrós et al. (2003)
7
 discuss the role of the age-class 
structure of the forests, although in partial equilibrium framework (still assuming that 
there is one type of species). Under these conditions, the use of values of the current 
year remains possible. Only if different species existed would theoretical studies 
integrate forward-looking values (see, e.g. Caparrós (2010)). In the third chapter of this 
dissertation, we estimate the contribution of forest biomass in terms of future values. 
This implies having a problem with an integral state equation of the Volterra type. The 
main implication of this special type of state equations is that they permit aggregating 
the growth of the different vintages in the forest. However, they make the problem more 
complex, as the equation cannot be simplified to the standard state equation by taking 
the time derivative (Vinokurov, 1969; Kamien and Muller, 1976). Although Volterra 
equations have been generally used to analyze durable goods in ‘vintage’ models 
(Schmalensee, 1979; Muller and Peles, 1990), in this dissertation we stress that this 
approach can be extended for modeling the growth of forests within a green accounting 
framework. Hence, this proposal opens up the possibility of more realistic scenarios by 
applying tools that have not been applied before in this field.  
 
1.3. Preview of results 
 
We express the need to agree upon a new methodology reflecting the contribution of 
ecosystem services with and without market prices, as well as without similar markets. 
This requires purging consumer surplus and using exchange values instead. We 
consider the SEV method to be the best choice to do so.  
                                                          
7
 In fact, Caparrós et al. (2003) calculate the stock values following this recommendation. 
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The second chapter of this dissertation makes an in-depth review of previous 
literature on national accounting from a theoretical, empirical and accounting point of 
view and focuses on terrestrial ecosystems. If follows from this analysis that there are 
differences between these perspectives, for example on how the value of non-market 
ecosystem services must be estimated. Therefore, it is relevant to discuss these 
divergent positions and to make proposals for resolution.    
In the third chapter, we focus on the theoretical part by presenting a general 
equilibrium model that makes it possible to expand Weitzman’s results to incorporate 
non-market ecosystem services. In this way we show that it is possible to integrate these 
services into the GNNP definition and, most importantly, to include them in a consistent 
way with market goods and services. In order to be coherent with the proposal of 
national accounting systems, exchange values must be used. To that end, we simulate 
the ‘quasi-market’ prices for forest amenities such as public recreational use. We thus 
provide the theoretical basis for the SEV method. As explained below, this method 
requires knowledge of the competitive environment of non-market ecosystem services. 
Hence we characterize exchange values for perfect competition, monopoly and 
monopolistic competition.  
Apart from this, we also demonstrate that the possibility of defining GNNP by 
using only values of the current year is only available under certain restrictive 
conditions. It would apply, for instance, if trees grow instantaneously and belong to the 
same species, as assumed by previous studies on forests (Vincent, 1999a; Cairns, 2001, 
2003). We show that this result also remains certain when the single species grows 
following a constant decay exponential function and trees are not felled. However, these 
two scenarios are unrealistic. In order to approach this problem in a more realistic 
manner, we prove that when reforestations are carried out with several species growing 
differently, there are forward-looking values within the GNNP calculation. Thus, we 
develop an approach that advances better understanding on the role of future values in 
the estimation of net accumulation of forest capital.  
In this dissertation we also use the SEV method to estimate the aggregated values 
of two non-market ecosystem services, which are public recreation (the fourth chapter) 
and biodiversity conservation (the fifth chapter). In latter, we focus on a conservation 
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program for the Iberian Lynx in Spain, as it is one of the most endangered feline species 
originally native to the Iberian Peninsula.  
In order to simulate exchange values, the demand function must be estimated using 
non-market valuation techniques. In the fourth chapter, we present a choice experiment 
and we analyze its validity by testing the convergent validity of two elicitation formats 
(ranking and choice recoded as a choice) and two payment vehicles (entrance fee and 
increased trip expenditures). Results show convergent validity between elicitation 
formats in an experiment with three alternatives plus status quo; while divergent results 
when including both payment vehicles simultaneously in the choice sets. We also 
estimate aggregated recreation values. Choice experiments application usually focus on 
compensating variation (a welfare measure in line with consumer surplus), but we 
extend this analysis by comparing this measure with the simulated exchange value 
measure. Results indicate that the latter measure accounts for 35 to 51% of the former 
values.  
In the fifth chapter, we present a contingent valuation study for the conservation of 
the Iberian Lynx and we analyze it in terms of preference ordering. Individuals may be 
motivated by reasons other than the direct use of the good or service in scrutiny. The 
only study formalizing the differentiation between consumers (or Homo Economicus) 
and citizens (or Homo Politicus) in the field of environmental valuation can be found in 
Nyborg (2000). She goes beyond and differentiates Homo Politicus between Homo 
Politicus with sole responsibility and Homo Politicus with shared responsibility. In 
addition to the two above-mentioned types of individuals, we introduce another one, 
called Homo Strategicus. Results show that there are some differences between them 
when it comes to facing with a contributing scenario. After identifying empirically this 
triple consumer-citizen-strategic distinction, we also estimate aggregated values of the 
biodiversity conservation program. As in the fourth chapter, we compare compensating 
variation and simulated exchange value measures. Results indicate that the latter 
measures account for 55 to 64% of the former values, depending on the type of 
respondent considered.  
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2. A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON NATIONAL AND ECOSYSTEM 
ACCOUNTING 
 
In this second chapter we conduct a comprehensive literature review in order to find out 
common points and contrasting elements between accounting-related theoretical studies 
and national accounting systems. We seek, however, as the title indicates, to make 
further progress in answering how natural resources can be integrated within these 
approaches. This holistic understanding includes renewable and non-renewable 
resources, although ecosystem services are of significant relative importance here. 
Reveal how near or far these two perspectives are when it comes to accounting 
ecosystem services, and more specifically those lacking market prices, is therefore the 
major underlying goal here.  
At this point it is relevant to differentiate between green accounting and 
environmental accounting, as both concepts will appear throughout the rest of the 
dissertation. Green accounting is the terminology used in theoretical optimal control 
models when referring to the attempt of relating a comprehensive measure of NNP to 
the social welfare of a dynamic economy. An inclusive NNP includes more than the 
conventional market goods and services and net investment of man-made capital. When 
other ‘utilities’ related to the natural environment, as well as natural capital, are taken 
into account, the extension of the NNP is commonly referred to as GNNP (Aronsson 
and Löfgren, 1998a). Environmental accounting, by contrast, is not about measuring 
welfare, but economic activity. It is aimed at assessing, in monetary terms, the influence 
of natural resources into the national accounts, which are a set of macroeconomic 
accounts oriented towards providing a detailed picture of economic activities and the 
interactions between stakeholders. Hence, it obtains information on a wide range of 
natural resources and their use. At national level, it falls within the scope of the System 
of Environmental-Economic Accounting (SEEA). It is referred to as a ‘satellite’ 
accounting framework of the SNA, which we will speak about below. Thus, when 
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mentioning conventional environmental accounting, we are talking about the role 
adopted in these differentiated accounting systems by the environment. Meanwhile, 
ecosystem accounting (or natural capital accounting) is no more than a subfield within 
environmental accounting. Consequently, it provides information on ecosystem stocks 
and flows so that it is possible to measure the ecosystem asset (natural capital)
8
.  
The chapter is organized as follows. We will start focusing primarily on 
environmental accounting. This section is divided into five subsections: (i) the first 
discusses conventional national accounting systems; (ii) the second analyzes the 
‘satellite’ systems of accounts for natural resources and ecosystem services; (iii) the 
third assesses the valuation principles set out by these systems; (iv) the fourth describes 
an alternative accounting system that represents a considerable improvement on the 
current systems; (v) and the fifth presents various research projects aimed to estimate 
ecosystem services from different perspectives. Section two is dedicated to non-market 
valuation techniques. It is a different discipline based on obtaining monetary values for 
non-market resources. It is, however, more in line with environmental accounting than 
with the theoretical models that follow. Green accounting is left to the end, as the third 
chapter of this dissertation is closely related to the models presented here. This section 
begins with a description of the basic model pioneered by Weitzman in 1976, and 
continues with the extensions of this approach to include natural resources. It concludes 
with a brief explanation of the points of criticism made by alternative proposals to the 
original Weitzman’s model.   
 
2.1.  Environmental accounting 
 
Environmental accounts are relevant, as they permit, on the one hand, analyzing the 
interactions between the economy and the natural environment, and, on the other hand, 
knowing the state of natural stocks in terms of sustainability (Nordhaus and 
Kokkelenberg, 1999). 
While the SNA is the international accounting standard, developed and developing 
countries, as well as supranational institutions, have made important advances with the 
                                                          
8
 It is playing a relevant role in Post-2015 development agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals. 
This may introduce the necessary conditions for a more sustainable development. Furthermore, in the 
near future, it may contribute to developing a new methodology including private and public income in 
ecosystem accounting, regardless of whether or not they have observable market prices (Campos, 2015).  
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view to helping this system become a more effective tool in policy making (Bos, 2003; 
OECD, 2004). Environmental accounts must play an essential role in this regard. 
Crucial for a sustainable development is indeed the integration of environmental 
policies into other policies9
 
(European Council, 1999). In order to serve as a tool for 
such integrated policies, environmental accounts must be harmonized with national 
accounting standards.  
In this respect, the United Nations Statistical Division (UNSD) promoted the 
creation of the Integrated Environmental and Economic Accounting in 1993 (later, in 
2003, the SEEA) as ‘satellite accounts’ of the SNA. However, being under the influence 
of the SNA, the SEEA did not go beyond the market production, this being a major 
constraint. Ecosystems have been recently incorporated within the scope of the SEEA, 
giving rise to the SEEA-Experimental Ecosystem Accounting (SEEA-EEA) framework. 
 
2.1.1. Conventional national accounting systems 
 
The first SNA was presented in 1968 and remained valid until 1993, when the new 
version was endorsed. It was "a comprehensive and detailed framework for the 
systematic and integrated recording of the flows and stocks of an economy" (Bartelmus, 
1989: 81). Nevertheless, although the SNA noted that man-made capital stocks must be 
included, which is right, it did not provide an explicit and comprehensive capital 
account. In fact, as the SNA primarily aimed to make recommendations on how to 
compile measures of economic activity, it was limited itself to the measurement of what 
is known as Net Valued Added (NVA)
10
 or NDP, as it will be explained below.  
Regarding the role of the environment for economic activity, the 1968 SNA 
suffered a number of shortcomings: only final consumption was incorporated and newly 
discovered reserves and changes in the values of reserves due to price changes were not 
                                                          
9
 In other institutional settings, several conference and forums on sustainable development, climate 
change and the environment have also been held since the 1990s to seek to address the concerns raised on 
these issues. In 1992, Rio de Janeiro was the setting for the Earth Summit or the UN Conference for 
Environment and Development (UNCED) that led to the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development. The Convention on Biodiversity, the Framework Convention on Climate Change or 
Agenda 21 were also adopted. A decade later, the World Summit on Sustainable Development allowed 
renewing the commitment to the principles of the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21. 
10
 It corresponds to the difference between the market value from sales of final extracted products and the 
amortization of man-made capital. 
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taken into account either (Harrison, 1989). Although advances were introduced in the 
1993 SNA
11
, it confined itself to estimating an incomplete and inconsistent concept of 
national income – NVA or NDP – rather than tending towards the measurement of 
Hicksian income
12
. It therefore failed to adjust accounting indicators by the use of 
productions in progress (as part of costs) and natural growth of the year (as part of final 
production) (Campos, 2015). Depreciation of natural capital and environmental 
degradation were excluded as well. Non-market amenities were not included either. As 
a result, the GDP and NDP estimated by the SNA are recognized as providing an 
incomplete picture of the economy. In view of the fact that economic activity involves 
multiple interactions with the environment, these measures do not accurately assess the 
contribution and effect of the environment (Harris and Fraser, 2002). 
A new version of the SNA was published in 2008. It was just an update of the 1993 
SNA, rather than a revision. Some methodological and conceptual improvements for 
measuring economic activities were, however, undertaken in order to reflect the changes 
occurring since the 1990s (UN et al., 2008: 581-601; Eurostat, 2014: 27-28). Still, it did 
not prevent the new version from being immune to the required changes needed to 
calculate Hicksian income. 
In parallel, other accounting systems were also developed in Europe and in the 
United States. The methodology of the national accounts put forward by the United 
States, called the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPAs) and produced by the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), has given up measuring national total income. 
That is, it provides estimates for the monetary value of income and output per year. As 
this methodology is under the umbrella of the SNA, it is just limited to estimating NVA. 
In Europe, the first European System of Integrated Economic Accounts – also known as 
ESA – was implemented in the mid-1970s; while its integration process with the 
international proposals was accelerated at the end of the 1980s. The ESA-95 emerged in 
this context, so it is fully consistent with the 1993 SNA, especially as regards the 
accounting rules. In any case, it also took into consideration some of the specific 
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 It was created under the joint work of Eurostat, the United Nations, the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. 
Upon publication, a harmonization of the different existing accounting systems in the world took place. 
12
 In fact, economists have been expressing the need for official statistics to advance on a better 
measurement of Hicksian income (Campos, 2015). 
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characteristics of the European Union. It was later revised under the scope of the 2008 
SNA, giving rise to the ESA-2010. It presented relevant differences compared with the 
ESA-95, notably in relation to the conceptual framework (see, European Commission 
(2013) for a manual on the changes between ESA-95 and ESA-2010).  
 
2.1.2. ‘Satellite’ systems of accounts  
 
The strong dependence of certain developing countries on natural and energy resources, 
on the one hand, and the negative effects of environmental degradation, on the other 
hand, made it necessary to develop an international framework for the environment. The 
UN Statistical Office (UNSO) presented the framework for the development of 
environmental statistics in the 1980s. However, it was in the 1990s that the UNSD 
prepared the ground for the development of the upcoming Integrated Environmental and 
Economic Accounting (later SEEA), whose preliminary version was tested in Mexico 
and Papua New Guinea (Hamilton and Lutz, 1996). It was therefore a framework to 
compile economic statistics and environmental statistics. The SEEA was published in 
2003 as a system of ‘satellite accounts’ of the SNA. Following the guidelines laid down 
by the SNA though, the SEEA was considered to be more comprehensive due to the 
inclusion of households’ accounts and some natural resources such as mineral, energy 
or water. However, non-market inputs and outputs and the discovery of new resources 
remained unacknowledged (Nordhaus and Kokkelenberg, 1999), as commercial NVA 
was again the only concept measured by this system. Production in progress and natural 
growth of the year were also ignored. Only current production was calculated, 
irrespective of the renewable resources to which it is applied (Campos, 2015). In any 
case, much of the debate about extending market limits to incorporate other 
commodities was not wound up (Landerfeld and McCulla, 2000)
13
. With regard to 
environmental degradation, the SEEA 2003 did not make any clear recommendation. 
Indeed, it proposed various methods such as cost-based valuation and damage-based 
valuation methods (UN et al., 2003: 394-395).  
The UNSO led the development of the SEEA-Central Framework (SEEA-CF) (UN 
et al., 2009, 2014), which was published in 2014. It represents the current agreement 
between statistical offices for elaborating an international standard that can be 
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 The SNA and the SEEA only include direct use values for market goods and services. Direct use values 
for non-market amenities, indirect use values, option and passive use values are, by contrast, excluded. 
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successful in implementing accounts for marketed environmental assets. It has resulted 
in considerable advances towards linking physical environmental values to the 
economic production. Subsystems of the SEEA have been elaborated on specific 
resources (see, for example, SEEA-Water and SEEA-Energy).  
In the United States, the prototype satellite environmental account system - US 
Integrated Environmental and Economic Satellite Accounts (IEESA) - was drawn on the 
experience of the SEEA. It did not take into account the change in the value of 
environmental stocks, however. In Europe, the Methodology on the Economic Accounts 
for Agriculture and Forestry (EEA/EAF) (European Communities, 2000) was developed 
for measuring the NVA of the most characteristic elements from the European forests 
(Lange, 2004), whereas non-market values and the capital balance were excluded 
(Campos and Caparrós, 2006).  
 
2.1.2.1. Ecosystem accounting  
 
The limitations of the SEEA and the EEA/EAF in measuring the total income of an 
ecosystem have generated a controversial debate over the amendments being made to 
these frameworks to construct ecosystem accounts (Campos, 2015). On the one hand, 
the Statistical Office of the European Communities (EUROSTAT) began working on 
this issue, but it took a long time for the statistical office to publish the pilot study 
European Framework for Integrated Environmental and Economic Accounting for 
Forest (IEEAF) (Eurostat, 2002). Either way, experimental results of the IEEAF so far 
have not gone beyond the limits of the production function of the ESA-2010 and its 
satellite EEA/EAF; while it integrates variations in forest capital during the accounting 
period instead (Caparrós et al., 2003). 
On the other hand, the UNSD, in cooperation with the European Commission, the 
World Bank and the OECD, have recently complemented the SEEA-CF by integrating 
ecosystem accounting (i.e. the accounting for flows and stocks of environmental 
assets
14
), giving rise to the SEEA-EEA framework (UN et al., 2014). It is not yet 
                                                          
14
 “In the SEEA Central Framework environmental assets are measured from the perspective of 
‘individual’ environmental assets, such as timber resources, land, mineral and energy resources, and water 
resources”. “In contrast, the SEEA-EEA measures environmental assets from the perspective of the 
ecosystems…Ecosystem assets are thus environmental assets seen from a systems perspective” (European 
Commission et al., 2013: para. 1.19 and 1.20).  
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however an official standard. It relates ecosystems to economic activities in both 
physical and economic terms and covers some of the associated services classified by 
the report published by the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA) in 2005 
(Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005: 15), such as provisioning services, 
regulating services and cultural services
15
. Criticisms of the MA (2005) are often related 
to the methodological weaknesses in terms of double-counting (Boyd and Banzhaf, 
2007). One way of reducing the possibility of double-counting consists in better 
distinguishing between intermediate and final ecosystem services. Accordingly, 
progress is being made in the SEEA-EEA with a view to redefine this differentiation 
(Obst, 2015: 44-55). Likewise, although this system has its roots in conventional and 
‘satellite’ systems of accounts, it aims to shed light on the non-market activity related to 
ecosystems and to integrate this information with market related data (UN et al., 2013: 
1). It also attempts to make visible some market environmental services that are not 
recorded by current measurements of conventional national accounts (Campos, 2015) 
and to differentiate ecosystem services and assets in terms of the actors involved, 
namely public and private sectors (UN et al., 2013: 113)
16
. 
As mentioned above, the SNA does not provide an explicit accounting for 
environmental stocks. This gives an incomplete assessment of economic activity. By 
contrast, the SEEA-CF measures the stocks of environmental assets and changes in 
these stocks. In any case, ecosystem accounting described in the SEEA-EEA provides 
additional perspectives on this measurement, while principles of valuation are aligned 
between the two systems (we shall return to this issue later). For example, in the SEEA-
EEA, biodiversity is considered as a characteristic of ecosystems rather than as an 
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 MA (2005) also includes habitat/supporting services. However, the classification of ecosystem services 
of the MA (2005) has been recently revised. The European Environment agency proposed the Common 
International Classification of Ecosystem Services (CICES) (Haines-Young and Potschin, 2013). This 
classification integrates supporting services into regulating services precisely to avoid double-counting.  
16
 The project Compiling and Refining Environmental and Economic Accounts (CREEA) is intended to 
compile and refine environmental and economic accounts for water, waste and forest sectors within the 
limits of the SEEA-CF, while it does not advance in methodologies to integrate the monetary valuation of 
non-market ecosystem goods and services. It also works on issues related to climate change, emission 
allowances and land use changes. An interesting part of this project is that two databases, EXIOPOL and 
FORWAST, have been set up. The former is probably the most extensive economic-environmental 
database at global level. It follows the principles of the SNA and the SEEA. The latter provides physical 
waste and material accounts for the European Union countries (http://forwast.brgm.fr/ 02/11/2016). 
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ecosystem service, so falling biodiversity corresponds to declining ecosystem condition 
(UN et al., 2013: 48).  
 
2.1.3.  Valuation rules and principles in conventional and ‘satellite’ accounts 
 
Regardless of the accounting framework used, there is a growing recognition of the 
utmost importance of economic valuation of environmental assets. Policy makers and 
international institutions require more data to draw up strategies, programs and policies 
oriented toward protecting the environment and mitigating the environmental 
degradation process (see, e.g. The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB) 
and Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) 
initiatives). Thus, for accounts compiled in accordance with the SNA and the SEEA-CF 
the question of valuation in monetary terms is central.  
The SEEA-CF recommends that exchange values be used
17 
whenever market prices 
are observable (UN et al., 2014). In cases where this does not occur (for example, for 
goods that are recollected free and without paying a price such as mushrooms), the use 
of market price equivalents (i.e. the use of prices for similar markets) is proposed as the 
first criterion. It is considered that they provide an approximation to market prices (UN, 
2008: 51; UN et al., 2014: 33). But some goods and services have neither market prices 
nor similar markets. Thus, the fact of giving a monetary value to them is a challenging 
task. The first solution that immediately comes to mind is to use the consumer surplus 
calculated with non-market valuation techniques (Bateman et al., 2002, 2013). 
However, the central normative national accounts framework excludes welfare 
measures for both market and non-market goods and services
18
. As pointed out by 
United Nations et al. (2003: 407), "one problem with the use of contingent valuation to 
value environmental damage is that it gives an average willingness to pay figure which 
includes an element of consumer surplus of indeterminate amount. This poses a problem 
when using contingent valuation in the accounting context, since the national accounts 
exclude consumer surplus". As for theoretical studies, they state that using consumer 
surplus for measuring non-market amenities is correct as long as one also includes it for 
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 Hultkrantz (1992) and Kriström and Skånberg (2001) apply this valuation principle for non-timber 
products and lichens, respectively, in Sweden, and so do Campos and Caparrós (2006) for hunting, 
grazing resources and mushroom gathering. 
18
 Nonetheless, there is no consensus about how exchange values should be obtained for them.  
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market goods and services. It is just that most theoretical papers take it out for market 
goods and services. 
With regard to environmental assets
19
, the use of market price observations, or, 
alternatively, the use of information from similar assets would be, ideally, the best 
options. But considering that many of them are not traded in the marketplace, 
difficulties when applying the market price principle appear. This is, for example, the 
case of mineral and energy resources, natural aquatic resources and natural timber 
resources (UN et al., 2014: 33). That is why accounting frameworks propose two 
approaches: (i) written-down replacement costs, and (ii) Net Present Value (NPV). The 
former entails that the value of the asset will decline over time, as the acquisition price 
is reduced by the consumption of fixed capital over the assets life (UN. et al., 2014, 
151). The second approach calculates the discounted present value of expected future 
returns (UN, 1993; UN et al., 2013, 2014)
20
. As the SEEA defines returns using the 
concept of economic rent
21
, it may also be understood as the net present value of the 
economic rent to be generated for each of the future years. One needs first to estimate 
the current level of the resource rent, and then to make projections into the future. 
Future rents must finally be discounted to a current value (UN et al., 2003: 317). The 
NPV framework is also used for deriving valuations of flow measures of depletion, 
income and revaluation (UN et al., 2014: 219) and for investment decision-making. In 
the third chapter of this dissertation we will deal with this issue more extensively.  
Beyond these accounting systems, yet related, there is also a line of research that 
seeks to estimate the real contribution of the forestry sector to the income generated by 
a country in an applied framework (Repetto et al. (1989) pioneered this approach for 
Indonesia's forests). Unfortunately, some studies have limited themselves to measuring 
total economic values, which include consumer surplus. In other words, they add 
exchange values for market goods and services and consumer surplus for non-market 
goods and services (the most well-known of these applications can probably be found in 
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 The same explanation applies to the stock of ecosystems – ecosystem assets –. 
20
 It is in fact a dynamic CBA. It can either be done in terms of consumer surplus, and this is what most 
studies do, or in terms of market prices, as we do. In all cases, discounting the two measures is correct.  
21
 It is defined as "the surplus value accruing to the extractor or user of an asset calculated after all costs 
and normal returns have been taken into account" (UN et al., 2014: 140). 
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Costanza et al. (1997)
22
). Thus, income is not estimated in a consistent manner with the 
criterion using exchange values (Fisher et al., 2008). Only a few papers have been 
following this practice (Caparrós et al., 2003, 2015; Campos and Caparrós, 2006; Obst 
et al., 2013
23
; Edens and Hein, 2013; Remme et al., 2015). 
 
2.1.4.  The Agroforestry Accounting System  
 
The Agroforestry Accounting System (AAS) developed by the Group of Environmental 
Economics of the Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas is a methodological 
proposal for ecosystem accounting as an alternative to the SEEA-EEA. Unlike the 
accounting systems explained above, in this case the measurement of the total income 
of an agroforestry system complies with the concept of Hicksian income. Total income 
incorporates economic products and costs by activities and unique products (this system 
also differentiates between private and social
24
 income and measures incomes omitted 
by the EEA/EAF). Goods and services lacking both observable market prices and prices 
for similar markets are empirically simulated by using the SEV method to which we 
shall return later. The estimation of total income requires the compliance of the double-
entry bookkeeping principle and the integration of the change in capital value at the end 
of the year. This permits estimating total income as net value added plus capital gains of 
the current year (Campos, 2015).  
The fact that the AAS aggregates (simulated) exchange values for non-market 
amenities and exchange values for market goods and services and extends conventional 
and ‘satellite’ systems of accounts to the valuation of capital gains makes it a possible 
alternative to the SEEA-EEA. Extending the concept of production beyond market 
commodities by using (simulated) market prices follows the criterion proposed by the 
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This study first estimates the value of global ecosystems by including consumer surplus and then 
compares it with GNP at market prices.   
23
 More recently, Obst et al. also argue in favor of exchange values: “Despite their common motivations, 
the approaches of Bateman et al. and the SEEA differ in the ways that they assign value to ecosystem 
services. Bateman et al. ground their analysis in welfare changes as a consequence of specific policy 
scenarios. The SEEA approach aims to record the “output” generated by ecosystems, given current uses 
of ecosystem capital; thus, monetary values represent exchange values consistent with the principles of 
national accounting” (Obst et al., 2013: 420).  Bateman et al. is referred to Bateman et al. (2013). 
24
 Net transfers (i.e. subsidies minus taxes on product) and new discoveries during the accounting period 
are not included. 
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international normative frameworks and guarantees the consistency when aggregating 
public and private incomes. 
Furthermore, although the AAS is a system of microeconomic accounts applied in 
multiple-use forests (Caparrós et al., 2003; Campos and Caparrós, 2006; Campos et al., 
2008; Campos, 2010; Oviedo et al., 2013), it can also be used as a whole-farm 
approach. The project Renta y Capital de los Montes de Andalucía (RECAMAN) has 
implemented this accounting system and estimated the geo-referenced values for a 
whole Spanish region, Andalucía (Caparrós et al., 2016). 
 
2.1.5. Global, regional and national research projects 
 
In this context, several research projects have been launched over the last years with the 
goal of estimating the value of one or various ecosystem goods and services in some 
parts of the world. The study of these projects is relevant, as it permits analyzing what is 
being done in applied research. Most of these studies follow a multidisciplinary 
approach and are not intended to draw up economic accounts for environmental assets. 
Their main interest lies in the empirical estimation of the variation of consumer 
surpluses derived from comparisons of simulated management scenarios. These studies 
therefore perform a CBA of large-scale assessments. The project RECAMAN is a 
remarkable exception (we shall return to that later). As explained in section 2.1.3, 
conventional and ‘satellite’ systems of account are very clear in rejecting the use of 
consumer surplus for measuring goods and services with neither market prices nor 
market price equivalents. Still, the explanation of these projects helps strengthen the 
understanding of what this dissertation proposes and conducts to estimate the value of 
ecosystem services in a consistent way with the principles of accounting systems.  
In 2007, G8+5 Environment Ministers proposed a global initiative to analyze the 
value of biodiversity loss, ecosystem degradation, economic benefits of biological 
diversity and cost of conservation in such a way that informed decisions can be taken at 
all levels. The results of this study led to the initiative The Economics of Ecosystems 
and Biodiversity (TEEB). It is inspired by the Stern Review on the Economics of 
Climate Change and the proposals of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) (Ring et al., 2010). Some countries and international institutions, including the 
European Commission and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), set in 
motion this initiative and put into practice political actions to move forward on the 
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evaluation of future economic consequences of biodiversity loss. Although there is no a 
specific methodological proposal in relation to ecosystem accounts, its view on the 
valuation of ecosystem services is in favor of applying the TEV approach. It also 
recognizes the importance of non-market ecosystem services when designing public 
environmental policies (Campos, 2015). Study reports were accomplished in 2010, 
allowing several countries to join the initiative and to seek assistance to gather 
information to improve their own national systems (www.teebweb.org 02/11/2016).   
In the same vein, the European Environment Agency has also been effective in 
developing TEEB by proposing the aforementioned CICES. Indeed, the European 
project EURECA was promoted by this very same institution in 2008 and oriented 
towards evaluating European ecosystems. It is one of the evaluations under the follow-
on program of MA (2005) and was designed, in part, to bring together all national 
projects. Among them are differences over whether to use economic valuation for the 
development of ecosystem accounts (Campos, 2015).  
One of the projects in favor of estimating economic values for non-market goods 
and services is UK National Ecosystem Assessment (UK NEA). It is financed by the 
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs of the United Kingdom and other 
institutions involving experts on natural, economic and social sciences. Although it is a 
successor to the MA (2005), it brings some conceptual and scientific advances. 
However, the main objective is to analyze and quantify the status of ecosystem 
processes and the services they provide across the United Kingdom (Bateman et al., 
2011). It is, thus, more focused on non-market valuation, rather than on environmental 
accounting itself. Even so, it deserves to be mentioned, as in chapters four and five of 
this dissertation we also focus on issues related to non-market valuation techniques, 
while in a different sense. Going into more detail, this project promotes the valuation of 
ecosystem services from a welfare perspective derived from the modeling of simulated 
scenarios of future management of ecosystems (Bateman et al., 2011). Simulations from 
the present until 2060 to better understand the consequences of alternative land-use 
features are carried out (Bateman et al., 2013).  
Renta y Capital de los Montes de Andalucía (RECAMAN) is one of the most 
ambitious projects ever to be undertaken in the field of environmental accounting. 
Unlike other research efforts, RECAMAN has been done within an accounting 
framework, rather than within CBA. The AAS methodology has been applied in order 
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to measure total Hicksian income in multiple-use forests of this southern Spanish 
region. Goods and services for which income is calculated are: timber, cork, firewood, 
forest dried fruits, grazed fodder, conservation forestry, government forestry, forestry, 
game, residential services, private amenities, public recreation, mushrooms, carbon, 
landscape, biodiversity and forest water. This methodology has also been applied to a 
group of 58 estates with various cases-types of forest vegetation in an experimental pilot 
scheme. 33 of them are private estate; whereas 25 are public (Ovando et al., 2015). 
They have been later geo-referenced at regional scale, where the results for each main 
forest species present in Andalucía are presented. The aggregation by vegetation 
formations is also analyzed (Caparrós et al., 2016). The application of the AAS at 
regional scale may encourage the governments of the European Union to implement 
ecosystem accounting in the national accounts by 2020.  
In parallel with the above, albeit from the SEEA perspective, the World Bank 
project launched in 2010 the project Wealth Accounting and the Valuation of Ecosystem 
Services (WAVES). Taking the SEEA-CF as the conceptual basis, it seeks to develop a 
methodology to estimate total income and total capital of ecosystems, including some 
non-market goods and services and more inputs than those currently covered (WAVES, 
2013). Various pilot applications are being put in place in eight countries: Botswana, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Indonesia, Madagascar, the Philippines and Rwanda 
(www.wavespartnership.org 02/11/2016). The Technical Experts Committee is made up 
of experts from different countries and institutions. This project also works closely with 
the UNSD to develop a tool to help guide countries apply the SEEA at national level.  
 
2.2.  Non-market valuation techniques 
 
At this point, it is important to address the issue of non-market valuation methods, as 
most applied studies on non-market ecosystem services use them to calculate their 
economic value. We have just seen that these techniques have also been the line of work 
followed by research projects such as the UK NEA. In chapters four and five, we also 
deal with these techniques, although from a different perspective to that used in most of 
these studies. While non-market valuation techniques are generally required for use in 
CBA, in these two chapters they are utilized to obtain the (simulated) exchange value of 
public forest recreation and biodiversity conservation in Spain.  
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As explained in the introductory part, the main purpose of CBA is to estimate the 
costs and benefits that individuals may experience resulting from a change (positive or 
negative) in an ecosystem good or service. The basic concepts that are used to measure 
such costs and benefits are WTP and WTA. Non-market valuation techniques calculate 
these two economic values, thereby deriving consumer surplus or Hicksian variation 
measures. Aggregating individuals’ preferences gives the welfare value that the whole 
society attaches to the change in the ecosystem good or service under consideration.  
Preferences can be valued as a result of non-market behavior (actual or intended) 
according to their own characteristics. Revealed preferences (RP) techniques analyze 
actual behavior; while stated preference (SP) techniques assess intended behavior by 
constructing hypothetical markets that elicit individual preferences for a change in the 
provision of a good or service (Atkinson, 2010). Given that the fourth and fifth chapters 
of this dissertation deal with SP techniques, we will focus on these techniques. 
SP methods have received growing attention over the last decades owing to its 
flexibility and ability to estimate passive use values (Atkinson and Mourato, 2008; 
Hoyos et al., 2012). The economic value of non-market ecosystem services is obtained 
by asking people directly, via questionnaires, how much they are willing to pay to 
change the condition of the good or service in question or to preserve it, rather than by 
looking at its influence on actual markets for some other goods or services (Bateman et 
al., 2002)
 25
. Hypothetical markets are used to analyze intended behavior, thus allowing 
ex-ante judgments to be made (Mitchell and Carson, 1989: 89). Applying SP techniques 
therefore involve taking into account behavioral patterns, as well as the heterogeneity of 
preferences within or between individuals (Farizo et al., 2014a, 2016)
 26
. Out of these 
techniques, contingent valuation and choice modeling are the most important. Both 
methods share the theoretical framework in the random utility approach developed by 
McFadden in 1974 (Hanley et al., 2007: 341).  
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 Respondents may also be asked for the WTA for a loss, but this format is not very often in SP studies 
(Mitchell and Carson, 1989: 2).  
26
 Traditionally, heterogeneity has been included through variables reflecting individual characteristics 
such as education, gender, age or income, so the effect of these variables on individuals’ utility and WTP 
can be explored. Attitudinal and behavioral factors, as well as the influence of the socio-cultural and 
regional context in which individuals live, have often been disregarded. However, their inclusion in SP 
methods has been increasing over the last years (Boxall and Adamowicz, 2002; Johnston, 2007; Soliño et 
al., 2009; Farizo et al., 2014a,b, 2016; Hoyos et al., 2015).  
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Contingent valuation has been extensively applied over the last decades and a large 
body of empirical and methodological research has developed (Nyborg, 1996; Hanley et 
al., 2007). Using an appropriately designed questionnaire
27
, the hypothetical market is 
described. There are several variants in the formulation of the question aimed at 
obtaining a price for the good or service (Riera, 1994). Questionnaire usually starts 
asking whether he/she is willing to pay a certain amount of money. If so, question may 
be repeated increasing the amount. If not, a lower amount is offered (Hanemann and 
Kannninen, 1999). Finally, it is often asked what the maximum price that he/she would 
be willing to pay would be, considering previous responses. Questionnaire survey may 
therefore be conducted using closed-ended formats and open-ended formats. The main 
difference between the situation faced by the respondent in a contingent valuation 
scenario or in a real market is that in the former case the market is hypothetical so that 
he/she does not have to pay the stated price (see, Mitchell and Carson (1989); Hausman 
(1993); Bjornstad and Kahn (1996); Bateman et al. (2002); Champ et al. (2002); 
Alberini and Kahn (2006) for a thorough review). In the fifth chapter we conduct a 
contingent valuation study to calculate the demand function for a conservation program 
to protect the Iberian Lynx in Spain. 
Choice modeling (Louviere and Hensher, 1982; Louviere and Woodworth, 1983; 
Louviere et al., 2000) offers respondents to choose among different alternatives 
described by a set of attributes, including a payment vehicle, such as a fee, a 
contribution to a fund or a tax increase, that they would have to pay. As respondents 
may evaluate attributes separately, choice modeling is more appropriate for valuing 
specific attributes (Hanley et al., 1998a,b; Morrison et al., 2002); while contingent 
valuation is better suited to analyze the general result of a change in the non-market 
ecosystem service (Baker and Ruting, 2014). Choice modeling uses a range of formats, 
including rating, ranking
28
 and choice. The last two formats (although ranking in a 
lesser degree) tend to be preferred, as they are more readily interpreted in terms of 
random utility (Roe et al., 1996). In choice experiments respondents are requested to 
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 The theoretical proposal of using a survey method was first introduced by Ciriacy-Wantrup in 1951. It 
was not, however, until 1963 when R. David empirically implemented the contingent valuation method 
for the first time.  
28
 They are also known as contingent rankings (Laureu and Rae, 1989; Hanley et al., 2001; Foster and 
Mourato, 2000; 2002; Bateman et al., 2006; Varela et al., 2013).  
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choose one alternative out of a set
29
; while in rankings they are requested to rank the 
options offered (see, Hoyos (2012)). Choice experiments are increasingly used in 
research, as they estimate the value of non-market goods and services by making 
separate assessment of the respondents’ preferences for the attributes of the good or 
service. In the fourth chapter, we use a choice experiment to estimate the demand 
function for public recreation in stone pine and cork oak forests in Spain.    
For many years, contingent valuation was not very popular amongst researchers, 
following the publication of a critical paper by Samuelson in 1954. Being public goods, 
individuals who do not pay anything cannot be excluded from consuming them. Thus, 
respondents may provide a strategic response by indicating a different price than the one 
they are actually willing to pay. This strategic bias may be associated with a free-rider 
problem that led Samuelson to discourage this method (Riera, 1994; Jakobsson and 
Dragun, 1996: 83; Champ, 2002; Carson and Hanemann, 2005; Carson, 2012).  
In the same vein, the validity of the contingent valuation method (and of stated 
preference techniques in general) has also often been called into question (Hausman, 
2012) due to their hypothetical nature which makes difficult to discern if stated choices 
would be actual choices in real markets. As far as back as the 1970s, relevant 
improvements were made to the reliability of the method (Bohm, 1972; Randall et al., 
1974; Brookshire et al., 1976; Rowe et al., 1980; Schulze et al., 1981). These advances 
boosted the popularity of contingent valuation. But it was in the 80’s when this 
technique gained ground thanks to the works of Cummings et al. (1986) and Mitchell 
and Carson (1989). Both studies brought together practitioners, economists and 
psychologists with the goal of placing this technique in a broader and more 
multidisciplinary context than that of environmental economics (Hanemann, 1994; 
Riera, 1994). In 1989 the Exxon Valdez oil spill occurred. Government agencies 
realized that the compensation of damaged included passive use values. In fact, one 
clear advantage of this method, and of SP techniques in general, is that, unlike RP 
techniques, they can be used to estimate passive use values, which are likely to be 
important when it comes to non-market ecosystem services such as biodiversity 
conservation. In order to evaluate economically the damaged caused by the oil spill, 
contingent valuation method was therefore proposed. While objections were raised, the 
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 Accordingly, contingent valuation can be seen as a subtype within choice modeling.  
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NOAA panel’s report (1993) rejected the criticisms expressed and ruled in favor of the 
use of this method. Since then, contingent valuation, but also choice modeling, has 
become increasingly widespread amongst researchers.  
Concerning the aspect of the hypothetical nature of these techniques, there is a one 
way to validate them. It consists in testing their internal consistency by targeting the key 
elements in the valuation scenarios that guarantee a realistic market simulation. This 
means testing for construct validity, which includes theoretical and convergent validity 
(Whitehead et al., 1995; Whitehead et al., 1998). Theoretical validity (also termed 
internal validity) refers to extent to which the findings of the study are consistent with 
theoretical predictions and a priori expectations (Schläpfer, 2008)
30
; while convergent 
validity assesses whether two measures of WTP obtained using different methods or 
choice techniques are correlated and therefore converge to similar estimates (Diamond 
and Hausman, 1993).   
 
2.3. The Simulated Exchange Value method 
 
The SEV method estimates exchange values for ecosystem goods and services that are 
currently outside the market, i.e. for which there are neither market prices nor similar 
markets. This estimation helps ensure consistency with market based figures considered 
in the national accounts.  
As explained above, normative frameworks recommend that exchange values be 
used as long as market prices are observable in the marketplace. Hence the SEV method 
proposes to simulate, in a partial equilibrium model, the (simulated) market price that 
one could get if non-market ecosystem services, such as public forest (free access) 
recreation, were internalized (Caparrós et al., 2003, 2015). This differs from CBA 
which uses different Hicksian variations, namely welfare measures for non-market 
ecosystem services (Bateman et al., 2003).  
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 One way of testing it is to analyze the determinants of WTP (Mitchell and Carson, 1989: 206) such as 
income (e.g. the higher the income, the greater the probability of paying). Interesting papers analyzing 
internal validity of choice experiments can be found in Soliño et al. (2012, 2016). The former is aimed at 
estimating consumers’ preferences for a policy of replacing conventional electricity sources with 
electricity generated by forest biomass, while the latter analyzes the preferences of Andalusian hunters for 
different driven hunts.  
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The SEV method simulates the whole market (demand, offer and competitive 
environment). The only way of internalizing consumer surplus in a market is to assume 
that each individual would pay their maximum WTP, namely a differentiated price to 
each individual. As his assumption is far-fetched, the premise of the SEV method is that 
there would be a single price for the provision of the service with the goal of 
maximizing profits. To get this price, this method uses a demand function (a WTP 
function) estimated with one of the non-market valuation techniques previously 
explained, and a supply function based on the commercial costs associated with the 
provision of the service. Demand functions can be simulated using the travel cost 
method, thus obtaining the marshallian demand function, or alternatively using SP 
methods. In the latter case the Hicksian demand function is obtained, so the marshallian 
demand can be calculated under the assumption that the wealth effect is of small 
significance.  
Having discussed the procedure to determine the price, the next issue consists in 
estimating the number of units consumed at that price. The common procedure followed 
by studies estimating ecosystem values based on prices for similar markets involves 
multiplying the price by all the units consumed outside the market (see, e.g.  Hultkrantz 
(1992); Kriström and Skånberg (2001)). This is the proposal of the SNA. According to 
this approach, setting a price would not result in a drop in the number of units 
consumed, which does not make sense. However, from the demand functions we know 
that when a price is set, only part of the population would pay that price in the case that 
the non-market services were internalized. For example, if a price is equal to the 
estimated value of the median of the WTP of a sample of visitors to a forest area, only 
50% of them would be willing to pay this price (Caparrós et al., 2003). The applied 
studies conducted in the fourth and fifth chapters of this dissertation show that this 
percentage is not exactly 50 per cent, but close to it. As we will see, under the SEV 
scenario, revenue function is defined as the (simulated) price multiplied by the number 
of individuals that would consume the service (in the case of public forest recreation, 
we would refer to the number of visitors) in the hypothetical market. That is, the SEV 
method only considers the number of individuals that would accept a payment. 
Advantages of this method include the possibility of making international 
comparisons. While some countries, such as Spain, do not usually charge any price for 
forest recreation, other countries do so. However, it suffers from the problem associated 
Chapter 2. A review of the literature on national and ecosystem accounting  
33 
with all the extensions of the national accounts based on simulations (Caparrós et al., 
2015). Actually, the use of the SEV is an interesting proposal that may be considered an 
important improvement compared with omitting values for non-market ecosystem 
services or with estimating welfare measures within a CBA analysis. This means that 
associating environmental accounting with the calculation of the TEV is not correct in 
that it supposes the estimation of consumer surplus or any other Hicksian variation. By 
contrast, the huge advantage of the SEV method is that it permits linking environmental 
accounting and green accounting in the same light. This method is therefore the 
backbone of the dissertation, as will become apparent in subsequent chapters.  
 
2.4. Green accounting  
 
This section approaches the incorporation of natural resources into the economic 
analysis from the perspective of national income accounting. Consistent with this, the 
issue analyzed is whether NNP is the appropriate indicator of economic performance 
and social welfare. This in turn raises the question of whether NNP growth entails a 
welfare improvement over time. It is not less important to look at whether answers to 
these questions remain valid when it comes to GNNP. Although natural resources had 
generally been excluded from the standard neoclassical growth model (Nordhaus and 
Tobin, 1972), there has been a commitment to greening national accounting since the 
beginning of the 1990s. Interest in the relationship between income, wealth and social 
well-being has indeed emerged in recent decades due to the growing concern about the 
long-term negative consequences of environmental degradation and natural resource 
depletion (Ferreira and Vincent, 2005).  
The main challenge facing green national accounting is, therefore, how to make it 
more comprehensive so that depletion of natural resources (Pemberton and Ulph, 2001) 
and goods and services with and without market prices may effectively be assessed. 
However, ‘greening’ national accounting is by no means straightforward, as it involves 
regarding different perspectives and purposes.  
In this section, we critically analyze the progress made in this field over the past 
decades. We start from the welfare interpretation of NNP given by Weitzman in his 
seminal 1976 paper. This requires considering some of the underlying assumptions on 
what this statement is based. Weitzman's model has been extended to cover natural 
resources (green national accounting), especially exhaustible and renewable resources. 
Chapter 2. A review of the literature on national and ecosystem accounting  
34 
As this dissertation focuses on forests, most of this section is dedicated to analyze and 
explain theoretical frameworks on forests. This will help follow the steps given in the 
model set out in the third chapter.  
 
2.4.1. National Income, Net National Product and Social Welfare 
 
Drawing on the definitions of income proposed by Hicks and Fisher and already 
analyzed in the introductory chapter, national accounting is mainly targeted to 
answering whether a country will be as well off in the future as in the present. Although 
apparently general, this question is neither simple nor a foregone conclusion. It includes 
not only measuring current and future welfare, but also knowing whether the actual 
development is sustainable. This also leads to the question of which measures may be 
used in order to achieve these purposes.  
Measuring social welfare involves measuring individuals’ utility, which is a 
function of consumption. As utility cannot be directly observed and it is just a 
theoretical construct without objective measurement unit (Li and Löfgren, 2002), a 
measurable indicator of social welfare is needed. The standard measure of current 
welfare in the national accounts is the aggregate market value of consumption. 
However, one also needs another summary consumption-based measure of future 
welfare (Vincent, 2000) in order to allow for a direct comparison. The question has 
arisen as to whether NNP may be interpreted as the suitable indicator in this respect. 
This has resulted in an intense debate over the last decades. Contrary to the idea 
supported by earlier economists including Fisher, Samuelson (1961) argues that current 
national income concepts must be rejected if a welfare concept is to be searched for and 
proposes to use wealth-like magnitudes
31
, such as the present discounted value of future 
consumption. Formally, one may construct what is known as ‘wealth-equivalent 
income’ (or Hicksian income): the consumption that if held constant will yields the 
same wealth – or, alternatively, the same discounted sum of consumption – as wealth-
maximizing path (Asheim, 2000). 
Instead, Weitzman (1976) demonstrates that, under certain special assumptions, 
conventionally defined NNP includes not only current consumption, but also the present 
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 “The only valid approximation to a measure of welfare comes from computing wealth-like magnitudes, 
not income magnitudes of the Haig, Fisher or any other type” (Samuelson, 1961: 57). 
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discounted value of future consumption
32
, thus bridging the gap between Samuelson’s 
statement and current income measures. These assumptions are: a single consumption 
good, linear utility, stationary technology (i.e. technology is independent of time), and 
constant interest rate (or utility discount rate). In the optimal control model developed in 
the third chapter of this dissertation we also take into account these assumptions.  
On this basis, the initial question may now be worded as follows: is the economy 
able to keep consumption constant over time such that future generations may have the 
possibility of consuming at the same level as current generations?  
Weitzman (1976) is inclined to answer the question in the affirmative. Let us see 
the argument: Imagine that economy consists of a single consumption good and n 
capital goods (including pools of exhaustible resources). Consumption level at time t is 
denoted ( )tC , the stock of capital is ( )tK  and net investment flow is ( ) ( ) dttdKti = . 
However, as consumption is the ultimate end of economic activity, investment is an 
intermediate good whose final products are the consumptions of different years.  
The aim of the Social Planner is to maximize households’ utility (social welfare) 
 
  dtetC rt


0
max                                                [2.1]  
subject to the resource constraint of the economy and an initial condition for the capital 
stock: 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )tKΦtitC ∈,            [2.2] 
( )
0
=0 KK             [2.3] 
where ( )KΦ  is the production possibilities set.  
The necessary conditions for any solution of this problem are: 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )t
dt
dK
tptCtptKY ii
*
** +=,           [2.4] 
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 “It is not really a question of choosing between a conventional but inappropriate current income 
concept and an impractical but correct wealth-like magnitude, because in principle they are merely 
different sides of the same coin […] the welfare justification of net national product is just the idea that in 
theory it is a proxy for the present discounted value of future consumption” (Weitzman, 1976: 156). 
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     t
dt
dp
trpt
dK
dY i
i
i

*
               .,...,1= ni         [2.5] 
where [2.4] represents NNP (with consumption as numeraire) along the competitive 
trajectory. From this equation is also derived that relative prices equal marginal rate of 
transformation. Equation [2.5] is the intertemporal efficiency condition of a competitive 
capital market, being ip  the cost of buying an extra unit of capital good i (see footnote 
5 in Weitzman (1976) for a further explanation) and r the rate of return.  
In order to be able to provide a welfare interpretation of NNP, understanding this to 
be the largest permanently maintainable value of consumption, investment goods must 
be weighted with prices measuring marginal rate of transformation, as in equation [2.4]. 
The main advantage is that, if all investment may effectively be convertible into 
consumption at the given price-transformation rate, NNP as currently defined in [2.4] 
may be expressed as “the maximum attainable level of consumption that could be 
maintained forever without running down capital stock” (Weitzman, 1976: 159). That 
is, NNP would be equivalent to what is known as ‘welfare-equivalent income’: the 
consumption that if held constant will yield the same welfare – i.e. the same discounted 
sum of utility – as the welfare-maximizing path (Asheim, 2000; Vincent, 2000).  
However, considering that marginal transformation rates cannot be generally used 
to transform investment goods into consumption, the consumption level in [2.4] is not 
attainable at time t 
33
. In other words, it is based on a hypothetical consumption path.  
Hence, if one wants to estimate the maximum welfare actually attainable, it is required 
to measure what is known as sustainable income
34
: the maximum sustainable 
consumption – i.e. the maximum consumption that can actually be sustained over time – 
(Cairns, 2000; Pezzey and Toman, 2002). Weitzman (1976) demonstrates that: 
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 The first definition of stationary welfare equivalence as the hypothetical constant utility level that 
would yield exactly the same welfare as the welfare-maximizing path can be found in Weitzman (1970). 
34 Sustainable income is related to the term sustainable development. While sustainability (Pezzey, 1989, 
1992; Hanley, 2000; Hamilton, 2000) has been the center of many debates among environmental 
economists, this concept was not defined until 1987 when the report "Our Common Future" was made 
public. It follows that if current consumption exceeds sustainable income, sustainability is not achieved, 
as consumption would need to be lower in the future than at the present time (Vincent, 2000). Thus, 
sustainability will only be secured if ( ) 0≥sU  for all ts ≥  (Pezzey, 1997; Asheim, 2000).  
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           dset
dt
dK
tptCdsesC tsr
t
i
tsr
t




 






*
**        [2.6] 
where sustainable income (the R.H.S.) is equivalent as the maximum welfare actually 
attainable (the L.H.S), which, in turn, is the same as what would be obtained from the 
hypothetical constant consumption level.  
Weitzman’s result therefore confirms the definition of NNP as the stationary 
equivalent of future consumption. This provides a measure of social welfare and gives 
economic form to the concept of sustainability. Moreover, as utility function is assumed 
to be linear – i.e.     tCtCU  –, current utility equals the market value of 
consumption, so wealth-equivalent income and NNP are equivalent to each other and 
with welfare-equivalent income, thereby reconciling Fisher-Lindahl-Hicks' view with 
optimal growth theory (Aronsson and Löfgren, 1998a; Asheim and Buchholz, 2004; 
Asheim, 2007).  
In addition to the foregoing, the most striking result derived from the seminal paper 
by Weitzman is that the Hamiltonian for a general optimization problem of the form 
[2.1] – [2.3] can be interpreted, under the above-mentioned assumptions, as being 
equivalent to the NNP measured by the national accounts (see, Asheim (2003) for a 
taxonomy of different results, and the related assumptions). The Hamiltonian is a 
function that summarizes the objective function and the constraints of an intertemporal 
optimization problem by using only values at the current instant (the current year in the 
case of NNP). It suffices for it to be maximized in order to achieve the optimal path. All 
the same, as explained, these results can only be achieved due to the assumptions made. 
As we will see in the final part of the chapter, a strand of literature exploring with a 
critical view some of these assumptions has been developed. 
The basic result by Weitzman (1976) has been later extended, but it has shown that 
it continues to be valid, provided that the assumptions made are met. The most 
advanced model so far can be found in Sefton and Weale (2006). After taking into 
account the criticisms of the Weitzman’s work over the last decades, they obtain similar 
results. They analyze real NNP as a measure of social welfare from a decentralized 
economy, defining NNP in terms of consumption from the production side and relating 
net savings (real income minus consumption) to the rate of change of households’ well-
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being from the consumption side
35
. NNP is thus equivalent to the Hamiltonian and to 
the national income, the latter being understood as wealth (return of capital) (Cairns, 
2008). Yet this is only true in case of non-convexities (Cairns, 2003). On this basis, 
Asheim and Wei (2009) develop the results achieved by Sefton and Weale (2006) for 
the case when the interest is on sectorial incomes.  
Still, on the basis of this approach, national accounting has been expanding the 
concept of NNP to include the value of environment in terms of welfare (Cairns, 2002). 
Many efforts have been made since the beginning of the 1990s to incorporate 
exhaustible resources, renewable resources and the negative effects of pollution. 
Logically, as the title indicates and in order to remain consistent with the main objective 
of the dissertation, we will devote most of this section to explaining theoretical models 
focused on goods and services provided by forests.   
 
2.4.2. Exhaustible resources 
 
The consumption of a resource unit involves its complete destruction and its 
regeneration requires a very long period of time. Exhaustible resources are used up in 
the production process and their growth rates are zero (Dasgupta and Heal, 1979: 153), 
so the intertemporal sum of the services they provide is limited. 
Hotelling (1931) did open up the way for a new literature by turning his attention to 
the appropriate time of extraction and the rate at which resource deposits should be 
extracted (Turner et al., 1994). Hotelling's rule states that the present value of a 
homogeneous exhaustible resource should be identical regardless of its extraction time. 
It turns out that the price of these resources should grow at a rate equal to the interest 
rate in an efficient and competitive economy. The same conclusion is shared by Stiglitz 
(1976) in the case of infinite time horizon and absence of extraction costs
36
.  
                                                          
35
 The relation between real savings and the change in social welfare is grounded in the Hartwick rule: 
consumption will be constant over time if the value of net investment is zero (Hartwick, 1977). This is 
equivalent to making the present value of future changes consumption zero.  
36
 Romero (2012) derives an interesting theoretical framework in which the maximization of the NPV 
associated with the exploitation of a given resource is given by the sum of the present value of the amount 
of resource extracted, the present value of the accumulated flow of possible non-market services provided 
by the resource across its planning horizon and the present value of the accumulated flow of possible land 
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The Dasgupta-Heal-Solow-Stiglitz (DHSS) model (Solow, 1974; Dasgupta and 
Heal, 1974; Stiglitz, 1974) assumes that the stock of exhaustible resources is an input of 
production that can either be consumed or used for net investment in man-made capital 
(Benchekroun and Withagen, 2011). It helps analyze whether accumulation in 
augmentable capital may compensate their depletion (Mitra et al., 2012). This is the 
same to the Hartwick rule:  if society invests rents from exhaustible resources and 
profits from instruments of wealth in reproducible capital, consumption and output will 
remain constant (Hartwick, 1977; Hanley et al., 2014). This means that a specific 
investment policy should be designed in order to achieve a constant consumption path.  
From a green accounting point of view, and on the basis of the Weitzman’s (1976) 
approach, Solow (1986) inquires about the intertemporal allocation of non-renewable 
resources and gives a growth-theoretic interpretation of the Hatwick rule
37
. On the one 
hand, the conventional Ramsey optimal growth and capital accumulation model takes a 
utilitarian approach. It assumes that the sum of instantaneous utilities of consumption 
over time represents a measure of social welfare and that each generation’s utility only 
depends on its own consumption. Thus, it is possible to bring about equity between 
generations by adding the utility level of different generations
38
. On the other hand, 
intergenerational equity has also been analyzed from the Rawlsian perspective: “the 
welfare criterion is the standard of consumption of the least well-off generation” 
(Solow, 1986: 143; Swenson, 1986: 1). However, Solow (1986) argues that these two 
approaches have many problems. Thus, he regards consumption as the interest on the 
stock of the non-renewable resource. Applying the Hartwick Rule involves that 
                                                                                                                                                                          
rents that the use of the resource entails. By calculating the first order conditions, the basic rule for the 
optimal economic exploitation is found.  
37
 The absence of exogenous technological progress implies that, if consumption is constant at all future 
time, the value of net investment is zero at time t.  
38
 The key question is to analyze under which conditions sustainability is consistent with optimal growth. 
This is based on the Golden Rule of economic growth, i.e. the growth path that gives the largest level per 
capita consumption that be maintained permanently. This utility-based definition of sustainability 
differentiates between weak and strong sustainability (see, Garmendia et al. (2010) for a comparison on 
fisheries management). Given the existence of a critical natural capital for which no substitutes exist 
(strong sustainability), weak sustainability assumes that there are substitutes for all assets and that only 
the maintenance of total capital stocks is relevant to generate future utility (Solow, 1974; Hartwick, 1977; 
Pearce and Atkinson, 1993; Neumayer, 2003). Moreover, from equation [2.5] it is also shown that weak 
sustainability and intertemporal efficiency are not conflicting (Olschewsky and Klein, 2011).  
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  0

tK  in [2.4], while the reproducible capital goods are included as net investment in 
the conventional way. In the case of the exhaustible resource,  tK

  is the current rate 
of depletion and    tptK i

  is the market rent when there are no extracting costs. This 
means that     0

tptK i , so the sum of current resource rentals equals current net 
investment in reproducible capital.  
Hartwick (1990) goes beyond and states that changes in the stock of exhaustible 
resources are defined as the difference between the stock of new discoveries and the 
current flow. There are also costs of extraction and exploration. By linking linearized 
current-value Hamiltonian to GNNP, it is shown that current ‘Hotelling Rents’ on net 
stock diminution over the period (i.e. the difference between marginal product and 
marginal cost of extraction multiplied by the variation in the stock) should be deducted 
from green GNP to arrive at GNNP.  
Cairns’ (2002) model is in line with the previous approach, albeit more complex. 
The economy has a stock of exhaustible resources and it is subject to pollution, so the 
arguments of the utility function are consumption of composite goods, the stock of 
pollution and the flow of environmental amenities, which is equal to the negative 
change in the stock of resources. It is also assumed that the utility flow is discounted at 
a rate  t , so the resulting maximization problem is exactly what CBA would pursue. 
However, Cairns’ approach differs from CBA, as it takes out consumer surplus, which 
allows him to relate the linearized current-value Hamiltonian to GNNP.  
 
2.4.3. Renewable resources 
 
These natural resources can be used repeatedly, as they regenerate themselves naturally. 
This entails that they are practically inexhaustible. Solar energy, fisheries and wood are 
the clearest examples.  
The first approach including renewable resources within a green accounting 
framework can be found in Hartwick (1990). This model is relevant for the objective of 
this dissertation, as, while focused on fisheries, it opened up the possibility of 
developing other similar studies on forests, as will be discussed later.  
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Utility is derived from current aggregate consumption of a composite good and fish 
A  with linear approximation,    AAUCCU  39 . Total production of the economy, 
which is function of the stock of man-made capital and current labor force,  , is 
distributed between consumption, investment and fishing costs ( )RAξ , , being R the 
stock of fish and h  the current harvest. 
The Social Planner’s problem is (r is the discount rate): 
 
   dseACU tsr
t


 ,max             [2.7] 
 
subject to: 
   RACKYK ,, 

           [2.8] 
  hRgR 

            [2.9] 
 
where ( )Rg  is the natural growth in the stock. 
The current-value Hamiltonian for this problem (in utility terms) can be written as: 
 
         hRgRACKYACUH c  21 ,,,       [2.10] 
 
Using the linear approximation above-mentioned and dividing [2.10] by the utility, 
the current-value Hamiltonian can be rewritten in ‘monetary’ values. At the same time, 
by calculating the canonical equations, NNP can be derived as:   
 
 
 
 
 
 







 R
CU
AU
K
CU
AU
AC
CU
H
NNP A
c       [2.11] 
 
where 
 
 CU
AU
 is the market price of a unit of fish and
A  the marginal cost of fishing. The 
last term can be considered as economic depreciation when 0

R
40
. By deducting this 
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 As the models set out in this section are only derived at time t, we take out any source of time-
dependence for simplicity. 
40
 As the existence of clear national property rights make distortions in prices and quantities smaller, it is 
better to define depreciation in terms of current harvests and natural growth. However, for certain 
renewable resources such as fish there is a difficulty in establishing property rights.  
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term from GNP, one calculates NNP. This approach thus shows that the current-value 
Hamiltonian is equivalent to NNP.  
Following from this work, two types of alternative approaches (which may, 
however, be used in combination) may be drawn up for dealing with goods and services 
provided by forests, as well as with the interactions between the forestry sector and the 
rest of economic sectors: noteworthy are the studies by Cairns (2001, 2003), on the one 
hand, and by Vincent (1999a) and Matero and Saastamoinen (2007), on the other hand.  
A similar model as the one of Hartwick (1990) can be found in Cairns (2001), 
though focused on forests. The Social Planner seeks to maximize households’ utility 
(social welfare), which is generated by consumption of a market good and forest 
amenities ( )RA which depend on the stock of environmental asset. Unlike in Hartwick 
(1990), resource constraints of this economy are now:  
 
  KitK 

           [2.12] 
    RKaYtR  

          [2.13] 
 
where the change in the stock of man-made capital is defined as the difference between 
investment and depreciation ( is the depreciation rate), and the change in the stock of 
environmental asset (e.g. forest biomass) is calculated as the difference between the 
level of improvements or maintenance Ω  and the sum of degradation due to the 
economic activity ( )KaY  and from natural causes Rγ . 
The current-value Hamiltonian for this problem is: 
 
       RKaYKiRACUH c   21,       [2.14] 
 
In order to bring this expression into what is actually measured by national 
accounting, [2.14] can be rewritten as: 
 
    
 
    RKaYKi
RA
U
RA
C
U
CRACSH c  





 21,     [2.15] 
 
where [2.15] consists of consumer surplus of market goods and forest amenities, two 
terms that value the consumption of market goods and forest amenities, and two terms 
referred to the stock of man-made capital and environmental asset, respectively.  
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Total production of the economy is distributed between consumption, investment 
cost, ( )iφ , and costs of maintenance, ( )Ωρ , such that: 
 
       iCKY                             [2.16] 
 
The utility derived from the consumption of market goods can be calibrated such 
that p
C
U



, being the monetary price of consumption. From the first-order conditions 
it is known that: 
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where
ip  is the market price of investment and Ωp  is the market price of maintenance 
(defensive) expenditures.  
Cairns proposes to calculate the linearized Hamiltonian
41
, thus leaving out non-
linearities (i.e. consumer surplus), and to evaluate consumption of market goods and 
forest amenities at the margin (see, Cairns (2000, 2002)). Including consumer surplus is 
correct as long as one also includes it for market goods and services. However, most 
theoretical approaches purge consumer surplus for market goods and services when 
interpreting NNP as a measure of social welfare. To quote Cairns (2001: 68), "the part 
of consumers’ surplus which is attributable to amenities, should not be part of green 
NNP, just as the part which is attributable to marketed goods is not a part of traditional 
NNP. In general, consumers’ surplus may not easily be divided among marketed and 
environmental goods" (see, Cairns (2008) and Caparrós (2010) for a similar argument). 
Hence, [2.15] is now equivalent to NNP: 
 
 
 
    RKaYpKip
RA
U
RApCHNNP ic   


       [2.19] 
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 Linear measures permits aggregating results from small economic units at the shadow prices of the 
economy. The same is done in traditional NNP using market prices as proxies for shadow prices (Cairns, 
2001). In this way NNP corresponds to a linear, and hence additive, index of intertemporal welfare 
(Caparrós et al., 2015). 
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The model by Cairns (2003) differs from the earlier in that aggregate social utility 
is a function of consumption, stock of environmental amenities or disamenities and 
labor exerted (a disutility). Moreover, the change in the stock of environmental assets is 
calculated as   hRgR 

, i.e. as the difference between growth and harvest.  
On the other hand, the approaches taken by Vincent (1999a) and Matero and 
Saastamoinen (2007) share the same purpose and are very similar to one another.  
However, they are relatively different from Cairns’ models as more forest-economy 
interactions are considered. Though apparently more comprehensive, the existence of so 
many interactions makes these models less flexible when it comes to adapting them to 
specific cases and different conditions. Furthermore, they make it all the more difficult 
to solve the necessary conditions of the problem. Still, an interesting contribution of 
these frameworks regarding the previous ones is the treatment of changes in the value of 
stocks, which opens the way to a discussion (we will come back to that later). 
Vincent’s (1999a) framework is quite complex, as there are five factors of 
production used by five different economic sectors to produce four goods and services. 
Production sectors are: forest management, F , logging, W , households’ collection of 
non-timber products, N , land clearing (deforestation), D , and the rest of the economy, 
O . These sectors use labor, man-made capital, agricultural land, I, forestland, F
42
, and 
emissions of air pollutants other than 
2CO , e
43
, to produce logs (wood,
WZ ), non-
timber products, 
NZ , newly cleared land, DZ , and to represent output in the rest of the 
economy. This output can be consumed, 
CO , invested in man-made capital used both in 
the production of market goods and in forest management ( Fo ii  ), or used in logging 
and forestry as intermediate input  (
FW OO  ). 
Households derive utility from consuming market goods, non-timber products and 
forest amenities; while they do not derive disutility from pollution. Concerning the 
change in stocks, the main difference with respect to Cairns (2001, 2003) is the 
inclusion of the following resource constraints: 
 
                                                          
42
  The current area of agricultural land is equal to total land area minus the current forestland. Note also 
that F  denotes both a sector and a variable, and the same is true for O . 
43
 This model ignores transboundary pollution problems such as acid rain.  
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FFF KiK 

           [2.20] 
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
            [2.22] 
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where P is the stock of 
2CO  in the global atmosphere. It is equivalent to average global 
2CO  concentration. The change in the stock of land implies that forest area decreases, 
while agricultural area increases due to deforestation. The change in the timber stock 
equals the difference between growth and harvest, as in Cairns (2003), while defining 
the growth function differently. Finally, the change in the stock of atmospheric
2CO is 
given by the difference between net emissions by the rest of the world and net 
sequestration in the country’s forests.  
On the basis of the Maler’s (1991) approach, Vincent shows that the linearized 
Hamiltonian for the maximization problem provides an approximation to NDP, and that 
the latter should be adjusted in the following ways: 
 
(i) Adjustments to the level of GDP and NDP 
(ii) Adjustments to the sectoral composition of GDP 
 
Concerning the former, adjusted NDP would read as follows: 
 
 
            
 
 
 
Conventional GDP is  FOCO iiOp  , where Op is the price of market goods. It 
should be adjusted by incorporating non-market goods and services, such as non-timber 
Adjusted NDP = 
                         Conventional GDP + Non-market values to be added to GDP − 
         Depreciation of man-made capital + Net accumulation of natural capital 
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products and forest amenities, FUZp FNN  , where Np  is the price of non-timber 
products and 
FU  is the marginal utility of consumption of amenities
44
. 
Conventional NDP, which is equal to GDP minus depreciation of man-made capital
 FO KKp  0 , should be adjusted to reflect changes in the value
45
 of land (more 
specifically, land converted from forest to agriculture), timber stock and the stock of 
atmospheric
2CO . Net accumulation
46
 is thus obtained by multiplying the variation in 
natural capital stocks in physical terms by the adjoint (costate) variable of these stocks, 
which can be interpreted as the marginal shadow price of capital stocks (this issue will 
be discussed in more detail below).   
Concerning the second type of adjustments, Vincent (1999a) links conventional 
GDP to the sum of the value added (VA)
47 
in industry, agriculture, logging and forest 
management: 
 
 
 
In the first two cases, VA is expressed as the sum of payments to factors of 
production; whereas in the last two cases it is calculated as the difference between 
revenue from sales of output and expenditure on intermediate inputs. The question is 
how to reallocate VA for services provided by forests. For example, this model assumes 
that forests benefit other sectors but do not receive goods and services from the rest of 
sectors. Still, the level of GDP remains equal. 
Matero and Saastamoinen (2007) draw up a similar framework on forest-economy 
interactions to that of Vincent (1999a), while adapting it to some specific features of 
Finish forests. For example, in addition to including emissions of air pollutants as a 
factor of production, they also consider emissions of pollutants to water, which will be 
increased as the production of logs is higher. The stock of nutrients pollutants in water 
                                                          
44
 Only amenities independent form markets, such as existence values of biodiversity, are considered.  
45
 Note that net accumulation, and not simply reductions in value of forest-related assets, is included.  
46 Unexpected capital gains and losses are not included, as there are neither exogenous technological 
changes nor exogenous changes in prices. 
47
 Without including taxes and subsidies, gross VA equals GDP.  
                                               Conventional GDP = 
              Conventional VA in logging + Conventional VA in tourism +       
      Conventional VA in industry + Conventional VA in forest management 
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negatively affects the production of market goods. Furthermore, non-timber products 
are considered as intermediate inputs in the production process.  
While the aim of the Social Planner remains the same, in this model households 
explicitly derive disutility from the stock of threatened species representing the loss of 
existence values
48
. Resource constraints of the economy now refer to changes in the 
stock of: man-made capital (equations [2.12], [2.20]), land (equations [2.21], [2.22]), 
timber, threatened species, atmospheric
2CO , soil nutrient and nutrients in water. 
Changes in timber stock are calculated as the difference between growth and the sum of 
harvest and natural mortality; while pollution stocks are defined as the difference 
between emissions from harvest and from decaying wood and the sum of net 
sequestration in the forest and decay in atmosphere. Changes in the stock of threatened 
species are given by the difference between the sum of cutting effect and decay and 
mortality of living trees. The soil nutrient stock is increased by the decay of dead wood 
and by deposition from air pollution and decreased by emissions to water from logging 
and forest management. Finally, the change in the stock of nutrients in water is defined 
as the difference between emissions from forests, deposition from air and internal load 
and sedimentation. 
  Adjusted NNP is now calculated as: 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Compared to Vincent (1999a), VA in agriculture has now been replaced by VA in 
tourism
49
. VA can also be expressed either as the sum of payments to factors of 
                                                          
48
 This argument is not, however, so far from the Vincent’s (1999a) one as households derive utility from 
directly consuming forest amenities, which only refers to existence values associated with biodiversity. 
49
 However, services provided by forest have been reallocated to other sectors in the same way.  
Adjusted NNP = 
             Conventional VA in logging + Conventional VA in tourism +       
    Conventional VA in industry + Conventional VA in forest management + 
                                                           
Non-timber services and (loss of) existence values – 
             Depreciation of man-made capital + Net accumulation of natural capital 
 
 
+ Non-market values to be added to GDP − 
   Depreciation of man-made capital + Net accumulation of natural capital 
 
Conventional GDP 
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production (VA in logging, tourism and industry) or as the difference between revenues 
from sales and expenditure on intermediate production (VA in forest management).  
 
2.4.3.1. Empirical adjustments 
 
As regard adjustments to conventional GDP, Vincent (1999a) points out that the value 
of non-timber products is proportional to the opportunity cost of labor used in collecting 
them, i.e. the result of multiplying the shadow price of labor by the amount of labor 
employed
50
. Matero and Saastamoinen (2007) also follow this line and use the average 
net hourly wage rate as a proxy for the value of time used in the production of 
(decorative) lichen, reindeer management and Christmas trees. By contrast, the 
existence value associated with forest amenities, such as biodiversity conservation, is 
derived by Vincent (1999a) through a contingent valuation survey, rather than through 
travel cost or hedonic pricing techniques. Using his own words, conservation is 
completely independent of marketed inputs and outputs. Compared with this, we offer 
an alternative solution (the SEV method) whereby markets are simulated to determine 
exchange values of non-market ecosystem services. Caparrós et al. (2003) and Campos 
and Caparrós (2006) also apply this method to pasture resources, game, forest 
recreation, carbon fixation and conservation in Spain. Matero and Saastamoinen also 
simulate the value of outdoor recreation activities, while not applying the SEV method.   
As for adjustments to conventional NDP, net accumulation has been calculated by 
Vincent (1999a) and Matero and Saastamoinen (2007) as the physical variation in 
capital stocks times the corresponding adjoint variable (shadow price), the latter being 
expressed in terms of future returns to the natural capital stock (Caparrós et al., 2003). 
The treatment of timber stock is especially relevant for this dissertation. That is why we 
will dwell on this aspect further.  
Vincent (1999b) shows that, for a forest where logging is done only once (at 
moment T), there are at least two correct methods for including net accumulation in the 
national accounts: (i) El Serafy variation, and (ii) net-price method.  
The first method is so called, as it is a generalization of the method proposed by El 
Serafy for non-renewable resources. It differentiates between mature forests in which 
                                                          
50
 That said, it is important to mention that this is only possible under the condition that households have 
free access to the forest. 
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logging time is reached and immature forests in which this time has not yet come
51
. For 
mature forests, net accumulation tends toward current resource rent (with negative 
sign). In subsequent years, there will be a positive net accumulation, as the species is 
approaching the time of logging
52
. Thus, forestry supposes that the probability of 
harvesting is zero until the moment in which the tree reaches the diameter-age 
associated to age T. At that moment, the probability of harvesting is one. This would 
imply knowing future forestry for each of the species available
53
. 
The second method assumes that logging follows the Faustmann-Hartman ‘optimal 
rotation’. It maximizes the net present value behind an infinitive chain of planting 
cycles, rather than a unique planting cycle
54
. This means that there is an opportunity 
cost of land rents and that the method involves marginal rents (see, Olschewski and 
Benítez (2005)). It does not, however, produce precise results if all trees in a given stand 
are the same age-class
55
. 
As appeared from Vincent (1999a), the adjoint variable for timber stock is a proxy 
for the marginal stumpage value (marginal ‘net price’). This is because ‘net-depletion’ 
method does not take into account the age-class of the forest, thus not affecting the price 
of timber. It therefore obviates the time lags that occur between timber harvests. The 
fact that the age-class does not affect the price is not what normally happens, so 
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 When this differentiation is made, ‘net-depletion’ method overstates both the decrease in forest value 
that occurs when mature forests are logged and the appreciation of immature forests due to growth 
(Vincent, 1999b).  
52
 The methodology set out by Caparrós et al. (2003) confirms the results of El Serafy variation method, 
which is a particular case when all trees are cut down upon reaching age T. 
53
 This probability may be estimated building on historical wood removals, thus determining the 
conditional probability that a living tree of the diametric-age d is harvested in the diametric-age j, where    
j > d (Caparrós et al., 2003). 
54
 As pointed out Benítez-Ponce (2005: 20), “it might happen that for some standing forests the spillover 
amenity benefits might be so great that it would not be economically feasible to harvest the forest at any 
time in the future. This would be represented by an infinite Faustman-Hartman rotation length”. 
55
 Cairns (2001) shows that if the forest is an even-aged stand on a given area, the cut rotation period is 
optimal and there is also a single species, it can easily be a stand with multiple ages with selective cutting 
of tree of age T on a sustained basis. Consequently, the value obtained through this method is relatively 
similar to that obtained discounting the future. 
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Caparrós et al. (2003) propose to project values for different age-classes into the future 
by discounting future returns (we will come back to that later). 
According to the criteria of conventional national accounts
 
explained above, 
Caparrós et al. (2003) calculate the stock values in the capital balances (i.e. at the 
beginning and at the end of the accounting period) discounting future returns to the 
corresponding capital stocks. In this way, net accumulation of man-made and natural 
capital is obtained by multiplying the physical variations by the shadow price 
(discounted future returns). Another difference compared to the Vincent’s (1999a) 
model is that price of timber is highly dependent on the age-class of the forest. Hence, 
the growth in forest not only produces more tons of timber, but also a revaluation of the 
stock existing at the beginning and at the end of the accounting period due to the 
changes in the ‘quality’ of the timber when passing from one diameter class to the next. 
This change in the value must be incorporated into the asset accounts. 
 
2.4.4. Pollution 
 
There is a perception that national accounting overestimates GNNP, as it does not 
account for the damage to the environment from pollution emissions. Attempts have 
been made to include pollution damages and abatement costs (or defensive 
expenditures) in the national accounting literature. The basic idea is that the value of 
environmental damage should be deducted from green GDP in order to arrive at GNNP, 
and that defensive expenditures must be treated as intermediate consumption, rather 
than as final demand (Hamilton, 1995).  
Hartwick (1990) explicitly extends Weitzman's approach to environmental damages 
caused by pollution. The stock of pollution is an input into the production function and 
affects it negatively, as the higher the level of pollution, the lower production will be. 
But at the same time, more production generates higher levels of pollution, so it is 
necessary to determine the net pollution increments, i.e. the difference between 
pollution due to production and the amount of pollution that evaporates by natural 
environmental stock regeneration. This means that pollution is controlled indirectly by 
output decisions. We also consider this assumption in the model developed in the third 
chapter. However, changes in the pollution stock may also appear in the utility function 
(Hartwick, 1993). In both cases, abatement costs must be deducted from GNP.  
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Mäler (1991) constructs a similar model where the quantity of residuals generated 
is an argument within the production function and where firms can buy pollution control 
services offered by pollution control firms. Households can also improve their 
environment by defensive expenditures. These expenditures have often been thought of 
as a proxy of environmental damage. This means that one may subtract defensive 
expenditures, rather than environmental damage. However, as pointed out by Mäler, this 
is true only if these expenditures are perfect substitutes to environmental services.  
In a related field, while not part of green national accounting, Feng et al. (2002) 
examine land use changes driven by a climate change policy. The optimal patterns of 
carbon sequestration, including carbon emissions and sequestration simultaneously, are 
analyzed for a scenario of instantaneous growth of new reforestation. This is 
particularly restrictive for the forestry sector, as many species need long periods of time 
to reach maturity. Caparrós (2009) relaxes this assumption and considers that when land 
is converted, carbon sequestration takes place at two moments in time. Caparrós and 
Zilberman (2010) include the intensive margin of land use climate policies, represented 
by the choice of species each of them growing differently. Thus, the optimal control 
problem allows Social Planner to choose the type of species to plant and to take into 
account, in each moment in time, the growth performed by all trees in the past.  
Assuming the basic premises of theoretical studies on forests above-mentioned 
makes it possible to estimate GNNP using information of the current year. However, 
although this scenario has been widely adopted, it is unrealistic. Hence, building on the 
model developed by Caparrós and Zilberman (2010) in the context of carbon 
sequestration, a model incorporating the growth of different vintages in the forests using 
Volterra integral equations is developed in the third chapter of this dissertation. Each 
portion of forest planted at any period s  ( s < t ) continues to grow at a rate that depends 
on the type of species chosen at time s and on the age of the forest, i.e. the time lag 
between s  and t . This involves having future values.  
 
2.4.5. Beyond the Weitzman’s approach: limitations and alternative proposals 
 
In the theoretical model set up in the following chapter, we follow the tradition initiated 
by Weitzman (1976) and subsequently extensions. Even so, we are aware that there is 
another stand of literature (Hamilton and Clemens, 1999; Dasgupta and Mäler, 2000; 
Arrow et al., 2003a,b; Dasgupta, 2009; Arrow et al., 2012; Fenichel and Abbott, 2014) 
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that raises questions about the usefulness of Weitzman’s approach and its derivatives. 
Interesting though these proposals may be, we have, nevertheless, decided to follow the 
approach pioneered by Weitzman (1976), and therefore to set aside these criticisms, as 
it is closely related to NNP and because most of the results have been derived within 
this tradition
56
 (see, for example, previous models on forests). In any case, we will 
explain what this alternative proposal is about. The main criticisms concern the fact that 
(i) utility function is linear, (ii) economy is on the optimal path, and (iii) there is no 
exogenous technological change.  
With regard to the first assumption, the argument goes that utility function should 
be concave in consumption (see, Kemp and Long (1972)). This is widely accepted, as 
assuming concavity is more convenient for applied works (Vincent, 2000). So, why are 
linear utility functions so common in economics? Welfare measures must be 
transformed into real terms if a static welfare equivalent is being sought. The 
conventional way to do so is to linearize the current-value Hamiltonian
57
, which is the 
same as normalizing the price of consumer goods to one (see previous models by Cairns 
(2001, 2003)). Thus, utility and money metrics are equivalent (Aronsson et al., 2004: 
34). Conversely, if the utility function is concave, the current-value Hamiltonian and the 
linearized current-value Hamiltonian are not the same and the welfare interpretation of 
the latter remains unclear. Weitzman (2000) attaches the problem by calibrating the 
instantaneous utility function so that the normalized function was proportional to the 
money-metric value of consumption
58
. That is, if linearizing the Hamiltonian is 
interpreted as money metricizing the instantaneous utility function, the Hamiltonian is 
not measured in utility terms, but with aggregated consumption as numeraire. He also 
made a generalization of this approach by allowing the possibility to have multiple 
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 Yet, the key results that we obtain in the model could also be derived within the framework pioneered 
by Dasgupta and his co-authors.  
57
 However, once linearity is abandoned, we have to work with consumer surplus (Weitzman, 2001). 
58
 Any positive affine transformation of the utility function induces the same welfare, i.e. the 
instantaneous utility function ( ) ( ) bCaUCW +=  gives a welfare ordering that does not depend on 0>a
and b  (Weitzman, 2000: 59), which are constant (Asheim, 2004: 37-42). 
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consumption goods
59
, including environmental goods and services, as they also 
contribute to the improvement of the ‘standard of living’. 
Nevertheless, one needs to enable intertemporal index comparisons. This led 
Weitzman (2001) to derive an exact welfare measure in real terms. As the utility 
function is quasi-linear (concave) in income, the change in the present discounted future 
utility is defined as the change in real income plus consumer surplus, which is also a 
quasi-linear utility function (Weitzman, 2000) representing the information lost by 
linearizing the Hamiltonian (Aronsson et al., 2004). Welfare function therefore consists 
of monetary and utility terms, making it necessary to take out the marginal utility of 
income. To that end, Weitzman (2001) introduces an ‘ideal’ market-basket price index, 
and develops a ‘unified theory’ according to which consumer surplus theory and index-
number theory are related. Imposing the money-metric normalization is equivalent to 
using Marshallian consumer surplus, which is the appropriate measure of social welfare 
when income effects do not exist. 
Concerning the second assumption, the resource allocation mechanism of an 
economy is considered to be optimal by the Weitzman’s approach, thereby 
implementing an efficient path that maximizes welfare (Asheim, 2003). Although it is 
very popular among economists, it is at the same time unrealistic in the current context 
where property rights and other institutional failures exist. This is particularly relevant 
when it comes to natural resources and environmental management regimes (Vincent, 
2000). Dasgupta and his co-authors contend that economies do not pursue optimal 
policies, so NNP cannot be interpreted as a measure of social welfare. Since the 
resource allocation is sub-optimal, the evaluator must carry out an economic program in 
order to enhance the path of consumption, production and capital accumulation. Hence, 
welfare will increase over time if a small investment project
60
 improves NNP measured 
in local shadow prices (Kriström, 1996; Kriström and Skånberg, 2001; Aronsson et al., 
2004: 43). In an optimal and competitive economy where the set of taxes and subsidies 
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 As explained above, practitioners use the aggregate market value of consumption as the standard 
indicator when estimating current consumption, and thus social welfare, in the national accounts. 
60
 Focusing on small projects is not trivial considering that "if the alterations in economic activities were 
not small (i.e. if they were to affect the accounting prices), the appropriate index of social well-being 
would be non-linear. This is because the index would then have to include changes in consumers' and 
producers' surpluses, and changes in income distributional weights" (Dasgupta et al., 1997: 129). 
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supports a full optimum, market prices are equivalent to local shadow prices. However, 
in imperfect economies, market prices are solely a good approximation for shadow 
prices for some goods and services (Dasgupta, 2009). This means that it would be 
enough to empirically quantify direct consumption values of the environment and 
values associated with the stock of natural capital (Vincent, 2000).  
This is related, but not identical, to another argument that opposes Weitzman's 
proposal: NNP should no longer be used to make comparisons across time and space 
and to evaluate long-term policies, but to assess short-term policies, even if the problem 
is non-convex. Thus, a short-term policy reform increases social welfare if and only if 
NNP measured in local accounting prices increases (Dasgupta and Mäler, 2000). Even 
so, linear indexes in quantities must be developed when it comes to making 
intertemporal and cross-country comparisons, as well as when checking if policy 
reforms result in sustainable development
61.
 Weitzman maintains that NNP, measured at 
shadow (accounting) prices, is such index in the context of a closed economy
62
. Even if 
the utility function is concave, changes in NNP still reflect changes in welfare (Asheim 
and Weitzman, 2001). Critics propose to work with economic forecasts and to focus on 
comprehensive wealth instead. It is a state variable, rather than a flow variable, which 
takes into account total stock of composite goods and natural resources valued at 
shadow prices. In either case, it is not the same as social welfare, but both concepts 
respond in the same direction to perturbations (Dasgupta, 2009). In line with 
comprehensive wealth, comprehensive investment, or equivalently genuine saving
63
, 
has emerged as a widely used indicator of sustainable development (Oxley et al., 2014) 
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 If these indexes were not used, future changes in consumer surpluses would have to be estimated. 
62
 The choice of metrics does not have any impact on welfare measurement, so NNP growth entails 
welfare improvements as a result of endogenous changes in shadow prices (Li and Löfgren, 2002). 
However, if consumption price changes, this relationship is not so clear-cut. There is a case where NNP 
growth indicates a welfare improvement; hence it requires the Divisia consumption price index (Sefton 
and Weale, 2006; Asheim and Wei, 2009). Then, growth in real NNP can be used for intertemporal 
welfare comparisons (Asheim and Weitzman, 2001), thus differing from the claim made by Dasgupta and 
Mäler (2000). All this, however, entails having positive interest rate (Li and Löfgren, 2006).  
63
 The variation in comprehensive wealth is measured by genuine savings (Pearce and Atkinson, 1993, 
1998; Hamilton and Clemens, 1999; Hamilton and Ruta, 2009). It is simply net savings (gross savings 
less depreciation on man-made and environmental capital), measured at shadow prices. 
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as it measures the rate at which intergenerational social welfare changes over time (i.e. 
the present discounted value of changes in consumption) (Dasgupta, 2009)
64
. 
The last assumption regarding stationary technology is one of the most restrictive 
assumptions with profound and far-reaching implications. If technological change is not 
attributable to any specific production factor, a non-time-autonomous model emerges 
and the welfare significance of NNP becomes more complex, as it is difficult to predict 
the variation of utility
65
. NNP equals stationary equivalent of future consumption 
possibilities without the ‘Solow residual’ (i.e. the non-attributable technological 
change), but the inclusion of such residual would involve a larger NNP. Then the 
current-value Hamiltonian should also incorporate the present value of marginal 
technological change in order to be a measure of social welfare (Aronsson and Löfgren, 
1998b). NNP, as currently defined in [2.4], only takes into account endogenous changes 
to capital stock. Exogenous technological progress may take different forms, including 
exogenous changes in prices, so real NNP should be modified to include changes in the 
values of capital stocks, namely anticipated capital gains. They should also be taken into 
account if interest rate (or utility discount rate) is volatile and technology does not 
exhibit constant returns to scale
66
 (see, Wei (2012)).   
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )tKt
dt
dp
t
dt
dK
tptCtNNP ++=           [2.25] 
Under these assumptions, the conclusion to be drawn is that wealth-equivalent 
income underestimates welfare-equivalent income (Asheim, 1997) and sustainable 
income. In the latter case, as prices are not constant, there is a loss of present values 
when turning the current consumption path into a constant consumption path.  
In the third chapter of this dissertation, we extend our benchmark framework from 
which it follows that the growth of natural capital (forest biomass) is no longer constant. 
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 Achieving an overall sustainable development at time t requires at least one of these three conditions: 
(i) comprehensive wealth should be non-declining at t, (ii) comprehensive investment should be non-
negative (Arrow et al., 2003b, 2012), or (iii) the value of net changes in the flow of consumption plus the 
change in comprehensive investment should be non-negative. 
65
 In this case, the current value Hamiltonian will not represent a static equivalent of welfare along the 
optimal path (Aronsson et al., 1997: 54). 
66
 Note that NNP only coincides with wealth-equivalent income if production technology exhibits 
constant return to scale (Vincent, 2000) 
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This means having unanticipated capital gains, as the value of forest biomass at moment 
t  will differ from the value of forest biomass at moment s  (for ts ≤ ), so at each period 
of time, the value will change and depend on the species chosen and on the age of such 
species. This interpretation is similar to that described above for technology progress.  
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3. GREEN NATIONAL ACCOUNTING AND TERRESTRIAL ECOSYSTEMS: 
FOREST CAPITAL AND NON-MARKET GOODS AND SERVICES
67
 
 
This chapter presents an intertemporal optimization model that extends Weitzman’s 
results to the forestry sector
68
. More specifically, this theoretical approach is similar to 
those of Cairns (2001, 2003), while nevertheless showing that one of the results is not 
applicable to this sector.  We prove that GNNP can continue to be measured using only 
values of the current year when there is a single species that grows following an 
exponential function with constant decay and there is no felling. By contrast, if different 
types of species exist, GNNP cannot be estimated using values of the current year, as in 
Vincent (1999a) and Cairns (2003), as there are future values.  
We also discuss the need to expand GNNP to incorporate non-market services such 
as public forest recreation or biodiversity conservation. Our results confirm that 
consumer surplus (or any Hicksian variation) must not be used for valuing non-market 
goods and services, once they have been taken out for market goods and services. 
Instead, these services should be incorporated into national accounting using exchange 
values. In doing so, we provide theoretical support for the SEV method explained in the 
previous chapter. We first characterize exchange values for the case of perfect 
competition, although we then extend the analysis to cover monopoly and monopolistic 
competition. The latter are especially relevant for recreational use of National Parks 
which are unique, or at least rare.  
 
 
 
                                                          
67 
This chapter is based on Caparrós and Ruiz-Gauna (2016).  
68 As explained in the previous chapter, there is a critical literature on the Weitzman’s approach that 
argues that the adequate linear index of welfare is not NNP, but ‘comprehensive wealth’. As the goal of 
this chapter is to expand NNP by including ecosystem services, we do not follow this approach. 
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3.1. Benchmark model 
 
This closed economy consists of two sectors: the forestry sector and the rest of the 
economy. As described in previous theoretical models,  tK  is the stock of man-made 
capital,  tR  is the stock of natural capital (forest biomass, for example), and  tP  is the 
stock of atmospheric pollution
69
. In order to maintain the problem as simple as possible, 
we assume that there is no man-made capital in the forestry sector. Investment in man-
made capital is represented by ( )ti and the extraction of forest biomass is given by ( )th . 
Each unit of production is emitting e units of carbon (which is considered to be the sole 
pollutant). 
The Social Planner’s problem is: 
 
   
      dtetRAtCU rt
thti



0
,
,max         [3.1] 
 
subject to: 
 
      tKtitK 

       [3.2] 
 
      thtRgtR 

      [3.3] 
 
            tPthtRgtKetP  

           [3.4] 
 
    0lim,0 0 

tXXX
t
for PRKX ,,         [3.5] 
 
where   tRA  is a function that collects non-market benefits (amenities) provided by 
forests, which depend on forest biomass, as in Cairns (2001). Furthermore, and in order 
to simplify the analysis, we assume that these amenities do not influence the production 
function
70
. Equation [3.2] indicates that the change in the stock of man-made capital 
equals the difference between gross investment and depreciation. Equation [3.3] 
indicates that the change in the stock of forest biomass is determined by the difference 
between trees’ growth, which is given by the function   tRg  and the selective 
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 Unlike in the second chapter, here we need a source of time-dependence, as the derivation of the 
problem will not only include values at one moment in time t, as we will see below.  
70
 This way of dealing with amenities is common for the existence value of biodiversity, but we extend it 
to other non-market ecosystem services such as public forest recreation.   
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extraction of wood (measured in tons). Equation [3.4] shows that the change in the 
stock of pollution is given by the difference between emissions and the sum of the 
amount of carbon sequestered in forests and decay in atmosphere (σ denotes the decay 
rate). Equation [3.5] represents the appropriate transversality conditions. 
The economy’s total production at time t,       tPthtKY ,, , is a function of the 
stock of man-made capital, forest biomass extracted and the stock of pollution. As we 
are in a general equilibrium model, final production is distributed between consumption 
of market goods and services, the investment cost,   ti , and the cost of extracting 
forest biomass,   th , such that: 
 
              thtitCtPthtKY  ,,          [3.6] 
 
The current-value Hamiltonian
71
 for this problem is: 
 
                      
             tPthtRgtKet
thtRgttKtittRAtCUtHc




3
21,
   [3.7] 
 
In order to bring this expression into what is actually measured by national 
accounting, [3.7] can be rewritten using the same affine transformation as Cairns (2001, 
2002): 
 
           
 
 
 
 
  
  tRA
tRA
tU
tC
tC
tU
tRAtCStRAtCU





 ,,       [3.8] 
 
so that [3.7] becomes: 
 
       
 
 
 
 
  
         
                     tPthtRgtKetthtRgt
tKtittRA
tRA
tU
tC
tC
tU
tRAtCStHc










32
1,
            [3.9] 
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 Rather than using the Hamiltonian, we work with the current-value Hamiltonian, as in Cairns (2001, 
2003), as the presence of the discount factor only adds complexity to the derivatives of the maximization 
problem. In any case, it can be proven that if we had used the Hamiltonian, the solution would not have 
been modified, as the current-value Hamiltonian is defined as a Hamiltonian that is free of the discount 
factor (Chiang, 1999: 210).  
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where [3.9] has now three clearly differentiated parts: i)      tRAtCS , , which 
represents consumer surplus of market and non-market goods and services, ii) two terms 
that value consumption and non-market benefits by using exchange values (as we will 
see below), and iii) the last three terms which refer to the stock of man-made capital, 
natural capital (forest biomass in our case) and pollution, respectively. 
It is possible to continue working with the utility as numeraire, but the conventional 
‘trick’ consists in calibrating the utility derived from the consumption of market goods 
and services such that
 
 
 tp
tC
tU



,  tp  being the monetary price of consumption, 
which is considered to be constant.  
From the necessary conditions (see Appendix A), we also know that: 
 
   tpt i1                                        [3.10] 
 
       tptptBt hw   12           [3.11] 
 
   tBt 13                                                                [3.12] 
 
with 
 
 
  
 
 tp
ti
ti
tpi




             [3.13] 
 
 
      
 
 tp
th
tPthtKY
tpw



,,
        [3.14] 
 
 
  
 
 tp
th
th
tph




          [3.15] 
 
 
 
  
 
      
 
  
 
 tp
tK
tKe
tK
tPthtKY
ti
ti
r
tB





















,,
1


      [3.16] 
 
where  tpi  is the market price of investments in man-made capital,  tpw  is the 
market price of the forest biomass (wood) as a factor of production, and  tph  is the 
market price (cost) of extracting wood. ( )tB1 relates real profits (or losses) for each unit 
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of capital
72
 to the responsiveness of emissions to a change in an additional unit of 
capital
73
. 
These conditions allow us to rewrite [3.9] (see Appendix A) as: 
 
           
 
  
         
                  tPtKetBthtRgtptp
tKtitptRA
tRA
tU
tCtptRAtCStH
hw
ic







1
,
          [3.17] 
 
The last ‘trick’ consists in ‘linearizing’ [3.17] (Cairns, 2001, 2003, 2008), which 
means taking out consumer surplus, as it does not depend linearly on  tC  and   tRA  
(see, however, Dasgupta’s (2009) criticisms to this procedure). Remember that, as 
explained above, we are removing consumer surplus for both market and non-market 
goods and services. Given that NNP is calculated by multiplying market prices by 
quantities of market goods and services, we define GNNP as: 
 
       
 
  
         
                  tPtKetBthtRgtptp
tKtitptRA
tRA
tU
tCtptGNNPtH
hw
ic







1
∧
    [3.18]  
 
The first term of [3.18] refers to the consumption of market goods and services at 
their market price, as entered in conventional national accounting. The second term 
refers to the consumption of non-market goods and services multiplied by their non-
market value, which is given by its contribution to the utility of individuals (section 3.3. 
is entirely devoted to the valuation of this term). The third term refers to the 
                                                          
72
 The L.H.S. of the numertator is the real cost of acquiring one addtional unit of capital. When a unit of 
capital is acquired, the money that it would be obtained by investing costs of acquisition is being left. 
Moreover, capital depreciates. Thus, real cost would be determined by ( ) ( )tpδr i+ . The R.H.S. is the 
value of marginal product of capital, also known as the marginal revenue product. It is defined as the 
change in total revenue that results from employing one more unit of capital, i.e, the market value of one 
additional unit of output. For a perfectly competitive economy, marginal revenue product diminishes as 
the quantity of capital employed increases because the marginal product of capital diminishes.    
73
 As expalined in the second chapter, pollution is controlled by output decisions, as in Hartwick (1990).  
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depreciation of man-made capital (valued at its market price). The last two terms refer 
to net accumulation of forest biomass and pollution, respectively.  
The term           thtRgtptp hw  in [3.18] is deceptively simple, as will be 
explained in the section below. Under the expression of GNNP which we have just 
derived, we would simply have to assess net growth (natural gross growth in the year 
minus extractions in the year) by its stumpage price (the value of wood as a factor of 
production minus extraction costs). This simplicity is due to the assumptions made (see, 
Repetto et al. (1989); Hartwick (1990); Hultkrantz (1992); Vincent and Hartwick 
(1997); Vincent (1999a); Kriström and Skånberg (2001); Caparrós (2010)).  
 
3.2.  Forest capital 
 
We concluded the previous section by indicating that the fourth term in [3.18] was 
overly simple. If we could effectively use this term to calculate GNNP, we would have 
the obvious advantage of being able to estimate this indicator using only values of the 
current year. In this section, we relax the assumptions that yield this result and discuss 
their implication for green accounting (building on the model developed by Caparrós 
and Zilberman (2010) in the context of carbon sequestration). 
We show that if the growth of a single species can be approximated by an 
exponential function with constant decay and there is no felling, GNNP can continue to 
be estimated by using only values of the current year
74
. Without a doubt, this scenario is 
restrictive. That is why we also analyze the implications of allowing different types of 
species to exist. This assumption means that there are future values so that it is not 
possible to estimate GNNP by using values of the current year
75
.  
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 If we would extend this analysis by assuming that after T years all trees are felled, we would no longer 
deal with a conventional optimal control model, but rather with a modified model in which there would 
be variables at time t and time-delayed variables. In any case, GNNP only depends on two points in time 
(we will come back to that later).  
75
 While we are aware that tree volume tends to grow following a logistic function (or other functions 
such as the Chapman-Richards, among others), we utilize exponential functions. Optimal control theory – 
starting with the classical Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model – implicitly uses exponential functions due to 
the ease of which state equations can be derived. In fact, if we worked with logistic functions, state 
equations would take a different form than that adopted in optimal control models.   
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3.2.1. A single species and a constant decay exponential growth function 
 
Let us first suppose that, instead of felling trees, the forest grows without human 
intervention following a constant decay exponential function. The amount of growth 
(trees are treated as ‘growth’ machines) produced at time s is called x(s), which 
continues to generate growth over time at a decaying rate. The cost of planting is   sx  
and the growth function of one tree planted at time s in any moment in time t (note that 
trees are ‘planted’ in every instant) is denoted m, according to the growth function 
detailed in the next definition: 
 
Definition 1 Constant decay exponential growth function: Assume that the growth 
function of one tree takes the following exponential form 
 
    steGsbtm stb   ,,, 0                [3.19] 
 
where b and 
0G  are parameters. Hence, the growth of all vintages at time t, denoted by 
G(t)
 76
, is given by: 
 
     dsesxtG stb
t


0
                [3.20] 
 
and the function that accumulates all the past growth – i.e. forest biomass R(t) – is: 
 
        dzdsesxdzzGtR
t z
szb
t
  






 
0 00
                          [3.21] 
 
To simplify the analysis, we assume that 10 G , as this has no impact on our results.  
Let us see the argument graphically with a particular numerical example
77
. A 
reforestation process is implemented at three different points in time – s1 = 0, s2 = 10 
and s3 = 20 –, as shown in Figure 3.1. These new-planted trees (remember that trees 
belong to one and the same species) grow following the constant decay exponential 
function [3.19]. However, the growth of all vintages,  tG , has a different shape. From s1 
= 0 to s2 = 10, there is just one vintage, so  tG  coincides with the growth of trees 
belonging to this vintage. This is no longer the case at s2 = 10, as a new reforestation 
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In the benchmark model, trees’ growth is denoted by g(t); while here it is denoted by G(t).  
77
 Values given to the function are: m(t,b,s1) = 1, s1 = 0, s2 = 10, s3 = 20, b = 0.03.  
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takes place. This means that two vintages are underway. Thus, the value of  tG  is 
larger than before. Forest is again reforested at s3 = 20 with the ensuring increase in the 
value of  tG . Hence there are three vintages at this time. Because no more 
reforestations are undertaken, the value of  tG  continues to decay from s3 = 20 on.  
 
Source: own elaboration 
 
Figure 3.1. Growth of all vintages at time t when there is a single species and a 
constant decay exponential growth function 
 
 
The reverse process occurs when it comes to the accumulated past growth (Figure 
3.2). The growth of trees planted in the three vintages accumulates over time, so the 
value of  tR  is continually growing. Moreover, at s2 = 10 and s3 = 20, this value 
increases more than before as new trees are planted. 
 
Source: own elaboration 
 
Figure 3.2. Accumulated past growth at time t when there is a single species and a 
constant decay exponential growth function 
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The Social Planner’s problem is now: 
 
   
      dtetRAtCU rt
txti



0
,
,max          [3.22] 
 
subject to [3.2], [3.20], [3.21], the appropriate transversality conditions, and a 
modified version of [3.4], which is now defined as: 
 
             tPtRtKetP  

                                                                             [3.23] 
 
The economy’s total production at time t is given by78: 
 
              txtitCtPtxtKY  ,,                [3.24] 
 
In order to transform this problem into a standard optimal control model, we can 
take the time derivatives of [3.20] and [3.21] such that: 
 
               tGtxdsesxbtxdsesxbtxtG
t
stbbtbs
t
 


00
      [3.25] 
and 
         tGdsesxdsesxtR stb
t
btbs
t
 


00
      [3.26] 
 
so we can now rewrite the Social Planner’s problem as before, while replacing 
[3.20] by [3.25], [3.21] by [3.26] and [3.23] by  
 
        tPtGtKetP  

     [3.27] 
 
Thus, the current-value Hamiltonian of this problem is: 
 
                  
                tbGtxttPtGtKet
tGttKtittRAtCUtH c


43
21,


    [3.28] 
 
From the necessary conditions (see Appendix B), we know that, apart from [3.10]: 
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 In order to simplify the analysis, let us assume that, in the two cases analyzed in this section, there is no 
cost of extracting forest biomass. 
Chapter 3. Green national accounting and terrestrial ecosystems 
68 
 
         rbtptptBt xFx   22         [3.29] 
 
   tBt 23              [3.30] 
 
     tptpt xFx 4            [3.31] 
 
with  
 
      
 
 tp
tx
tPtxtKY
tpFx



,,
        [3.32] 
 
 
  
 
 tp
tx
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tp x


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
          [3.33] 
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

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



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

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

,,
2


                   [3.34] 
 
where ( )tpFx  is the marginal revenue product of the amount of growth produced at time 
t. ( )tp x  is the market price (cost) of planting trees.  
After affine transformation and purging consumer surplus, the ‘linearized’ current-
value Hamiltonian and GNNP (see Appendix B) are: 
 
       
 
  
         
                 tPtKetBtxtrGtptp
tKtitptRA
tRA
tU
tCtptGNNPtH
xF
ic
x








2
    [3.35] 
 
In short, we show that if: 
(I) there is a single species that grows instantaneously (as in the benchmark 
model), or  
(II) there is a single species that grows following an exponential function with 
constant decay [3.19],  
then we are back to an optimal control model where both the ‘linearized’ current-value 
Hamiltonian and GNNP depend only on values of the current year. 
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3.2.2. Different types of species  
  
Building on Caparrós (2010) and Caparrós and Zilberman (2010), we now consider that 
each tree grows following a different exponential function. To simplify the analysis, we 
assume that there is a continuum of forest species
79
 and that each species has a different
 sb , defined at the moment of planting. Only one type of species is planted in each 
instant. Still, we suppose that for all species   100  GsG  s . Hence, different species 
only differ in their  sb .  
We also assume that trees are not felled, and are thus only planted to increase 
amenities. The result would also hold if trees were felled (just adding unnecessary 
complexity).  
Let us now consider the case of a non-constant decay exponential function, as the 
one defined below: 
 
Definition 2 Non-constant decay exponential growth function: Assume that, at each 
moment of time s, the growth function takes the exponential form 
 
        stesGssbtm stsb  0,,         [3.36] 
 
and hence that the growth of all vintages at time t, G(t), is now given by: 
 
      dsesxtG stsb
t

0
                                          [3.37] 
 
and that the function that accumulates all the past growth, R(t), is: 
 
       dzdsesxtR
t z
szsb
  






 
0 0
  [3.38] 
 
Graphically
80
, growth is no longer constant and differs among species (see, for 
example, the different growth paths between trees planted in the first and third vintages 
                                                          
79
 Although this is unrealistic, it allows us to stress our main point in a relatively straightforward model. 
80
 In the figure, values given to the function are: m(t,b1,s0) = 1, m(t,b2,s0) = 2.5, m(t,b3,s0) = 3.2, b1 = 0.02, 
b2 = 0.04, b3 = 0.06, s1 = 0, s2 = 10, s3 = 20.  
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in Figure 3.3). The value of  tG decreases from 203 s  on, as no more reforestations 
are undertaken.  
 
 
Source: own elaboration 
 
Figure 3.3. Growth of all vintages at time t when there are different types of 
species 
 
 
The growth of trees belonging to each species accumulates over time, albeit 
differently from each other. In any case, the value of  tR  is continually growing (see 
Figure 3.4). 
 
 
Source: own elaboration 
 
Figure 3.4. Accumulated past growth at time t when there are different types of species 
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The Social Planner’s problem is now:  
 
     
      dtetRAtCU rt
tbtxti



0
,,
,max   [3.39] 
 
subject to equations [3.2], [3.37], [3.38], the appropriate transversality conditions, 
and a modified version of [3.4]: 
 
        tPtRtKetP  

  [3.40] 
 
The economy’s total production at time t is now: 
 
                txtitCtPtbtxtKY  ,,,        [3.41] 
 
Unlike previous scenarios, the time derivatives of [3.37] and [3.38] do not allow us 
to transform the problem into a standard optimal control model: 
 
                   dsesxsbtxdsesxsbtxtG stsb
t
tssb
t


 
00
     [3.42] 
and 
             tGdsesxdsesxtR stsb
t
tssb
t
 


00
      [3.43] 
where forest biomass at the given moment s continues to grow at a rate that depends on 
the type of species chosen at s and on the age-class structure (period of time between s 
and t). Thus, we can rewrite the Social Planner’s problem as before, while replacing 
[3.37] by [3.42], [3.38] by [3.43] and [3.40] by  
 
        tPtGtKetP  

      [3.44] 
 
This problem needs to use the adaptation of the Hamiltonian
81
 initially proposed by 
Vinokurov (1969) in order to solve it:  
 
                                                          
81
 Unlike previous scenarios, we now formulate the maximum principle by using the Hamiltonian, rather 
than the current-value Hamiltonian, as it makes the way of solving it easily. In any case, the results would 
have changed if we had chosen the current-value Hamiltonian, as explained below.    
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                  
                      dsetxtbstxttPtGtKet
tGttKtitetRAtCUtH
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t
rt
--
443
21,



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

    [3.45] 
 
From the necessary conditions (see Appendix C), we also know that 
    rti etpt
1            [3.46] 
 
       
 
 
  rtrtbFbx etBe
tx
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




  32       [3.47] 
 
    rtetBt  33            [3.48] 
 
       
 
 
rtb
Fbx e
tx
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tbtptpt 


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

4          [3.49] 
 
with  tpx  equal to [3.33] and: 
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                       [3.52] 
 
where ( )tpb is the marginal revenue product of the species planted at time t.  
 
After affine transformation and purging consumer surplus, the ‘linearized’ 
Hamiltonian is now (see Appendix C): 
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3       [3.53] 
 
As can be seen from [3.53], we have forward-looking values. We need future 
shadow values (not constant) to correctly evaluate the impact of current reforestations. 
The derivation of GNNP is now more complex than in previous scenarios as it is clear 
that final result maintains the integral which implies projections towards the future.  
 
In short, we show that if  
(III) there are various types of species each of them growing following a 
constant decay exponential growth function, as [3.36], but with a different 
values for the growth decay rate b,  
then neither the ‘linearized’ Hamiltonian nor GNNP can be measured using values of 
the current year, as there are future values.   
Note that in sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 we have assumed that trees are not felled. 
However, the possibility of felling trees after T years has been posed on the model 
developed in section 3.2.1 on a trial basis. In Appendix D we present this extension, 
although we have not been able to obtain reasonable expressions for the necessary 
conditions without the lambdas, so we cannot interpret them. One must take into 
account that the necessary conditions for solving this problem are different than those 
used in previous cases (Frankena, 1975; Kamien and Schwartz, 1991). In any case, it is 
shown that the current-value Hamiltonian depends on two points in time, i.e. that there 
are time-delayed variables. If we would apply these conditions, it could be expected that 
GNNP would also depend on two points in time.  
In the case of the model presented in the section 3.2.2, if the problem got more 
complex and contained the possibility of felling, the result that the ‘linearized’ 
Hamiltonian and GNNP depend on future values (i.e. on infinite points) would be 
satisfied as well, as the fact that makes not possible to use values of the current year is 
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the existence of different types of species that grow differently. We should also assume 
that each tree is felled at a different moment T, that is, that moment T varies depending 
on the species chosen. This assumption would also complicate the problem.  
In a nutshell, values of the current year only give a good approximation of the real 
contribution of natural capital (forest biomass) to GNNP when there is a single species. 
Since this assumption is far-fetched, it seems more appropriate to measure forest capital 
in GNNP by discounting net future returns, as indeed the SEEA recommends (UN, 
1993; UN et al., 2013, 2014). In Appendix E we address this issue in more detail.  
 
3.3.  Non-market ecosystem services 
 
So far, the value of consumption of non-market amenities has been given by its 
contribution to the utility of individuals, 
 
  
  tRA
tRA
tU


 (see [3.18]). However, in 
order to integrate non-market values into the national accounts in a consistent way with 
market values, we need to estimate exchange values for non-market goods and services. 
In doing so, we use the SEV method. Based on Caparrós (2010), and coming back to the 
benchmark model, let us suppose that the Social Planner decides to internalize forest 
recreation by establishing the obligation to make payments of an entrance fee to access 
the forest
82
. The number of times that the recreational service is rendered, i.e. the 
number of entrance fees purchased, is called υ . 
The Social Planner’s problem is now: 
 
     
        dtetRtAtCU rt
tthti



0
,,
,,max 

       [3.54] 
 
subject to [3.2], [3.3], [3.4] and [3.5]. 
 
If we assume that  t  must actually be paid, the budget constraint [3.6] is given 
by:  
 
                 tthtitCtPthtKY  ,,    [3.55] 
 
where   t  denotes the cost of the payment of the entrance fee.  
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 We refer to forest recreation for simplicity, but other non-market values could be equally treated.  
Chapter 3. Green national accounting and terrestrial ecosystems 
75 
The current-value Hamiltonian for the new problem is: 
 
                
                     tPthtRgtKetthtRgt
tKtittRtAtCUtH SEVc




32
1_ ,,
  [3.56] 
 
Apart from the necessary conditions derived in the section above ([3.10], [3.11] and 
[3.12]), we also obtain the following condition (see Appendix F): 
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    [3.57] 
 
where the Social Planner should equal the marginal cost in terms of the consumption of 
market goods and services to which individuals renounce due to the payment of the 
entrance fee (the L.H.S) and the change in consumption of non-market services that 
provides the payment of the entrance fee (which may be, for example, one-time access 
to the forest) multiplied by the variation in utility experienced by individuals who 
access the forest (the R.H.S). If we assume that 
    
 
1
,



t
tRtA


, the ‘quasi-market’ 
price,  tp A  , can be defined as the market value (in monetary units) of the entrance 
fee
83
 such that: 
 
  
 
 
 
    
 tp
tRtA
tU
tp
t
t
A





,

     [3.58] 
 
where the assumption
    
 
1
,



t
tRtA


 simply means that the payment of one 
additional entrance fee permits visitors an additional one-time recreational use of the 
forest.  
According to the result obtained in [3.57], and applying the same necessary 
conditions as those laid down for the benchark model, i.e. [3.10], [3.11] and [3.12], we 
can rewrite the current-value Hamiltonian [3.56] as: 
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 ( )tp A  is not to be confused with ( )tυ . While ( )tp A  refers to the price of the entrance fee, ( )tυ  is the 
number of entrance fees purchased. 
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                         tPtKetBthtRgtptptKtitp
tRtAtptCtptRtAtCStH
hwi
ASEVc




1
_ ,,,
  [3.59] 
 
The definition of GNNP, this time in terms of market and ‘quasi-market’ values, 
implies once again that [3.59] must be linearized. Thus, we can write the following 
Remark. 
 
Remark 1 The ‘linearized’ current-value Hamiltonian [3.59] is equivalent to 
GNNPSEV estimated using exchange values. More precisely: 
 
               
                 
       tPtKetB
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tRtAtptCtptGNNPtH
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


4
_ ,
 [3.60] 
 
Remember that consumer surplus for both market and non-market goods and 
services have been removed when taking out        tRtAtCS ,,  .  
 
3.4.    Exchange values and different market structures 
 
Prices of market goods and services (i.e. those recorded in the SNA) are collected in 
 tp  and calculated by balancing demand and supply functions in a competitive market. 
However, in real life, not all markets are perfectly competitive, so  tp  also collects 
prices from monopolistic or oligopolistic markets. On the whole, there is a minimum 
price if perfect competition prevails and a maximum price if the market operates as a 
monopoly. 
The SEV method proposes to utilize this information to simulate  tpA . This 
involves constructing demand and cost functions for these amenities and simulating at 
least the price that would be set up if perfect competition, monopoly or monopolistic 
competition prevails. This provides a range of values for  tpA . The exchange value for 
forest recreation is then calculated by multiplying  tpA  by the number of services 
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consumed at that price, as explained in the second chapter. This valuation would not 
include consumer surplus84. 
 
3.4.1. Perfect competition 
 
Under this assumption, the natural area is completely homogeneous with regard to other 
natural areas, so forest owners/managers cannot individually influence the price  tpA . 
Costs (essentially cleaning and warden costs) would also be covered with a standard 
return on invested capital. If we assume that the supply of the service requires an 
economically viable management system, at least fixed costs of the management must 
be covered by the ‘quasi-market’ price. This criterion was empirically applied in 
Caparrós et al. (2003) and Campos and Caparrós (2006). 
Under these circumstances (existence of many forests, identical service and 
freedom to enter and leave the market), forest owners/managers only decide the optimal 
amount of recreational services to the offered at the given market price with the goal of 
maximizing profits. Thus, at this price, any ‘sale’ is possible. If entrance fees are sold 
above the market price, no one would be willing to pay for a service that may be offered 
by other forests under equal conditions. If we look at the opposite case, it would not be 
possible to meet the entire demand considering the size of the forest. This means that 
the site-specific demand function for recreational access is perfectly elastic, i.e. price 
equals marginal revenue.  
Net profits, ( )tΠ pc , are given by the difference between total revenue and total 
cost: 
                       tRtAthtitctRtAtpt pcpcpcpcApc ,,,,,      [3.61] 
where pc is the superscript stand for perfect competition. The cost function can be 
redefined (for simplicity) as ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )tRthtitυc pc ,,,  such that: 
                 tRthtitctRtAtpt pcpcpcA
pc ,,,,        [3.62] 
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 The only way of internalizing consumer surplus into the market consists in assuming that the forest 
owner may charge each individual their maximum WTP, i.e. a different price to each visitor. This 
assumption is not realistic, so the premise of the SEV is that the forest owner may choose a unique price. 
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Profits are maximized at that point in which it is not possible to obtain any 
additional profit by allowing more visitors to access (application of the marginal 
analysis). This occurs when the last visitor accessing the forest provides exactly the 
same amount to total revenue as to total cost, that is, when marginal cost equals 
marginal revenue.  
From the necessary conditions, we know that: 
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, price also equals marginal cost.   
In short, we confirm the rule on the basis of which a competitive forest must act in 
order to maximize profits: maximization of profits occurs at the point in which marginal 
revenue equals marginal cost. As forest owners/managers are price-takers, pc
Ap  equals 
marginal revenue, so the maximization rule implies that pc
Ap  also equals marginal cost. 
 
3.4.2. Monopoly and monopolistic competition 
 
Monopoly is a reasonable scenario if the forest has a relevant characteristic that makes it 
unique so that there are no perfect substitutes (this scenario was analyzed in Caparrós et 
al. (2003)). There is, nevertheless, a certain degree of similarity between monopolistic 
and perfect competition market structures when it comes to determining the level of 
visitors who may gain access to the forest. In both cases, the marginal revenue-marginal 
cost perspective is used. That is, profits are maximized by equating marginal revenue 
and marginal cost. If the former exceeds the latter, the forest owner/manager will permit 
more visitors to access the forest and vice versa. Conversely, the basic difference 
between a monopoly and a competitive forest is that price is not set by market forces in 
the former case. In other words, the demand curve of a forest owner/manager who acts 
as a monopolist is not horizontal, but rather downward-sloping.  
Nevertheless, if there are a given number of different recreational natural areas 
which are to compete in the market, it is not reasonable to assume that all of them are 
either unique or homogeneous. Monopolistic competition represents an intermediate 
scenario (Caparrós et al., 2015). This market structure reflects reality better, at least in 
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the case of forests. As product differentiation is possible, there are several forests 
offering close substitutes to each other. In any case, forests are not perfect substitutes, as 
they may have specific characteristics or may be located in different geographical 
places, among others specifications
85
. Thus, the forest owner has some pricing power, 
but this power is limited by the number of forests offering recreational activities.  
In the short run the monopolistic competition model (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977) is 
almost identical to the monopoly (i.e. profits are maximized following the same 
procedure as in a monopoly, so ordinary profits, extraordinary profits or losses can be 
obtained). New entries are, in principle, possible but need a considerable amount of 
time.  In this way, the number of forests providing recreational services is fixed and 
each forest has a site-specific demand function. The equilibrium is given by the 
intersection between the site-specific marginal revenue function and the site-specific 
marginal cost function (Caparrós et al., 2015).  
In the fourth and fifth chapters of this dissertation we define the revenue function 
for public forest recreation and a biodiversity conservation program as the price 
multiplied by the number of people who are willing to pay, which in turn depends on 
the price – i.e.     tpqtp mmm –, where m is the superscript stand for monopolistic 
competition (this way of defining the revenue function is similar to that for the Bertrand 
competition in the context of oligopolistic firms). While it is more common to specify 
the revenue function in terms of quantities (as in the Cournot competition for an 
oligopoly), for these two particular services, it is more natural to think about forest 
owners/managers setting a price for accessing the forest and letting visitors decide 
whether or not they are willing to visit the recreational area at this price, rather than 
deciding the number of visitors that will have be allowed into the forest.  This is even 
more evident for the case of a conservation program to protect the Iberian Lynx. In 
order to be consistent throughout the dissertation, we also define the revenue function in 
these terms and derive the results for a scenario in which there is product 
differentiation
86
.  
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 If forests were perfect substitutes, visitors would choose the cheapest one. But as most visitors consider 
that forests are imperfect substitutes, the demand curve faced by each forest will be represented as 
downward-sloping. 
86
 When forests are identical, the equilibrium of the Bertrand model is the competitive equilibrium. 
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Each forest owner/manager sets the price in order to maximize profits, so they 
compete in prices, thus leaving it up to the market to determine the number of visitors. 
Resulting from [3.58], it can be derived that when paying 
Ap  one can obtain one 
entrance fee that gives the payer one-time recreational use of the forest. In this sense, 
    tRtA ,  can be redefined as     tRtpA A , . This expression is more helpful under 
the market structure analyzed here, as the control variable for forest owners is now the 
price 
Ap , and not the number of entrance fees to be sold.  The problem faced by the 
forest owner/manager is as follows
87
: 
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From the necessary conditions, we know that: 
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so the forest owner/manager chooses a price such that marginal revenue equals 
marginal cost. From equation [3.65], we can derive the following reaction function: 
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Considering that an increase in the price brings about declining the number of 
visits, the quotient in the R.H.S of [3.66] is negative. This implies that the price  tpmA  
is higher than marginal cost, so the forest owner/manager obtains profits
88
. As we have 
just seen, marginal cost is equal to marginal revenue in the equilibrium, which means 
that the price  tpmA  is also higher than marginal revenue. From equation [3.66]: 
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 In the applications of chapters four and five, we assume that all costs are fixed, as we have no 
information to simulate the variable component. We also make an adaptation to this formula to define the 
quantity of visits as the probability of paying the price (we shall come back to this issue). 
88
 In so far as forests are imperfect substitutes, when one forest owner/manager reduces the price with 
respect to the others, not all visitors will choose the forest with a lower price. This implies that 
equilibrium prices will be above the competitive level. 
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In short, we confirm the rule on the basis of which a forest under a monopolistic 
competition structure must act in the short run in order to maximize profits: 
maximization of profits occurs at the point in which marginal revenue equals marginal 
cost. As forest owners/managers are not price-takers, m
Ap  is higher than marginal 
revenue, so the maximization rule implies that m
Ap  is also higher than marginal cost. 
If the demand function is linear and marginal cost is equal to zero, the price  tpmA  
that maximizes benefits coincides with the median, which facilitates the analysis. This 
scenario is perhaps an appropriate strategy for an application at the macro-economic 
level. Nevertheless, the assumption of zero marginal cost and the linearity of the 
demand function are not essential assumptions, as it is always possible to simulate the 
price that the forest owner would set. Caparrós et al. (2015) relax both assumptions and 
show that the monopolist (or the forest owner under a monopolistic competition 
scenario in the short run) would set a different price than the median, though relatively 
similar. In any event, the SEV method uses the value obtained under a monopolistic or 
monopolistic competition position as the maximum price of the visit. This is a situation 
that yields extraordinary profits to the monopolist or to the forest owner under a 
monopolistic competition situation (he/she collects profits above the opportunity cost in 
competitive capital markets).  
In the long-term new forests offering recreation activities are supposed to enter the 
market in the original model, although each forest operates with its own site-specific 
demand function (hence monopolistic competition and monopoly no longer coincide 
under this scenario). This mechanism operates until economic profits cease to exist. 
This occurs when  tpmA  equals average cost, AC, which is not zero in case of fixed 
cost, even if marginal cost is zero. In an equilibrium state, the price is higher than the 
respective marginal cost, however.  
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Whether the short-term pricing policy or the long-term pricing policy is more 
reasonable to obtain an exchange value depends on how credible is the ‘introduction of 
new recreational forests in one particular area’. Most applied studies analyze market 
structures in the short-term, as they are focused on a site-specific analysis. It is in this 
spirit that we present the fourth chapter of this dissertation. Although the type of forests 
analyzed, as well as the type of competition they face, may change in the future, we are 
only interested in estimating the value of public recreation in the forests that currently 
exist and the competitive environment within which they operate at present. 
Furthermore, national accounting systems also recommend focusing on the short run. 
  
3.5.   Intermediate summary 
 
This chapter sets out the main findings for the forestry sector obtained by the theoretical 
literature on green national accounting. From this perspective, we address the valuation 
of non-market ecosystem services and the treatment of future values.  
As regards the former, we show that non-market ecosystem services can be 
integrated into the national accounts at their (simulated) exchange values. We have 
provided theoretical support for the SEV method, which has been addressed from a 
green national accounting perspective. Rather than using prices for similar markets to 
include the final output of the forests, this method simulates the ‘quasi-market’ price 
that would be set if these services were internalized in the market. In principle, nothing 
distinguishes a service like public forest recreation (presently outside of the market as 
access is free, but which could be incorporated) from a non-timber product like 
mushroom picking in Sweden (also presently outside of the market as picking is free) 
(Campos and Caparrós, 2006). Thus, this method has proven to be a methodology in 
line with the central normative procedure of the SNA and the SEEA.  
As regards the treatment of future values when evaluating the stock of forest 
biomass, previous studies on forests (see, e.g. Cairns (2001, 2003)) assume that forests 
grow instantaneously. This allows defining the current-value Hamiltonian and GNNP in 
terms of values of the current year. However, we show that this result is only fulfilled 
under certain restrictive assumptions, which imply using a single species. When there 
are different species growing differently, there are forward- looking values and the 
Hamiltonian and GNNP include a Volterra integral equation that cannot be simplified to 
the standard state equation by taking the time derivative. This type of equations had not 
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been applied so far within a green accounting approach, so we make a useful 
contribution in this regard, by extending conventional ‘vintage’ models to the modeling 
of the growth of forest biomass.  
Moreover, as explained in the previous chapter, central normative national accounts 
frameworks propose to use the NPV approach in order to estimate the value of 
ecosystem stocks (in our case, forest biomass). NPV calculates the discounted present 
value of expected future returns (UN, 1993; UN et al., 2013, 2014), which requires 
making projections into the future.  
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4. AN APPLICATION TO PUBLIC RECREATION IN SPANISH 
FORESTS
89
 
 
As explained in the second chapter, in the last three decades there has been an effort to 
develop valuation techniques intended to integrate non-market benefits from ecosystems 
into economic analyses. Among these, public (free access) forest recreation is one of the 
most extensively studied subjects (Scarpa et al., 2000; Christie et al., 2007; Huhtala and 
Pouta, 2008; Rosenberger et al., 2012; Abildrup et al., 2013; Saelen and Ericson, 2013). 
Contingent valuation was originally the most widely used of all these methods, but 
choice experiments have attracted attention as an alternative due to the advantages 
associated with multi-attribute valuation. Although these methods are mainly applied to 
extended CBA, which uses Hicksian variation measures, there is an increasing interest 
in their use for national and ecosystem accounting, which require exchange values 
(Campos and Caparrós, 2016; Obst et al., 2016). 
In this chapter we present the results of a choice experiment applied to the valuation 
of public recreation in stone pine (Pinus pinea) and cork oak (Quercus suber) forests in 
Spain. Based on this choice experiment, we compare the compensating variation 
measure (a type of Hicksian variation) associated with a visit to these forests with the 
results obtained from the SEV method for the same visits (Caparrós et al., 2003, 2015). 
The latter method allows us to estimate the potential benefits that could be obtained 
from internalizing this service in a potential market of recreation in these forests. 
As explained in section 2.2, estimating these two measures relies heavily on the 
validity of the non-market valuation method used and the application of choice 
experiment is questioned due to its hypothetical nature (this also applies to contingent 
valuation) (Hausman, 2012). In this context, convergent validity tests offer ways to 
validate the results from these methods by assessing whether different techniques, 
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 This chapter is based on Oviedo et al. (2016). 
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formats and/or characteristic of the valuation scenario converge to similar WTP 
estimates (Hausman, 1993)
90
. Thus, and previous to the estimation of compensating 
variation and simulated exchange value measures, we empirically test the convergent 
validity of two elicitation formats and two payment vehicles in our CE application with 
the aim of validating the results from the experiment.  
 
4.1. Background 
 
Convergent validity of elicitation formats in CE mostly have compared rating, ranking 
and choice, although CE practitioners tend to prefer ordinal measures (ranking and 
choice) (Roe et al., 1996). Previous comparisons have given special attention to choice 
and ranking recoded as a choice formats, showing divergent results in earlier studies 
(Boyle et al., 2001; Mogas and Riera, 2001) and convergent validity in later studies 
(Caparrós et al., 2008; Akaichi et al., 2013). These comparisons, except Boyle et al. 
(2001)
91
, are performed in an experiment with two alternatives plus the status quo. In 
this chapter, we extend this by comparing the results from a choice and a ranking 
recoded as a choice in a split-sample design experiment with three alternatives plus the 
status quo, which implies additional information and complexity in the choice task 
compared to previous studies. 
Payment vehicles have also been compared in split-sample designs of choice 
experiment (Swallow and McGonagle, 2006; Biénabe and Hearne, 2006; Nunes and 
Travisi, 2009; Kaczan et al., 2013). In the procedure, a question including a different 
payment vehicle is randomly assigned to each respondent. These studies show that WTP 
estimates are statistically different across payment vehicles, highlighting the need for 
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See, for example, Cameron (1992); Adamowicz et al. (1994); Whitehead et al. (1995); Huang et al. 
(1997); Whitehead et al. (1998); Boyle et al. (2001); Mogas and Riera (2001); Azevedo et al. (2003); 
Scarpa et al. (2003); Dosman and Adamowicz (2006); Eom and Larson (2006); Caparrós et al. (2008); 
Azevedo et al. (2009); Christie and Azevedo (2009); Whitehead et al. (2010); Hoyos and Riera (2013); 
Akaichi et al. (2013); Jeon and Herriges (2016). 
91
 Although Boyle et al. (2001) used three alternatives plus the status quo, their experimental design was 
random in attributes, implying that the complete status quo alternative appeared only in some of the 
choice sets. This design is not usual in choice experiment and has the drawback that not having the status 
quo alternative in all choice sets makes it difficult to obtain adequate welfare measures (Roe et al., 1996). 
However, it may be case that it would be reasonable to ignore the status quo alternative, as there is no 
possibility of opting out, for example, for a legal obligation (Olschewski et al., 2012; Olschewski, 2013). 
Chapter 4. An application to public recreation in Spanish forests 
 
89 
 
further exploration of these divergences in choice experiment applications. In our choice 
experiment we compare two payment vehicles: an entrance fee and increased trip 
expenditures (due to increased gas prices), by including them in the same alternatives 
presented in the choice set. This particular design is inspired by previous hunting 
valuation studies that include both hunting trip costs and hunting fees as attributes in the 
same alternative (e.g., Mackenzie (1993)). We intend to identify how respondents make 
trade-offs between alternatives with different cost levels for the two payment vehicles 
presented. Thus, we perform a convergent validity test that analyzes whether the 
parameters (utility weights) of the different payment vehicles in the same utility 
function are similar or not; that is, whether the marginal utility of money associated 
with each payment is similar or not. In principle these utility weights should be similar, 
as both payments have the same consequence: reducing respondent’s income. However, 
Campos et al. (2007) find the opposite for the same payment vehicles that we analyze 
and in a similar empirical context, although they use a split-sample design and the 
contingent valuation method. They also show that the entrance fee generates a 
significantly higher proportion of protest response. Our design extends this analysis in a 
choice experiment setting, where trade-offs between alternatives are more explicit. This 
design also tries to minimize the protest response effect associated with the entrance fee.  
 
4.2. Survey and design 
 
Stone pine and cork oak trees are both characteristic of the Mediterranean landscape. 
They are found mostly on the Iberian Peninsula and in other countries in the 
Mediterranean basin. The cork oak tree has a thick, insulating bark that offers the raw 
material used for making cork bottle stoppers. The stone pine produces an edible seed, 
the pine nut, which is highly valued in the food sector. Firewood is also obtained as a 
by-product of silvicultural practices. In addition, cork oak and stone pine forests provide 
non-market services; e.g., preservation of biodiversity, landscape sightseeing, carbon 
sequestration and public recreation (Caparrós et al., 2010) and disservices, e.g., 
plantations increase evapotranspiration. In Spain, the forests where these species are 
dominant are located mainly in the southwest, west, northwest and northeast areas (see 
Figure 4.1); although there are important differences between the first three areas and 
the fourth. 
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Source: own elaboration based on MAGRAMA (2014a and 2014b) 
Figure 4.1. Distribution of stone pine (Pinus pinea) and cork oak (Quercus suber) 
forest area in Spain 
 
In the southwest, west and northwest these forests are managed open woodlands 
with low tree density. Trees are removed to increase the growth of grass and cork in 
cork oak forests and to foste pine-cone production in stone pine forests. This allows for 
easy access to these forests, which are usually found in contiguous extensions and large 
properties, although stone pine stands are also found in small pine groves. The cork oak 
landscape features an open woodland with scattered trees on hills with gentle slopes. 
The understory is mainly comprised of grasslands, which provide grazing for livestock 
and game. Cork oak stands can be pure or mixed with other tree species, such as holm 
oak (Quercus ilex), wild olive (Olea sylvestris) and stone pine. In the understory, we 
also find shrub species such as mastic (Pistacia lentiscus) and rockrose (Cistus spp.). 
The main characteristic of the stone pine tree is its singular umbrella shape. Grazing on 
stone pine forests is less common than in cork oak forests because of lower grass 
productivity. Stone pine forests can also be pure or mixed with other tree species such 
as holm oak, cork oak and Aleppo pine (Pinus halepensis). They either have no 
understory vegetation or may be accompanied by coppices of oaks and by other 
Mediterranean shrubs such as rockrose. 
In northeastern Spain, stone pine and cork oak forests are characterized by being 
fragmented (properties are small), minimally managed, densely forested and difficult to 
access. Commercial production of cork and pine nuts are also found in some areas, but 
there are many properties where this type of production has been abandoned. The result 
is a forest that usually functions as a wild garden for the cottage houses (known as 
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masias) that landowners have on their properties. These characteristics determine a 
different level of access to and provision of public recreation services than in the forests 
of the southwest, west and northwest areas. 
Our choice experiment targets recreation carried out by public visitors in the stone 
pine and cork oak forests located in the southwest, west and northwest of Spain, as they 
are more similar to each other and more suited for public recreation than forests in the 
northeast. In addition, cork oak forests in the southwest, west and northwest areas 
represent 92% of the cork oak forest area in Spain, while stone pine forests in these 
regions represent 86% of the stone pine forest area in Spain
92
. 
We included the choice experiment in a survey that was administered to a sample of 
604 Spanish adults (>18 years old) from 14 provinces located in the southwest, west and 
northwest of Spain (Cádiz, Málaga, Sevilla, Córdoba, Huelva, Badajoz, Cáceres, 
Valladolid, Madrid, Segovia, Toledo, Salamanca, Zamora and Ávila). We selected these 
provinces to draw our sample as they contain or are adjacent to regions that contain 
stone pine and cork oak forests, so most respondents know about or are familiar with 
these forests. We stratified the sample by provinces, based on population and randomly 
selected within each province. A professional company interviewed individuals from 
the sample at their homes from May to July 2008. The survey response rate was 70%. 
Although our initial sample was 604 respondents, the choice experiment was 
designed to be presented only to forest recreationists. Individuals not making an active 
use of these services are out of the scope of our valuation exercise. Thus, the valuation 
scenario started by asking respondents if they had made a recreation visit to a forest in 
Spain at least once in the past 12 months. Out of our initial sample of 604 individuals, 
336 answered affirmatively and were qualified as forest recreationists
93
. These 
respondents represent our final sample for the choice experiment. 
The choice experiment asked respondents first to think about the next visit they 
were planning to a forest and to imagine that, eventually, the expenses they incurred 
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 For brevity, when we refer to stone pine and cork oak forest in Spain throughout the chapter, we refer 
to forests located in the southwest, west and northwest areas. 
93
 Respondents who declared no participation in forest recreation skipped the CE. Previously, these 
respondents faced a series of attitudinal questions and a valuation scenario about the preservation of the 
Iberian Lynx. The analysis of these questions is presented in chapter 5. 
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during that visit increased because both the forest owner established an entrance fee for 
accessing the forest and there was an increase in trip expenditures (we asked 
respondents to think on a potential increase in these expenses but not to state a monetary 
value for this increase). This created the context for the valuation in the subsequent 
choice task. Respondents then faced two choice sets including three forest visit 
alternatives plus the status quo. The status quo implied not doing any of the visit 
alternatives presented in the choice set. Half of the sample had to choose one alternative 
and half of the sample had to rank the alternatives from most to least preferred. 
The forest visit alternatives were characterized by the following attributes and 
levels (see Table 4.1): the type of forest visited (TREE), the presence of recreation 
infrastructures (INS) (e.g., picnic tables, visitors’ centers, trail information), the 
possibility of seeing domesticated animals (ANI), the possibility of picking mushrooms 
(MUSH), the entrance fee (ENT) and the increased trip expenditures (EXP). We used 
two focus groups and a pre-test to identify the main attributes of a forest recreation visit, 
to design the vector of monetary values offered in the CE and to evaluate a preliminary 
version of the survey. We completed the pre-test with 50 individuals
94
. The pre-tests 
tested a preliminary set of attributes, where the presence of infrastructures for recreation 
and the possibility of sightseeing animals were highly scored. The possibility of picking 
mushrooms also appeared to be a valued attribute. This is probably because mushroom 
picking in some Spanish forests (particularly in those in the southern region of 
Andalucía) has a main recreation component independent of whether or not the 
harvested mushrooms are sold. Martínez Peña et al. (2015) show that only 4% of 
mushroom collectors in the forest of Andalucía have a commercial purpose while the 
remaining 96% are recreation-oriented. 
 
Table 4.1. Attributes of the Experiment and Levels 
Attributes Levels 
Type of forest (TREE) Stone pine; cork oak 
Infrastructures for recreation (INS) No; Yes 
Domestic animals (ANI) No; Yes 
Mushroom collecting (MUSH) No; Yes 
Entrance fee (ENT) €2; €7; €12; €17 
Increased trip expenditures (EXP) €2; €7; €12; €17 
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 Individuals participating in the pre-test and in the focus groups were general public and not only forest 
recreationists. 
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Using the universe of 256 combinations (4
2×24) of attribute levels (Table 4.1), we 
obtained 16 alternatives that form a main effects design. We then combined these 
alternatives in sets of three alternatives (plus the status quo), obtaining 16 choice sets 
that form an orthogonal design of combination of alternatives with an efficiency of 
100%. This design was also balanced in attribute levels. To reduce the cognitive effort 
of respondents, we blocked these 16 choice sets in eight questionnaire types with two 
choice sets each. To avoid potential order-effects, we replicated these questionnaires but 
changed the order of presentation of the choice sets. Thus, we ended up with 16 
questionnaire types presenting two choice sets each. The questionnaire type was 
randomly assigned to each individual. Appendix H presents an example of a choice and 
ranking set. 
Our sample is split up into 174 respondents facing the choice format and 162 
respondents facing the ranking format. We identified 10 protest responses in the choice 
sample (6% of the sample) and 12 protest responses in the ranking sample (10% of the 
sample). A chi-square test shows no significant difference between these protest 
response rates (χ2 statistic = 2.646). We identified protest responses by asking those 
who chose the status quo in both choice sets the reasons for their decision. When the 
answer to this question showed a clear rejection of the scenario presented (e.g., ‘I 
already pay enough taxes’ or ‘We have the right to freely access these forests’) we 
classified the respondent as a protest. For the remaining sample, we identified 2 
respondents in the choice sample (1% of the sample) and 7 respondents in the ranking 
sample (5% of the sample) that did not state the number of people they pay for during 
their forest visits. Again, a chi-square test shows no significant difference between these 
rates of non-response (χ2 statistic = 0.099). As this information is necessary to analyze 
the choice data (see section 4.3), our final sample is 162 respondents in the choice 
sample and 143 respondents in the ranking sample (324 and 286 observations, 
respectively, as each respondent faced two choice sets). 
 
4.3. Analysis 
 
We present now the econometric specification of the models for the choice and the 
ranking recoded as a choice (hereafter recoded choice) responses, the comparison tests 
used and the formulas and calculations needed for estimating aggregated economic 
values for forest recreation. 
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4.3.1. Econometric models 
  
We assume a linear-in-parameters utility function for individual l and alternative j in a 
set of J alternatives (j = 1, 2, 3, 4) and for choice situation u (u = 1, 2) with a systematic 
(
ljuV ) and a random component ( lju ): 
 
ljuljuljuljulju XVU  
'            [4.1] 
 
where   represents a vector of parameters, ljuX  is a vector of observed variables for 
alternative j, individual l and choice situation u; and lju  are random errors. We include 
as explanatory variables in the models the non-monetary attributes from Table 4.1 
(TREE, INS, ANI, MUSH) plus a constant specific to forest visit alternatives (ASC-
REC). The two monetary attributes from Table 4.1, which represent the total additional 
payments that the respondents would incur on the visit to the forest, are also included in 
the models but they are recoded to per-person values. Participants in the focus groups 
stated that it was easier to think in terms of total additional payment. However, as our 
goal is to estimate the WTP per visit per person, we asked respondents to indicate in the 
survey the number of people they usually pay for during their visits. Based on this, we 
recode the monetary attribute values to euros per person (named now ENTP and EXPP) 
to be included in the models. 
Given the previously defined utility function, the probability that the respondent l 
chooses alternative j over any alternative y ( Jy ) in choice situation u ( ljuPr ) is: 
 
    JyjVVVV ljulyulyuljulyulyuljuljulju  ,PrPrPr        [4.2] 
 
Different assumptions about the density function of random terms  ljuf   give 
different models. We start with a baseline model, the conditional logit, and further 
develop our analysis with the mixed logit model (Train, 2009). In the conditional logit, 
errors are assumed to be independently and identically distributed with an extreme value 
distribution across the h alternatives ( Jy ), l respondents and u choice situations. 
This gives the following probability: 
 



Jy
X
X
lju
lyu
lju
e
e
'
'
Pr


             [4.3] 
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where   is the scale factor, which is normalized to 1. This distribution implies that the 
ratio of the probabilities of choosing any two alternatives is independent of the 
remaining alternatives. This is known as the independence of irrelevant alternatives 
(IIA) hypothesis. The violation of this assumption may arise when some alternatives are 
qualitatively similar to others, as occurs in our experiment. Concerning the repeated 
choice situations faced by each respondent, we assume that they are independent; that 
is, we treat each choice situation as a different observation. 
The mixed logit is constructed on the assumption that the attribute parameters now 
have a component common to all individuals and an individual specific component. The 
utility function takes the following form: 
 
ljuljullju XU  
'                [4.4] 
 
where ljuX  is a vector of variables for alternative j , individual l and choice situation u, 
l  is a vector of parameters for person l (the individual specific component) and lju  
are random errors that are independently and identically distributed with an extreme 
value distribution (the common component). The individual specific component follows 
a distribution with density  f  which is a function of parameters   (for example, the 
mean and covariance of   in the population). This distribution is specified by the 
researcher. This model has the advantage of allowing correlated error terms between 
alternatives and between repeated choices made by each respondent, not assuming the 
IIA hypothesis and modeling unobservable heterogeneous preferences (Train, 2009). 
As this mixed logit model takes into account repeated choices by each respondent, 
the probability of a sequence of choices is the integral of the product of the conditional 
logit probabilities in [4.3] over all possible values of l  according to  f  (Train, 
2009). This integral has no closed-form solution but it can be evaluated through 
simulation for any value of parameters  . Being   the number of draws from   (in 
our models 500 ), the unbiased estimator of ljuPr  in the mixed logit is defined as 
(Train, 2009): 


















R
r
Jy
X
X
T
t
lju
lyu
r
l
lju
r
l
e
e
1
1
'
'
1
Pr




        [4.5] 
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In this application, we assume a normal distribution for random parameters, except 
for the payment attributes and the ASC-REC, which we assume to have fixed 
parameters
95
.  
The payment attributes (ENTP and EXPP) are coded as continuous variables (in 
euro values). The attributes INS, ANI and MUSH are dummy-coded (1 for the presence 
of the attribute in the alternative and 0 otherwise). The attribute TREE is effect-coded (-
1 for stone pine and 1 for cork oak) to differentiate the effect of choosing any of the two 
possible forest visit alternatives from the effect of choosing the status quo. The ASC-
REC is dummy-coded (1 for forest visit alternatives and 0 otherwise). The status quo 
attribute levels are normalized to zero. We used NLOGIT version 4.0 for estimating the 
parameters through maximum likelihood for the conditional logit and through simulated 
maximum likelihood for the mixed logit. 
From the models we generate empirical distributions for the individual parameters 
of each k attribute through the Krinsky and Robb (1986) bootstrapping technique. We 
take 1,000 random draws from the distribution of the parameters and their 
corresponding variance-covariance matrix. Then we use the resulting empirical 
distributions to estimate the mean marginal WTP for each k attribute using the formula 
ENTPk -  (or EXPPk   depending on the payment vehicle used in the calculation) 
and the mean WTP for a recreation visit to a forest given the values of the attributes 
characterizing that specific visit. The standard deviation and the 95% confidence 
interval of these estimates are calculated using the percentile approach (Efron and 
Tibshirani, 1993). 
 
4.3.2. Comparison tests 
 
To find out whether the choice and the recoded choice models provide similar 
parameter vectors we use a Likelihood Ratio test. We follow the proposal by Swait and 
Louviere (1993) that makes it possible to test whether divergences are due to 
differences in taste or differences in scale parameters.  
                                                          
95 
Specifying fixed parameters for the payment attributes allows for the WTP of each attribute to follow 
the same distribution as its random parameter (Revelt and Train, 1998). The option of specifying a normal 
distribution for the parameters of the payment attributes could imply behaviorally inconsistent WTP 
values. Alternatively, setting a different distribution for these parameters makes the interpretation of WTP 
values more difficult. 
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Our null hypothesis is: 
   RCRCCHCHAH  :                         [4.6] 
 
where CH refers to choice and RC refers to recoded choice. To falsify this hypothesis, 
the test separately examines two hypotheses. In hypothesis:  
 
   RCCHAH  :1            [4.7]  
 
where the relative scale parameter is set as RCCH  / . If HA1 is rejected, HA is also 
rejected and differences derive from taste parameters. If HA1 is not rejected, we test 
hypothesis: 
 
   RCCHAH  :2               [4.8] 
 
  
where the scale parameters are constrained to be equal under the null hypothesis. If HA2 
is rejected, HA is also rejected and the differences derive from scale parameters. If both 
HA1 and HA2 are not rejected, then HA is not rejected.  
We also compare the mean marginal WTP measures obtained with each format by 
applying the Krinsky and Robb (1986) bootstrapping technique. We do this for the 
marginal mean WTP estimated for attributes ASC-REC, TREE, INS, ANI and MUSH 
and for the mean WTP obtained for a visit to either a stone pine or a cork oak forest 
with no additional attributes. As we use two payment vehicles, we estimate separate 
WTP values for ENTP and EXPP; that is, in each case we divide the β parameters of the 
attributes by the β parameter of either ENTP or EXPP. Then, using the complete 
combinatorial test (Poe et al., 2005) we test the null hypothesis: 
 
   pvkRCpvkCHB WTPWTPH ,,,,:                         [4.9] 
 
where k corresponds either to an attribute or to a forest visit and pv corresponds to the 
payment vehicle used. 
To test differences between payment vehicles, we use a t-test to compare the 
parameters of the attributes ENTP and EXPP. Our null hypothesis here is: 
   EXPPENTPCH  :                [4.10] 
 
We also use the complete combinatorial test to compare the WTP obtained with 
each payment vehicle for each attribute and forest visits defined previously (a visit to 
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either a stone pine or a cork oak forest with no additional attributes). We test the null 
hypothesis: 
  
   kEXPPkENTPD WTPWTPH ,,:          [4.11] 
 
where k corresponds either to an attribute or to a forest visit.  
 
4.3.3. Estimation of aggregated values 
 
The Compensating Variation (CV) offers, given a specific set of attribute values, the 
welfare measure associated with the provision of the public recreation services of a 
forest visit. This is of interest for CBA and when using a welfare maximization 
approach. According to Small and Rosen (1981), the CV for forest alternative j from the 
conditional logit (CVj) is: 
 
    NMjNM
pv
j xxCV
'
0
'1 

         [4.12] 
 
where  NMx0' and  
NM
jx
' are the part of the utility corresponding to the non-
monetary attributes in alternatives 0 (the status quo) and j (a forest visit alternative) 
respectively
96
. 
pv  is the parameter of the payment vehicle used in the calculation. 
Alternative j represents visiting either a stone pine or a cork oak forest with no 
additional attributes. We consider this to be the most common scenario of a recreation 
visit in the analyzed stone pine and cork oak forests. When using the mixed logit model, 
the CV for forest alternative j, EJCV , is: 
 
    








 
NM
j
NM
pv
E
j xxECV
'
0
'1 

          [4.13] 
 
where the expectation, E , is taken with respect to the random parameters. To calculate 
this, we use stochastic simulation as in the mixed logit model in [4.5], estimating 
jCV  
1,000 times where E
jCV  is the mean of these 1,000 estimates. The aggregated jCV  (or 
E
jCV ) in a year is estimated multiplying jCV  (or 
E
jCV ) by the annual number of visits 
to the forest j, jQ . 
                                                          
96 
We drop subscript u as this estimation would be the same regardless of the choice situation faced by the 
respondent. 
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We also present the SEV measure, which offers the benefits that could potentially 
be collected in a real market for a non-market service. As explained in the previous 
chapter, this approach assumes that the forest owner/manager would set a single price 
for the provision of forest recreation services with the goal of maximizing benefits. 
Therefore, only part of the population would pay that price in the case that the non-
market services were internalized. To estimate this price, the method uses a demand 
function estimated with non-market valuation techniques (a choice experiment in our 
case) and a supply function based on the commercial costs associated with the provision 
of the service. In our application we assume that all costs incurred in the provision of 
recreation services are fixed because we have no information to simulate a cost function 
with a variable component. Under this assumption calculations are simpler, as the 
maximization of benefits occurs at the same price as the maximization of revenues. 
As explained in the third chapter, we calculate the revenues from a visit to forest 
alternative j,
jR
97
, in the hypothetical market as the price set for accessing a forest j,
jp , 
(the increased payment respect to the current situation)
98
 multiplied by the quantity of 
visits to a forest j, 
jq , which depends on jp : 
 
 jjjj pqpR                  [4.14] 
 
Assuming that at a zero price the number of visits equals the current visits under 
free access (i.e.   jj Qq 0 ), we express the quantity of visits as the probability of 
paying a price for visiting a forest j, 
jPr , multiplied by the current number of visits to a 
forest j, 
jQ : 
 
    jjjjj Qppq  Pr           [4.15] 
 
Therefore, we express the revenue function as: 
 
  jjjjj QppR  Pr           [4.16] 
 
                                                          
97
 In previous chapter R represents stock of renewable resources, buy we now use this notation to define 
the revenue function.  
98 
This increased payment can take any form that allows collecting the money in the hypothetical market. 
Any mechanism that allows charging jp  applies here. 
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Given that the increased payment in 
jPr is equivalent the price to be paid for the 
visit to a forest j, 
jp , we  calculate the first derivative of jR  in respect to jp  and find 
the
jp for which the first order condition of this derivative holds. To estimate jq , we 
substitute 
jp  in [4.15], using the probability function from the estimated model. We 
use the estimated 
jp  and jq  to calculate the maximum revenue from a visit to a forest j      
(
jR ), which is the SEV of public recreation. 
We perform this simulation for the next recreation visit that the forest visitors 
would make and then we assume that the estimated values are similar for the additional 
visits that these visitors make in the year. This implies that we simulate a single choice 
situation (t) in the probability function. This has no impact when we use the conditional 
logit, as this model assumes that choice situations are independent (even those faced by 
the same respondent) and the probability function is always [4.3]. In the case of the 
mixed logit, this simplifies the probability function because when 1=u  the product of 
conditional logit probabilities in [4.5] includes a single probability
99
. 
We estimate
jq , jp  and jR  in two scenarios:  
(i) One alternative of a forest visit plus the status quo (SEV-2) 
 
(ii) Two alternatives of a forest visit plus the status quo (SEV-3) 
The second scenario has the advantage of incorporating substitutes into the decision 
of visiting a forest. In both scenarios alternative j corresponds to visiting either a stone 
pine forest or a cork oak forest with no additional attributes. 
In SEV-2, we find 
jp  (see Appendix I) when: 
 
    01
'
 jpv
x
pe j 

         [4.17] 
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Ideally, the choice experiment design should have included in the questionnaire as many choice 
situations as number of annual recreation visit to forests made by the respondent. Unfortunately, this 
information was not available a priori. 
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As this equation has no analytical solution, we have to obtain jp  by iteration. For 
the mixed logit model, we estimate 
jp  by using stochastic simulation as in equation 
[4.5] when: 
 
     01' 
jpv
x
peE j 

         [4.18] 
 
We take the expectation, E , with respect to the random parameters; we estimate 
jp  1,000 times and we use the mean of jp  to calculate jq  and then jR .  
In SEV-3, we assume that the same price would be set in each forest alternative. In 
this case, we find 
jp  (see Appendix I) when:  
 
     
jpv
xx
pee yj  

1
''
         [4.19] 
  
As in SEV-2, we find 
jp  by iteration. For the mixed logit, we find jp  by using 
stochastic simulation when: 
 
        01'' 
jpv
xx
peEeE yj 

       [4.20] 
 
As in SEV-2 we take the expectation, E, with respect to the random parameters; 
we estimate jp  1,000 times and we use the mean of jp  to calculate jq  and  then jR . 
 
4.4.  Results 
 
4.4.1. Socioeconomic characteristics of the sample 
 
The average forest recreationist in our sample is a middle-aged person, with a net family 
income of almost €2,000 per month, a family of three members, a similar chance to be 
either a man or a woman, more likely to live in an urban center and more likely to have 
a medium level of education (between a high school and college degree). This person 
spends on average almost €9 per person and day during a visit to a forest (Table 4.2). 
While there are no official data available that offer information on the characteristics of 
forest recreationists in Spain, we can contrast our sample characteristics with those from 
previous studies on public recreation in Spanish forests (Arriaza et al., 2002; Campos et 
al., 2007; Samos Juarez and Bernabeu Cañete, 2011; Martínez-Carrasco et al., 2012). 
The characteristics from our sample are within the range of values offered by these 
studies except for gender; our sample offers a slightly higher percentage of women. In 
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previous studies age is between 33 and 43 years, net family income is between €1,718 
and €2,353 (updated to 2008 Euros), family members are between 3 and 4, percentage 
of woman is between 41 and 43 and trip cost per person and day is between €7.87 and 
€20.02 (updated to 2008 Euros). Education shows average levels between medium (high 
school) and high (college). No study offered information about percentage of 
respondents living in an urban center. 
 
Table  4.2. Socioeconomic characteristics of the forest recreationists facing the choice 
experiment 
Variables 
Choice experiment sample 
Mean n 
Age 36 300 
(13)  
Net family income (€ per month) 1,992 259 
(918)  
Family members 3.2 299 
(1.3)  
Gender (1=woman; 0=man) 0.47 305 
(0.50)  
Education (1= college degree or more; 0=otherwise) 0.39 305 
(0.49)  
Urban centre (% of respondents living in city with 
population larger than 20,000 inhabitants) 
0.68 305 
(0.47)  
Trip cost per person per day (€) 8.71 281 
(11.90)  
 
Note: standard errors are shown in parenthesis; n: number of observations. 
 
4.4.2. Choice versus recoded choice 
 
 
Mean parameters from the models
100
 for both the choice and the recoded choice samples 
are all significant, with the exception of TREE in the recoded choice sample (Table 4.3). 
The ASC-REC shows a positive sign, which indicates a preference for some of the 
presented forest visit alternatives. The negative sign of TREE shows a preference for 
visiting stone pine forests versus cork oak forests. This result is consistent with the fact 
that stone pine forests receive more visitors in Spain than cork oak forests, both in total 
and on a per hectare basis (see section 4.3). This may be related to a major proximity of 
                                                          
100 
Chi-square statistics for the IIA tests when removing the first, second and third alternative are 8.347, 
23.620
***
, and 20.067
***
 in the choice sample, and 12.555
*
, 8.400, and 9.555 in the recoded choice sample 
(
***
,
**
,
*
 denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively). IIA tests when the status quo 
alternative is removed cannot be computed. 
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stone pine forests to urban centers. In addition, stone pine forests cover almost 2.5 more 
hectares than cork oak forests in the studied area. The attributes INS, ANI and MUSH 
have positive signs, meaning that respondents are more likely to choose a forest visit 
alternative with these additional features. ENTP and EXPP both offer negative signs, 
indicating that the probability of choosing a recreation visit alternative decreases with 
higher payments. 
 
Table 4.3. Choice and recoded choice models. Likelihood ratio tests for comparing 
parameter vectors 
Attribute 
Choice (CH) Recoded choice (RC) 
Conditional 
logit 
Mixed 
logit 
Conditional 
logit 
Mixed 
logit 
Mean 
parameter 
Mean 
parameter 
St. dev. 
parameter 
Mean 
parameter 
Mean 
parameter 
St. dev. 
parameter 
ASC-REC 1.7839
***
 2.2942
***
  1.3580
***
 1.9211
***
  
 (0.3091) (0.4716)  (0.2897) (0.4911)  
TREE -0.1652
**
 -0.2000
*
 0.7318
**
 -0.0285 -0.0799 1.0466
***
 
 (0.0675) (0.1213) (0.3083) (0.0721) (0.1529)  (0.3480) 
INS 0.8737
***
 1.4375
***
 1.3474
**
 0.8108
***
 1.4771
***
 1.9569
***
 
 (0.1379) (0.3446) (0.5325) (0.1469) (0.3973)  (0.5983) 
ANI 0.5079
***
 0.7939
***
 2.0877
***
 0.3674
**
 0.5603
**
 1.5334
***
 
 (0.1368) (0.3044) (0.5850) (0.1454) (0.2794)  (0.5307) 
MUSH 0.2712
**
 0.5492
*
 1.6511
***
 0.5380
***
 0.9777
***
 1.5225
***
 
 (0.1320) (0.2883) (0.5731) (0.1429) (0.3132)  (0.5304) 
ENTP -0.1402
***
 -0.2400
***
  -0.1560
***
 -0.2858
***
  
 (0.0222) (0.0537)  (0.0263) (0.0644)  
EXPP -0.0517
**
 -0.0859
***
  -0.0695
***
 -0.1307
***
  
 (0.0204) (0.0332)  (0.0232) (0.0436)  
n 324 324 286 286 
Log-likelihood -351.67   -339.75 -325.31 -312.89 
Adj. McFadden ρ
2
   0.1259   0.1520   0.1076  0.1376 
Likelihood ratio 
test 
HA1: 
βCH=βRC 
Reject 
HA1? 
HA2: 
μCH=μRC 
Reject HA2? Reject HA? μβCH=μβRC 
Conditional logit      
   χ
2
 (CH vs. RC)     7.520 No    1.042 No No 
Mixed logit      
   χ
2
 (CH vs. RC)      9.492 No    2.755 No No 
Note: standard errors are shown in brackets; n: number of observations; asterisks (e.g.,***,**,*) denote significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Standard deviation parameters are all significant, with the highest values found for the 
attributes ANI and INS. This indicates more heterogeneity for preferences that lean 
toward the presence of animals and recreation infrastructures. According to the adjusted 
McFadden ρ2, choice models are better adjusted than recoded choice models and the 
mixed logit outperforms the conditional logit. In most cases, the estimated parameters 
show no large differences between choice and recoded choice models. The Likelihood 
Ratio test shows that we cannot reject the hypothesis (HA) that the parameter vectors of 
the choice and recoded choice models are statistically indistinguishable for both model 
specifications (Table 4.3). 
The complete combinatorial test indicates that we cannot reject the hypothesis (HB) 
of statistically indistinguishable WTP in most cases (Table 4.4). This is rejected only for 
the attributes ASC-REC and TREE and the Stone Pine visit in the conditional logit 
model when using the ENTP parameter, and for the attribute TREE in the conditional 
logit model when using the EXPP parameter. Overall, our results show convergent 
validity between choice and recoded choice. In the following analyses we work with a 
data-enriched model that pools the choice and recoded choice datasets. 
A caveat from our results is that the size of our subsamples are relatively small, 
decreasing the statistical power of the tests and therefore the probability of rejecting the 
null hypothesis. If we have larger subsamples the results of the tests may change. 
However, recent studies run similar tests using larger samples sizes
101
 and do not reject 
the null hypothesis of similar results between choice and recoded choice (from a 
ranking). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
101 
Caparrós et al. (2008) use subsamples of 3600 and 3594 observations (450 and 447 respondents, 
respectively) and Akaichi et al. (2013) use subsamples of 688 and 736 observations (43 and 46 
respondents, respectively). 
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Table 4.4. Mean willingness to pay (WTP) values and complete combinatorial test 
results from choice and recoded choice models 
Attribute 
Choice (CH) Recoded choice (RC) 
Complete 
combinatorial test  
(HB: WTPCH,k,pv = 
WTPRC,k,pv) 
Conditional 
logit 
Mixed 
logit 
Conditional 
logit 
Mixed 
logit 
Conditional 
logit 
Mixed 
logit 
(WTP) (WTP) (WTP) (WTP) (p-value) (p-value) 
Entrance fee payment vehicle 
ASC-REC 13.07 9.68 8.96 6.86 0.069
*
 0.146 
 [9.17, 17.98] [6.68, 13.40] [5.84, 12.69] [4.30, 9.92]   
TREE -1.23 -0.82 -0.20 -0.29 0.075
*
 0.250 
 [-2.20, -0.40] [-1.76, -0.05] [-1.03, 0.57] [-1.28, 0.66]   
INS 6.37 6.09 5.33 5.31 0.277 0.340 
 [4.52, 8.75] [4.05, 8.51] [3.56, 7.60] [3.35, 7.70]   
ANI 3.67 3.47 2.37 2.07 0.182 0.149 
 [2.10, 5.49] [1.53, 5.66] [0.85, 4.10] [0.45, 3.85]   
MUSH 2.00 2.40 3.57 3.51 0.143 0.254 
 [0.42, 3.68] [0.34, 4.63] [1.92, 5.48] [1.85, 5.49]   
Stone Pine 
visit 
14.30 10.50 9.16 7.15 0.069
*
 0.116 
 [10.17, 19.35] [7.36, 14.34] [6.02, 13.00] [4.44, 10.35]   
Cork Oak 
visit 
11.84 8.86 8.76 6.58 0.171 0.205 
 [8.13, 16.49] [5.70, 12.65] [5.68, 12.55] [3.85, 9.72]   
Increased trip expenditures payment vehicle 
ASC-REC 39.70 28.72 22.72 16.37 0.142 0.117 
 [19.99 , 86.45] [16.24, 53.73] [11.87, 40.46] [9.20, 27.48]   
TREE -3.76 -2.47 -0.53 -0.68 0.086
*
 0.217 
 [-10.10 , -0.86] [-6.49, 0.14] [-2.66, 1.32] [-3.05, 1.63]   
INS 20.38 18.63 13.80 13.19 0.272 0.270 
 [8.72 , 45.33] [8.23, 37.52] [6.51, 26.86] [6.08, 24.58]   
ANI 11.65 10.36 5.95 4.95 0.176 0.149 
 [4.73 , 24.03] [3.67, 21.41] [1.88, 11.68] [1.10, 10.46]   
MUSH 6.81 7.02 9.22 8.73 0.292 0.403 
 [0.78 , 15.90] [0.85, 16.88] [3.87, 17.91] [3.56, 16.79]   
Stone Pine 
visit 
43.46 31.19 23.26 17.05 0.118 0.102 
 [22.03 , 95.86] [17.35, 58.91] [12.09, 41.00] [9.35, 29.46]   
Cork Oak 
visit 
35.94 26.26 22.19 15.69 0.178 0.148 
 [18.22 , 77.99] [13.72 , 49.79] [11.54 , 40.28] [8.32, 26.83]   
Note: lower and upper bounds of the confidence interval (95%) are shown in brackets; asterisk (e.g.,*) denote 
significance at the 10% level; subscript k stands for attribute k, and subscript pv stands for payment vehicle. 
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4.4.3. Entrance fee versus increased trip expenditures 
 
The pooled models show similar results as the previous models in terms of significance 
and sign of the parameters (Table 4.5). We also find that the negative parameter is 
larger for ENTP than it is for EXPP. This indicates that having to pay a specific amount 
of money as an entrance fee derives a lower probability of visiting the forest than 
having to pay the same amount of money as additional trip expenditures. It seems then 
that respondents considered these two payment vehicles separately in their decision 
instead of the aggregated payment resulting from adding them up. A t-test for 
differences between ENTP and EXPP parameters shows significant differences in both 
the conditional logit (t-stat = –119.28;  p-value < 0.0001) and the mixed logit model (t-
stat = –102.94; p-value < 0.0001). Thus, we reject the hypothesis (HC) of similar 
marginal utility of money associated with these payment vehicles. 
 
Table 4.5. Pooled models using the choice and the recoded choice data 
Attributes 
Conditional logit  Mixed logit  
Mean parameter Mean parameter St. dev. parameter 
ASC-REC             1.5505
***
               2.0012
***
  
  (0.2099) (0.3248)  
TREE -0.1027
**
 -0.1574
*
            0.8351
***
 
 (0.0491) (0.0937)   (0.2248) 
INS             0.8387
***
               1.4051
***
            1.6360
***
 
 (0.1000) (0.2515) (0.3806) 
ANI             0.4357
***
               0.6450
***
            1.8748
***
 
 (0.9897) (0.1978) (0.3805) 
MUSH             0.3964
***
               0.7461
***
            1.3031
***
 
 (0.9642) (0.2025) (0.3962) 
ENTP -0.1436
***
 -0.2525
***
  
 (0.1680) (0.0394)  
EXPP -0.0580
***
 -0.0967
***
  
 (0.1519)  (0.0254)  
n 610 610 
Log-likelihood -681.26                             -660.14 
Adj. McFadden ρ2 0.1180          0.1435 
Note: standard errors are shown in brackets; n: number of observations; asterisks (e.g.,***,**,*) denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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The WTP values obtained with each payment vehicle (Table 4.6) show significant 
differences in all cases, except for the attribute TREE. This rejects the hypothesis (HD) 
that both payment vehicles derive a similar WTP estimates. Differences imply that 
respondents are willing to pay around 2.7 additional Euros as trip expenditures for each 
additional euro they are willing to pay as an entrance fee for visiting the forest. 
Although our design allows individuals to choose according to the aggregated cost from 
both payment vehicles, our models show that their utility parameters are significant and 
different from each other. If respondents had made the choice considering the 
aggregated costs, the utility parameters of the payment vehicles (and therefore the 
derived WTP estimates) should have been similar. 
 
Table 4.6. Mean willingness to pay (WTP) values and complete combinatorial test 
results obtained with the entrance fee and the increased trip expenditures 
payment vehicles from the pooled model 
Attributes 
Conditional logit Mixed logit 
Complete 
Combinatorial test 
(HD: WTPENTP,k = 
WTPEXPP,k) 
Entrance 
fee 
Increased  
 trip 
expenditures 
Entrance 
fee 
Increased  
trip 
expenditures 
Conditional 
logit 
Mixed 
logit 
(WTP) (WTP) (WTP) (WTP) (p-value) (p-value) 
ASC-REC 10.90 28.46 8.15 21.73 0.001*** 0.000*** 
 [8.35, 13.72] [18.58, 44.52] [6.18, 10.33] [14.62, 33.04]   
TREE -0.73 -1.97 -0.54 -1.46 0.133*** 0.224** 
 [-1.31, -0.17] [-4.14, -0.41] [-1.24, 0.11] [-3.45, 0.32]   
INS 5.92 15.68 5.58 15.04 0.002*** 0.001*** 
 [4.56, 7.49] [9.26, 25.44] [4.15, 7.10] [9.33, 24.42]   
ANI 3.07 7.99 2.58 6.87 0.013** 0.038*** 
 [1.86, 4.34] [4.38, 13.10] [1.25, 3.90] [3.03, 11.74 ]   
MUSH 2.75 7.22 2.89 7.67 0.021** 0.023** 
 [1.64, 4.02] [3.74, 12.36] [1.58, 4.34] [3.89, 12.44]   
Stone Pine 
visit 
11.63 30.43 8.69 23.19 0.000
***
 0.000
***
 
 [9.04,14.72] [19.87, 47.21] [6.60, 11.06] [15.45, 34.97]   
Cork Oak 
visit 
10.16 26.49 7.60 20.27 0.001
***
 0.001
***
 
 [7.58, 13.07] [16.88, 41.24] [5.56, 9.85] [13.52, 31.23]   
Note: lower and upper bounds of the confidence interval (95%) are shown in brackets; asterisks (e.g.,***,**) denote 
significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively; subscript k stands for attribute k. 
 
Chapter 4. An application to public recreation in Spanish forests 
 
108 
 
The rejection of convergent validity for these payment vehicles opens up the question of 
why this occurs. A possible explanation is related to the perception of the right to access 
forest areas freely in Spain. Free access to forests for public users in Spain is possible in 
some areas owned by public administrations, while the remaining private and public 
forests are not open to the general public. However, the possibility of accessing some 
areas freely may have created the perception for some people that they have the right to 
access forests for free. This may have resulted in protest behavior towards the entrance 
fee payment vehicle, reducing the stated WTP. Campos et al. (2007) discuss that this is 
the cause of different protest response rates between different subsamples facing one of 
these payment vehicles (up to 35% of protest for the entrance fee and 3% of protest for 
the increased trip expenditures) as most protest responses for the entrance fee were 
related to the perceived right to freely access forest areas. In our choice experiment, the 
protest response rate is lower (6%) than in Campos et al. (2007), but the difference 
between WTP estimates has not been reduced. A possibility is that the same protest 
behavior found in Campos et al. (2007) is present in our results but translated into an 
effect on the WTP, which is positive but significantly reduced respect to the increased 
trip expenditures. Another explanation is that the entrance fee payment vehicle may be 
more subject to strategic behavior; some respondents may think that by stating a lower 
payment for the entrance fee they may influence future policies aiming to establish fees 
for accessing these areas. Unfortunately, we did not design the survey with the goal of 
identifying these or other factors that drive this discrepancy in WTP estimates. This is 
left for future research with this specific goal in mind. 
Given the results obtained, the size of the subsamples in this analysis is not as 
relevant as in the comparison of the choice and the recoded choice. Having larger 
subsamples would increase the statistical power of the payment vehicle tests, but this 
would make even more likely the rejection of our null hypothesis. 
The mean WTP values from Table 4.6 lie within the range of values estimated in 
recent studies valuing public recreation in Spanish forests and using the same payment 
vehicles than our choice experiment. Studies using the entrance fee (Arriaza et al., 2002; 
Campos et al., 2007; Samos Juarez and Bernabeu Cañete, 2011; Martínez-Carrasco et 
al., 2012) offer mean WTP values between €4 and €12 (updated to 2008 Euros), so our 
estimations are in the upper bound of this range. The only study using the increased trip 
expenditures (Campos et al., 2007) offers a mean WTP between €14 and €23 (updated 
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to 2008 Euros), so our estimates are in the upper bound of these values, and in some 
cases slightly higher. We must note that these previous studies employed the contingent 
valuation method, and that choice experiments usually offer higher mean WTP values 
than contingent valuation (Metcalfe et al., 2012; Oviedo and Caparrós, 2015). 
 
4.4.4. Aggregated results 
 
We estimate the annual visits to stone pine forests from a question included in the 
survey. This question asked respondents who had made a recreation visit to a Spanish 
forest at least once in the past 12 months how many of these visits they made to stone 
pine forests. Based on this information, and considering the population from each of the 
provinces in our stratified sample, we estimate 13,359,885 visits to stone pine forests 
between May 2007 and April 2008 (we assume that these visits correspond to 2008). As 
the stone pine forest area in Spain (excluding the northeast area) is 451,826 hectares 
(MAGRAMA, 2015a)
102
, we obtain 29.57 visits per hectare in 2008. For cork oak 
forests, we use the data on annual visits to the Monfragüe National Park and to the 
Alcornocales Natural Park, the two major cork oak forest areas that receive recreation 
visits in the southwest and west of Spain. For the Monfragüe National Park, 
MAGRAMA (2015b) estimates 331,788 visits in 2008. For the Alcornocales Natural 
Park, Oviedo et al. (2015) calculated 1,737,695 visits in 2010. In the latter case, we 
assume that the number of visits were similar in 2008. As these two forests cover an 
area of 186,163 hectares (Europarc España, 2012), we estimate 11.11 visits per hectare 
in 2008. 
To obtain aggregated values (in 2008 Euros), we work with the pooled dataset. 
Additionally, instead of using the payment vehicles ENTP and EXPP separately, this 
model includes the variable Bid that adds up the amount offered with both payment 
vehicles. This is motivated by the fact that, due to the observed divergences between 
payment vehicle results, we are unable to pick a single payment vehicle to obtain 
aggregated values. As Campos et al. (2007) discusses, both vehicles can be conditioned 
by effects associated with the payment context that they create. We believe that adding 
up both payments in the model is the best solution for estimating aggregated values. The 
results of this model show that all parameters are significant and have the same signs as 
in previous models (Table 4.7). The mixed logit is better adjusted than the conditional 
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logit according to the McFadden ρ2. The significance of the standard deviation 
parameters for TREE, INS, ANI and MUSH also shows preference heterogeneity for 
these attributes. 
 
Table 4.7. Pooled models using the choice and recoded choice data and including the 
variable Bid as payment attribute 
Attribute 
Conditional logit Mixed logit 
Mean parameter Mean parameter St. dev. parameter 
ASC-REC 1.5446*** 1.9192***  
        (0.2087)   (0.2999)  
TREE   -0.0993** -0.1461* 0.7528*** 
 (0.0488) (0.0869)     (0.1993) 
INS 0.7918*** 1.2452*** 1.5240*** 
  (0.0985) (0.2153) (0.3505) 
ANI 0.4326*** 0.6189*** 1.6524*** 
 (0.0981) (0.1839) (0.3462) 
MUSH 0.3982*** 0.6896*** 1.2751*** 
 (0.0958) (0.1865) (0.3594) 
Bid   -0.0978*** -0.1586***  
 (0.0112) (0.0228)  
n          610 610 
Log-likelihood    -688.69 -668.41 
Adj. McFadden ρ2            0.1089                                0.13321 
Note: standard errors are shown in brackets; n: number of observations; asterisks (e.g.,***,**,*) denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively; the attribute Bid adds up the two amounts offered 
in the entrance fee and increased trip expenditures payment attributes.  
 
In all cases the conditional logit model offers a higher mean WTP for the CV 
calculation, a higher 
*p  for the SEV calculation and higher aggregated values than the 
mixed logit model (Table 4.8)
103
. For the mixed logit we find a higher mean WTP for 
the CV calculation and a higher 
*p  for the SEV-2 calculation for stone pine forests. 
The percentage of visits in SEV-2 is lower in stone pine forests (45% versus 46% for 
cork oak forests). Aggregated values are higher in all cases for stone pine forests 
because the number of annual visits to these forests is six times higher than the number 
of visits to cork oak forests. For the SEV-3 scenario, 
*p is forced to be the same for 
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Note that we round to the nearest unit without decimals the estimated p* values in Table 4.8, as we 
expect that the price in the potential market would be also rounded. 
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both forests, but it translates to a different percentage of visits in each forest. Compared 
to SEV-2, this percentage drops to 33% for stone pine forests and to 27% for cork oak 
forests. Aggregated values are higher for stone pine forests in SEV-3 in all cases. 
If we compare the three aggregated measures, we see that the CV offers the higher 
value, the SEV-2 represents between 45 and 51% of the CV, and the SEV-3 represents 
between 68 and 90% of the SEV-2. As expected, both the market simulation and the 
inclusion of substitutes imply a lower aggregated value for forest public recreation. 
Overall, the simulated exchange value is between 35 and 51% of the compensating 
variation value. 
Finally, we also notice that the survey was conducted in 2008 and the estimated 
economic values may have varied significantly since then. While using the consumer 
price index variation over a period may be appropriate to update values, it is true that 
the economic recession and the slow economic recovery since 2008 may have changed 
social preferences for non-market services. Therefore, our estimations must be taken 
carefully. However, we think that this time difference between survey and publication 
dates is not particularly relevant for the validity test and for the comparison of economic 
measures presented, as any variation in values should not be affecting differently to the 
compared estimates. 
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Table 4.8. Aggregated values of compensating variation (CV) and simulated exchange value (SEV) of public recreation in stone pine and 
cork oak forests in Spain (year 2008) 
Measure 
Stone pine Cork oak 
€ per visit Visits 
Aggregated 
€ per visit Visits 
Aggregated 
€ €/ha € €/ha 
Conditional logit 
CV 16.81 13,359,885 224,564,914 497.02 14.78 2,069,483 30,583,277 164.28 
SEV-2
a 
19.00 5,966,946 113,371,981 250.92 18.00 873,059 15,715,055 84.42 
SEV-3
b
 22.00 3,837,585 84,426,859 186.86 22.00 487,378 10,722,323 57.60 
Mixed logit 
CV 13.02 13,359,885 173,939,696 384.97 11.18 2,069,483 23,141,404 124.31 
SEV-2
a
 13.00 6,011,948 78,155,327 172.98 12.00 951,962 11,423,546 61.36 
SEV-3
b
 16.00 4,408,762 70,540,193 156.12 16.00 558,760 8,940,167 48.02 
Note: Total hectares of stone pine and cork oak forests are 451,826 and 186,163, respectively. 
a
 SEV-2 stands for simulated exchange value in the scenario of a forest visit alternative and the status quo. 
b
 SEV-3 stands for simulated exchange value in the scenario of two forest visit alternatives (either to a stone pine or to a cork oak forest) and the status quo. 
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4.5. Intermediate summary 
 
We have presented two convergent validity tests of a choice experiment for valuing 
public recreation in stone pine and cork oak forests in Spain. On the one hand, we have 
obtained similar results from a choice and from a ranking recoded as a choice in an 
exercise involving three alternatives plus the status quo. On the other hand, we have 
found that respondents are willing to pay €2.7 more as increased trip expenditures for 
each additional euro paid as an entrance fee. While these additional payments would 
have the same effect on the disposable income of forest recreationists, they do not seem 
to have the same effect on their utility. These results corroborate the findings from 
Campos et al. (2007) who used the contingent valuation method. These differences may 
be explained by the perception of some forest recreationists that they have the right to 
freely access the forest and by the strategic behavior of some respondents who try to 
avoid the establishment of fees for accessing current free access areas by stating a lower 
WTP when facing the entrance fee payment vehicle.  
Our empirical results show a small but significant difference in the WTP per person 
for visiting stone pine and cork oak forests in Spain. The WTP per person is around €2 
higher in stone pine forests. The valuation of the other attributes shows a significant and 
positive WTP for the possibility of seeing domesticated animals, the possibility of 
picking mushrooms, and for infrastructures that foster recreation opportunities. Of these 
three attributes, the highest value is placed on infrastructures. An implication for 
managers is that a higher priority should be given to forest areas with presence of these 
types of infrastructures.  
Concerning the aggregated economic values, we compare the compensating 
variation and the simulated exchange value measures. The latter measures account for 
35 to 51% of the former values. Aggregated values are higher for stone pine forests as 
they receive more visitors than cork oak forests. Results indicate that when visitors face 
a scenario in which they must actually pay for enjoying forest recreational activities, not 
all of them would be willing to pay this price. In particular, when there is no any other 
forest alternative, only around 44.82% of visitors of stone pine forests and 44.09% of 
visitors of cork oak forests would pay the price. When a forest visit alternative exists, 
percentages drop to 30.86% and 25.27% of visitors of stone pine and cork oak forests, 
respectively. 
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5. AN APPLICATION TO THE IBERIAN LYNX CONSERVATION IN 
SPAIN104 
 
The integration of non-market ecosystem services into the national accounts in a consistent 
way with market goods and services has shown to be possible for public forest recreation 
by using the SEV method, as discussed in the previous chapter. The main goal of this 
chapter is to apply this methodology to the economic valuation of threatened biodiversity, 
which is also a public good. In particular, we are now interested in analyzing how Spanish 
people assess a conservation program to ensure that the Iberian Lynx (Lynx pardinus) 
returns to 1990 levels, as well as the role they adopt when facing a contribution to an 
environmental program.  
As explained throughout the dissertation, the SEV method requires the estimation of 
the demand and supply functions in order to calculate a (simulated) exchange value. In this 
chapter, we use a contingent valuation study to obtain the demand function for this 
conservation program for the Iberian Lynx. Contingent valuation has been widely used in 
assessing individuals’ WTP for environmental public goods such as the one we are dealing 
with in this application. 
Next to this, motivations for paying for environmental public goods may differ among 
agents. If individuals use different response patterns, they are potentially using multiple 
preference orderings that provide different answers depending on the context the valuation 
is framed (Arrow, 1951; Harsanyi, 1955; Sen, 1977; Margolis, 1982; Hausman and 
McPherson, 1996; Beckerman and Pasek, 1997; Nyborg, 2000; Russell et al., 2003; Eggert 
et al., 2016). When the good or service in question solely affects the own respondent’s 
well-being, it is likely that he/she is acting as consumer; while when it comes to pure public 
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goods, he/she may be acting either as a consumer or as a citizen (Sagoff, 1988; Blamey et 
al., 1995; Nyborg, 2000).  
Altruistic behavior related to the consumer/citizen dichotomy has been widely studied 
both from a general point of view (Edwards, 1986; Andreoni, 1990; Holmes, 1990; 
Johansson, 1993, Arrow et al., 1993; Crowards, 1997; Curtis and McConnell, 2002) and 
with regard to environmental conservation and wildlife preservation (Sagoff, 1988; Stevens 
et al., 1991, 1993; Blamey et al., 1995). As far as we know, the only study formalizing the 
differentiation between consumers and citizens can be found in Nyborg (2000). She 
suggests using the term Homo Economicus (henceforth referred to as HE) to describe those 
individuals who maximize their own wellbeing, and the term Homo Politicus (henceforth 
referred to as HP) to describe those individuals who maximize social welfare and respond 
as they think that society should act. The latter individuals are motivated by altruism and 
consider that the entire society has a moral obligation of conserving the environment. Such 
a distinction suggests that every individual may have two different and possibly conflicting 
preference orderings depending upon whether they behave as HE or as HP. For example, 
one individual may prefer one alternative from a social perspective, while another may 
prefer the same alternative from a personal point of view. Nyborg (2000) goes a step further 
and also differentiates two types of individuals within Homo Politicus. She terms Homo 
Politicus with shared responsibility those who consider that the whole society has a moral 
obligation for providing the good (the decision of other citizens does matter), and Homo 
Politicus with sole responsibility those who act independently from the rest (personal 
consideration concerning environmental goods). These two types of individuals are 
henceforth referred to as HPsh and HPso, respectively.  
In our study, we introduce another type of individual: Homo Strategicus (or free-rider), 
henceforth referred to as FR. While these individuals may be interested in environmental 
conservation, they expect the payment of others may be enough for achieving the goal. In 
other words, they act knowing the possibility of getting some advantage with the parts 
provided by other respondents, thereby having a strategic incentive to understate WTP 
(McFadden and Leonard, 1993). This kind of behavior is considered to be rational in one 
shot games in a non-cooperative game theory framework. This is relevant because, contrary 
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to what may happen with market goods and services, when it comes to public goods, it does 
not seem so obvious that social welfare will be promoted following only self-interest 
because many individuals (maybe all of them) would want to free-ride. While theory 
predicts free-riding, empirical research provides mixed results (Marwell and Ames, 1981; 
Kim and Walker, 1984; Andreoni, 1988, 1995; Weimann, 1994; Ledyard, 1995; Bardsley, 
2000; Champ et al., 2002; Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010). 
After empirically identifying this triple consumer-citizen-strategic distinction through 
follow-up questions in the contingent valuation survey, we look at how it affects the 
valuation function of the respondents’ WTP for the Iberian Lynx conservation program and 
the aggregation of the estimated values. While applications of contingent valuation to 
biodiversity conservation usually focus on the compensating variation (or any other 
Hicksian variation), we extend this analysis by also applying the SEV method.  
 
5.1. Survey and design  
 
The Iberian Lynx is listed as one of the most endangered feline species of the planet by the 
International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN). In fact, it was classified as 
critically endangered in 2008 according to the IUCN Red List criteria; while it became 
classified as endangered in 2015 (Rodríguez and Calzada, 2015).  
Although this species is confined to the Iberian Peninsula, from where it originated, it 
is currently restricted to central and southwestern Spain and, in particular, to two separate 
regions, namely Andújar-Cardeña and Doñana-Aljarafe (Simón et al., 2012) (see Figure 
5.1). Population fragmentation and local extinction processes have been occurring since the 
middle of the last century. The population was estimated at 1,100 specimens in 1990, but 
wild populations have undergone a substantial decline by around 90% in last 20 years (see 
Figure 5.2). That is why the interest in its conservation has been continually increasing, and 
several programs, actions and plans for its recovery have been conducted by different 
administrations and NGOs in recent years (see, e.g. the projects Life + IBERLINCE and 
Programa de Conservación Ex-Situ del Lince Ibérico)
 105
.  
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Source: Rodriguez and Delibes (1990) for figures (a) and (c) and own elaboration based on MAGRAMA 
(2016) for figure (b) and (d) 
 
Figure 5.1. Spatial and temporal evolution of Iberian Lynx specimens (black areas indicate 
the Iberian Lynx distribution) 
 
Source: own elaboration based on Rodríguez and Delibes (1990); Guzmán et al. (2005); Simón (2016) 
 
Figure 5.2. Evolution of Iberian Lynx specimens 
1960 1980 
2010 
(a) (b) 
(c) 
1990 
(d) 
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Our field study deals with a conservation program that seeks for getting back the 
Iberian Lynx population to 1990 levels, which is considered the minimum threshold 
necessary to ensure its preservation. The survey was conducted with Spanish adults (> 18 
years old) from 14 provinces (Cádiz, Málaga, Sevilla, Córdoba, Huelva, Badajoz, Cáceres, 
Valladolid, Madrid, Segovia, Toledo, Salamanca, Zamora and Ávila) close to areas 
comprising the potential habitat for the Iberian Lynx or in which sometimes the Iberian 
Lynx used to exist (see Figure 5.1.b). The Iberian Lynx is very selective when settling in a 
certain area. This species preferably selects Mediterranean forests and scrublands, that is, 
open grasslands with a high density of shrubs and trees such as cork oak (Quercus suber) 
and holm oak (Quercus ilex). It is usually located 400 to 900 meters above the sea level, 
where there is a low and dense scrub brush, thus avoiding farmlands and population 
centers. This habitat provides the adequate shelter and access to open pasture for the Iberian 
Lynx to feed on the European Rabbit (Oryctolagus cuniculus), which represents 90% of 
their diet (Palomares et al., 2000; Palomares, 2001).  
A professional surveying company interviewed 750 individuals at their homes from 
May to July 2008. A booklet (see Appendix G) was presented to the respondents, with a 
brief description of the Iberian Lynx. The main highlights were: a) it is the most 
endangered feline species along with the Bengali tiger in the world; b) population has 
decreased from 1,100 to 200 individuals over the last 20 years; and c) 1,100 individuals are 
considered as the minimum threshold for the preservation of this species. The survey 
response rate was 70%. We also identify 93 protest responses (12.4% of the sample) giving 
a valid sample size of 657 individuals. However, our final sample is made up of 596 
respondents, as we only consider those respondents who are willing to pay certain amount 
of money, as we will see below. We also made a pre-test with 50 individuals.  
The valuation question was asked in a double-bounded format in which the first 
question asked respondents whether they would be willing to pay a certain amount of 
money to implement a program to conserve the Iberian Lynx (see Question 15 in Appendix 
H). If the answer was ‘yes’, they were offered the possibility of paying a larger amount 
(Question 16 in Appendix H). If the answer was ‘no’, they were offered the possibility of 
paying a lower amount (Question 17 in Appendix H). Following-up, we included an open-
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ended question that asked respondents to indicate the maximum amount of money they 
would be willing to pay (Question 18 in Appendix H). We have only used this question to 
identify the number of individuals who are willing to pay.  
The bid offered in the double-bounded question varies from one survey to another. We 
used three different bid vectors: (10; 20; 30; 45) for the single-bounded question, (30; 35; 
45; 65) for the upper bound of the double-bounded question, and (5; 10; 15; 20) for the 
lower bound of the double-bounded question (see the original survey in Appendix B).  
 
5.1.1. Payment vehicles 
 
Payment vehicles are usually compared in split-sample designs of contingent valuation so 
that a question including a different payment vehicle is randomly assigned to each 
respondent. Previous valuation research on the effects of payment vehicles in contingent 
valuation finds evidence of statistical significant differences between estimations 
(Johansson, 1996; Morrison et al., 2000; Jakobsson and Dragun, 2001; Champ et al., 2002; 
Bergstrom et al., 2004; Campos et al., 2007; Wiser, 2007; Ivehammar, 2009; Aoun, 2015). 
Kontoleon et al. (2005) is an exception to this. Most of these papers use taxes and 
donations (or voluntary contributions) as payment mechanisms. Champ et al. (2002) also 
incorporate the possibility of holding a referendum and Kontoleon et al. (2005) compare a 
standard production tax with a tax reallocation scheme. However, only a few of them are 
directly focused on the valuation of biodiversity conservation-related issues (Johansson, 
1996; Jakobsson and Dragun, 2001; Aoun, 2015). 
In our exercise, we compare the results from four payment vehicles: 1) contribution to 
a fund managed by a NGO; 2) contribution to a fund managed by a NGO with a guarantee 
that funds would be reimbursed if not enough were collected (if more than enough were 
collected, the surplus would be repaid); 3) additional increased income tax; and 4) a 
referendum for an increased income tax (the project will only be launched if a majority 
votes for it; see Appendix H). The payment associated to each of these four payment 
vehicles would be implemented only in one year. As the first two and the second two 
payment vehicles are similar to each other, we also analyze the same scenario by grouping 
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them into two categories: contribution to a fund and increased income tax. Table 5.1 shows 
the number of individuals facing each payment vehicle in our sample.  
 
Table 5.1.  Number of individuals facing each payment vehicle 
Four payment 
vehicles 
Contribution 
to a fund 
Contribution to a 
guaranteed fund 
Increased 
income tax 
Referendum for an 
increased income tax  
198 178 182 192 
Two payment 
vehicles 
Contribution to a fund Increased income tax 
376 374 
 
5.1.2. Motivations for paying to conserve the Iberian Lynx 
 
Motivations for paying may be very different when individual preferences come into play. 
To analyze this, we first need to identify how many individuals are actually willing to pay a 
certain amount of money by building on the single-bounded, double-bounded and open-
ended questions mentioned above. According to this format, individuals are willing to pay 
if they give: (i) a ‘yes’ response to the single-bounded question, or (ii) a ‘no’ response to 
the single-bounded question, but a ‘yes’ response to the double-bounded question, or, (iii) a 
‘no’ response to the single-bounded question, a ‘no’ response to the double-bounded 
question, but a positive (non-zero) amount of money to the open-ended question.  
By contrast, they would not be willing to pay if they give a ‘no’ response to the single-
bounded question, a ‘no’ response to the double-bounded question and either a zero 
response or a ‘no’ response to the open-ended question. 
Based on this information, we can build different models in order to identify the 
behavior of individuals when facing a payment scenario to protect the Iberian Lynx. To that 
end, we will use a set of follow-up questions. 
 
 
 
 
In order to know whether a respondent behaves as a consumer or as a citizen, we use a 
HEPFR follow-up question (see Question 19 in Appendix H). It has two possible answers:  
MODEL HEPFR: In this scenario we differentiate between HE and HP. Note that only 
those responding paying a certain amount of money can be classified as HE or as HP. 
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a) I pay because I consider socially correct to guarantee the preservation of the Iberian 
Lynx. 
b) I pay because the preservation of the Iberian Lynx is important for me.   
 
If the response is a), respondent is classified as HP; whereas if the response is b), 
respondent is classified as HE. 
However, it should be pointed out that this model includes the possibility of a free-
rider problem, as there may be individuals considered as HE or HP who behave 
strategically. To the extent that we work with the whole sample in this model, we do not 
analyze this effect separately. Determining how many of these respondents act as free-
riders and excluding them from the sample allows us to construct the following model: 
MODEL HEP: This scenario differentiates between HE and HP, while eliminating the free-
riding effect. That is, it only considers those HE and HP who do not behave strategically.  
 
In other words, HE and HP may be divided into those who are not FR and those who are 
FR. Thus, if we want to determine how many of them do not adopt this strategic behavior, 
we need to look at the HEP follow-up question (see Question 20 in Appendix H). This 
question has four possible answers: 
a) I thought that if I paid the rest of the Spanish citizens (contributors) would pay the 
same quantity. 
b) I thought that if I paid the rest of the Spanish citizens (contributors) would pay, but 
not necessarily the same quantity. 
c) I thought that if I paid even a small quantity, this could be compensated by the 
payment of other contributors.  
d) I did not take into account the quantity that others would pay. 
 
If the response is c), respondent is identified as a free-rider.  
But, what happens with respondents answering a), b) or d)? Such responses help us 
build the third model: 
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Coming back to the HEP follow-up question, if response is d), respondent is HPso; whereas 
if the response is a) or b), respondent is HPsh.  
In short, the five types individuals analyzed in our exercise are shown in Figure 5.3 (in 
grey color). This figure also permits visualizing graphically the three models referred to. 
 
Source: own elaboration 
 
Figure 5.3. Classification of types of individuals  
 
The next issue consists in analyzing what happens with those respondents who are not 
willing to pay any amount of money. Again, it may also be the case that some respondents 
are considered as FR even if they are not willing to pay. In order to identify them, we need 
the FR follow-up question posed to these respondents
106
. This question
107
 has three possible 
answers: 
                                                          
106
 Follow-up questions number 21, 22, 23 and 25 in Appendix H have not been analyzed, as we believe that 
they may lead to confusion and do not provide more explanatory capacity to the models.  
107
 In the case of the type of survey in which the payment vehicle is a referendum for an increased income tax, 
options are: a) I thought that although I did not vote in favor the rest of the Spanish people would vote in 
favor, b) I thought that if I did not vote the rest of the Spanish people would not vote either, and c) I did not 
consider what others would vote.  
MODEL HSSFR: In this scenario, we differentiate between HE, HPsh, HPso and FR.  
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a) I thought that if I did not pay the rest of the Spanish citizens (contributors) would 
pay.  
b) I thought that if I did not pay the rest of the Spanish citizens (contributors) would 
not pay either. 
c) I did not take into account the quantity that others would pay.  
 
If the response is a), respondent is classified as FR
108
. 
According to this survey, the number of individuals who belong to each group is 
shown in Table 5.2. 
Table 5.2.  Classification of types of individuals by groups 
 Observations 
Paying 596 
Homo Economicus (HE) 279 
     Strategicus (FR) 32 
Homo Politicus (HP) 317 
     With sole responsibility (HPso) 155 
     With shared responsibility (HPsh) 120 
     Strategicus (FR) 42 
Not paying 154 
They definitively do not pay 61 
      Strategicus (FR) 4 
Protest responses 93 
TOTAL 750 
 
As it can be seen in Table 5.2., there are 93 protest responses (12.4% of the sample). We 
identified them by asking a follow-up question to respondents who answered ‘no’ to the 
single-bounded question, ‘no’ to the double-bounded question and a zero WTP or ‘do not 
know’ answer to the open-ended question. In the follow-up, we asked them the motives of 
their responses and based on these motives we identified them as ‘zero’ protests. 
 
                                                          
108
 In Appendix I we analyze the dichotomy between FR and those who do not follow a strategic behavior, 
regardless of whether they are willing to pay or not. 
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5.1.3. Clarity, credibility and certainty of the scenario 
 
The survey also included three questions to identify whether respondents found the 
contingent valuation scenario difficult (Question 26 in Appendix H), whether they found 
the possibility of implementing the program through any of the four aforementioned 
payment vehicles feasible (Question 27) and whether they answered confidently to the 
contingent valuation question (Question 28). In these questions they were presented with a 
Likert scale from 1 to 5. For the clarity question, value 1 represents that the question is very 
unclear while value 5 means the opposite. For the credibility question, value 1 indicates that 
respondents find impossible that the program be implemented and value 5 means that the 
start-up of the program is perceived as very possible. For the certainty question, 
respondents who selected value 1 highly doubted when answering the question, while 
respondents who assigned a value of 5 answered absolutely convinced.  
 
5.2. Analysis 
 
We now present the econometric specification of the binary discrete-choice format used in 
our contingent valuation exercise, the comparison tests used and the formulas needed for 
estimating aggregated economic values for the conservation program for the Iberian Lynx.  
 
5.2.1. Econometric models 
 
We assume a linear-in-parameters utility function for individual l and alternative j (the 
preservation of the Iberian Lynx) in a set of J alternatives (j = 1, 2)
109
 with a systematic        
(
ljV ) and a random component ( lj ): 
ljljljljlj XVU  
'
                 [5.1] 
where β represents a vector of parameters, ljX  is a vector of observed variables for 
alternative j and individual l; and 
lj  are random errors. Depending on the model developed 
in each case, we include as explanatory variables the variables from Table 5.3 at the end of 
                                                          
109
 Unlike in the fourth chapter, here we only include two values for alternative j (paying a certain amount of 
money to implement the program to protect the Iberian Lynx or not paying).  
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the section (five types of individuals, four payment vehicles - or two if they are grouped - 
and three questions related to the clarity, credibility and certainty of the contingent 
valuation scenario) plus an Intercept. Unlike in the fourth chapter, here there is one 
monetary attribute (Bid). 
Given the previously defined utility function, the probability that the respondent l 
chooses alternative j over any alternative y ( yJ) (
ljPr ) is: 
 
    JyjVVVV ljlylyljlylyljljlj ∈,∀ PrPrPr                      [5.2] 
 
Using the proposal by Hanemann (1984, 1991) and assuming that
ljlyl    is 
logistically distributed, the probability that individual l will give a ‘yes’ answer is: 
 
 lylj VVlj e




1
1
Pr                  [5.3] 
 
which represents a binary logit model. Equation [5.3] is equivalent to saying that: 
 
1
1
1
1
Pr 





z
zz
z
lj e
ee
e
                    [5.4] 
 
where z is given by the following linear combination ii XβXββz +...++= 110 , being 0β  
the constant coefficient.  
The goodness-of-fit of the model is estimated using the maximum log-likelihood ratio. 
The log-likelihood function of any binary choice model is: 
 
      ∑
1
PrlnPrlnln
n
l
l
no
lj
no
ljl
yes
lj
yes
lj BiddBiddL

              [5.5] 
where 
yes
ljd  is 1 if the response is ‘yes’ to the payment of an amount of money to 
accomplish the conservation program and 0 otherwise; while 
no
ljd  is 1 if the response is ‘no’ 
to any payment and 0 otherwise. As 1 nolj
yes
lj dd , [5.5] can be rewritten as: 
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   
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
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
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ljz
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lj
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1 1
ln1
1
1
lnln               [5.6] 
 
Unlike in the single-bounded modeling shown above, in the double-bounded model 
respondent is presented with two bids. The level of the second bid depends on the response 
to the first bid. Thus, there are four possible results: both responses are ‘yes’, both 
responses are ‘no’, a ‘yes’ followed by a ‘no’ and a ‘no’ followed by a ‘yes’. Under the 
assumption of a utility-maximizing respondent (Hanemann, 1991), the log-likelihood 
function is: 
 
 
 
   
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1 ,,,,
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,Prln,Prln
,Prln,Prln
ln                  [5.7] 
 
where 
yesyes
ljd
,
, 
nono
ljd
,
, 
noyes
ljd
,
 and 
yesno
ljd
,
 are binary-valued indicator variables, u
lBid  is the 
upper bid and d
lBid  is the lower bid. 
We used NLOGIT version 4.0 for estimating the parameters through maximum 
likelihood for the single-bounded and double-bounded logit functions.  
The explanatory variables used in our models are shown in Table 5.3.  
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Table 5.3.  Explanatory variables used to test the different effects in the regression models 
Four payment vehicles 
Fund1
(a,b) 
Takes value 1 if the payment vehicle is contribution to a fund  
Fund2
(a,c)
 Takes value 1 if the payment vehicle is contribution to a guarantee fund   
Tax1
(a,c)
 Takes value 1 if the payment vehicle is increased income tax 
Tax2
(a,b)
 Takes value 1 if the payment vehicle is referendum for an increased income 
Two payment vehicles 
Fund 
(a)
 Takes value 1 if the payment vehicle is contribution to a fund 
Tax 
(a)
 Takes value 1 if the payment vehicle is increased income tax 
Models HEPFR and HEP  
Homo 
Takes value 1 if respondent is Homo Economicus and 0 if respondent is 
Homo Politicus 
Model HSSFR 
HPso 
(a)
 Takes value 1 if respondent is Homo Politicus with sole responsibility 
HPsh 
(a)
 Takes value 1 if respondent is Homo Politicus with shared responsibility 
FR 
(a)
 Takes value 1 if respondent is Homo Strategicus – both Homo Economicus  
and Homo Politicus 
Models considering the clarity, credibility and certainty of the contingent valuation scenario 
Clarity
(a)
 Takes value 1 if respondent answered 3,4 or 5 to the clarity question 
Credibility
(a)
 Takes value 1 if respondent answered 3,4 or 5 to the credibility question 
Certainty 
(a)
 Takes value 1 if respondent answered 3,4 or 5 to the certainty question 
(a) Takes value 0 otherwise. 
(b) The level of the single-bounded and double-bounded questions are €10, €30 and €5, respectively. 
(c) The level of the single-bounded and double-bounded questions are €30, €45 and €15, respectively. 
HEPFR refers to the model that differentiates between Homo Economicus and Homo Politicus. HEP refers to 
the model that differentiates between Homo Economicus and Homo Politicus, while excluding the free-riding 
effect. HSSFR refers to the model that differentiates between Homo Economicus, Homo Politicus with 
shared responsibility, Homo Politicus with sole responsibility and Homo Strategicus. 
 
From these models we also calculate empirical distributions for the individual parameters 
of each payment vehicle and each type of respondent. For this, we apply the Krinsky and 
Robb (1986) bootstrapping technique. We take 1,000 random draws from the distribution 
of the parameters and their variance-covariance matrix. This estimation is then utilized to 
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estimate mean marginal WTP for each payment vehicle and each type of individual by 
using the following formulas: 
1
1
1 += Fund
Bid
Fund
Bid
Intercept
Fund Xβ
β
β
β
WTP                  [5.8] 
Homo
Bid
Homo
Bid
Intercept
HE Xβ
β
β
β
WTP +=                                  [5.9] 
The same procedure is followed for the rest of payment vehicles and for any type of 
individual. The percentile approach (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993) is applied to estimate the 
standard deviation and the 95% confidence interval of the estimates.  
 
5.2.2. Comparison tests 
 
Based on the above-mentioned Krinsky and Robb (1986) bootstrapping technique, and 
using the complete combinatorial test (Poe et al., 2005), we compare the mean marginal 
WTP measures obtained with each payment vehicle and each type of respondent. We test 
the following null hypothesis for the payment vehicles: 
 
21 =: FundFundE WTPWTPH  ; 11 =: TaxFundF WTPWTPH  ; 21 =: TaxFundG WTPWTPH  
12 =: TaxFundH WTPWTPH   ; 22 =: TaxFundI WTPWTPH   ; 21 =: TaxTaxJ WTPWTPH  
  
TaxFundK WTPWTPH =:  
 
and for the types of individuals 
 
( ) ( )HEPFRHPHEPFRHEL WTPWTPH =:      [For the model HEPFR] 
)()( =: HEPHPHEPHEM WTPWTPH                 [For the model HEP] 
FRHPN WTPWTPH sh :  ; FRHPP WTPWTPH so =:  
shso HPHPQ
WTPWTPH :  
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We test the same hypothesis for the models that include Clarity, Credibility and 
Certainty as explanatory variables (see Table 5.3). 
 
5.2.3.  Estimation of aggregated values 
 
As explained in the fourth chapter, the compensating variation (CV) is a welfare measure 
that is used in CBA. The CV for each type of individual (Small and Rosen, 1981) is:  
    j
Bid
j xxCV
'
0
'1 

                          [5.10] 
where  0'x and  jx'  are the part of utility corresponding to the alternative 0 (the status 
quo) and j (the preservation of the Iberian Lynx). In other words,  jx'  represents the 
utility that this alternative provides to the different types of individuals. This allows us to 
obtain the value of this alternative (note that the type of individual is included as 
explanatory variable). 
Bidβ  is the parameter of the payment vehicle.  
We also present the SEV measure. As mentioned throughout the dissertation, it 
assumes that a single price is set for the contribution to the program, which means that only 
part of the population would pay that price if it were internalized in the market. To that end, 
this method uses a demand function estimated with non-market valuation techniques 
(contingent valuation in our application) and a supply function based on the commercial 
costs associated with the implementation of the program. As in the fourth chapter, we also 
assume that all costs are fixed as we do not have enough information to simulate the cost 
function. In this way the maximization of benefits occurs at the same price as the 
maximization of revenues.  
In our hypothetical market, revenues from the program to preserve the Iberian Lynx 
(Rj) are calculated as the price set for the conservation program (pj) multiplied by the 
quantity of contributors
110
 (qj), which depends on the price pj such that: 
 j j j jR p q p                 [5.11] 
 
                                                          
110
 As will be explained below, we consider the population from each of the 14 provinces in our sample. 
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As in the fourth chapter, we also express the quantity of contributors as the probability 
of paying a price for taking part in this program (Prj) (see equation [4.15]).  
The calculation of the estimates under the SEV method is equivalent, from a formal 
point of view, to that explained in the previous chapter for the scenario of one alternative 
plus the status quo (SEV-2). Hence, we find pj
*
 (see Appendix I) when  
 
    01
'
 jBid
x
pe j 

                    [5.12] 
 
As this equation has no analytical solution, we have to obtain pj* by iteration. 
 
5.3. Results 
 
5.3.1. Socioeconomic characteristics of the sample 
 
The average profile of the respondents in our sample is a middle-age married person with 
an average net family income of almost €1,900, a family of three members, while not even 
two of these members bring in income to the family. He/she does not hold a college degree 
and is a salaried employee. He/she does not work in a forestry-related sector. In terms of 
commitment, most of respondents are deeply gratified to know that the Iberian Lynx will be 
protected and feel good when giving money on a donation campaign (Table 5.4).  
There is no official data available that offer information on the characteristics of these 
individuals with the Iberian Lynx preservation in Spain. Yet we can contrast our sample 
characteristics with those from samples of previous studies on the valuation of biodiversity 
conservation in Spain (Martín-López et al., 2007a; Castro et al., 2011; Álvarez-Farizo et al., 
2016) or a specific list of species (Martín-López et al., 2007b), including the Iberian Lynx. 
In these studies most of respondents are men, with age between 30 and 44 years, net family 
income between €1,200 and €1,994 (updated to 2008 Euros) and a medium education level 
(high school) – only in Martín-López et al. (2007a) most of respondents hold a high 
education level (degree) –. Number of family members in Martín-López et al. (2007b) is 
2.91. In Álvarez-Farizo et al. (2016), most of respondents are married and salaried 
employees. No study offered information about whether they work in the forestry sector. 
However, this comparison must be taken carefully, as the population sample of these 
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studies is randomly selected from local residents in the Andalusia Region (Castro et al., 
2011; Álvarez-Farizo et al., 2016)
111
 or from visitors to different public areas of Doñana 
National and Natural Park (NPA), which is located in the southwestern Spain (Martín-
López et al., 2007a,b)
112
. Overall, net family income in our sample approaches the upper 
bound obtained by the other studies. This may be because income in Andalusia is lower 
than in the rest of Spain.  
 
Table 5.4.  Socioeconomic and Attitudinal Characteristics of the contingent valuation 
sample 
Variables Contingent Valuation sample 
Mean n 
Personal satisfaction when protecting the species  4.39 750 
 (0.89) 
Personal satisfaction when contributing for a good cause 3.38 750 
 (1.37) 
Age 38.68 733 
(14.00) 
Net family income (€ per month) 1,909.09 594 
(902.58) 
Family members 2.88 717 
(1.35) 
Number of members in the family that bring in income  1.73 713 
 (0.70) 
Marital status 
 
 
1.67 749 
(1=Single, 2=Married, 3=Divorced, 4=Widower) (0.74) 
Education 3.43 749 
     (1=No schooling, 2=Primary studies, 3=Secondary school,  
4=Diploma, 5=Bachelor, 6=Others) 
(1.64) 
Occupation 2.13 
748     (1=Salaried employee, 2=Entrepreneur and self-employed 
worker, 3=Unemployed, 4=Household tasks, 5=Student, 
6=Retired, 7=Others) 
(1.99) 
Work in the forestry sector 0.05 750 
(1=Yes, 0=Otherwise) (0.23) 
 
 
                                                          
111
 While the population sample in Castro et al. (2011) include local residents and tourist, results for socio-
cultural characteristics distinguish between the two groups, so we use the first group for comparison.  
112
 In the latter case, for example, each of these areas offer different results for various reasons – socio-
politically and ecologically – related. 
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5.3.2. Payment vehicles  
 
The model including four payment vehicles shows that they are not significant for the 
single-bounded and double-bounded models (Table 5.5). This means that respondents do 
not perceive them differently when deciding whether to pay or not. Only the variables 
Intercept and Bid are significant. The parameter for payment vehicle Fund1 is negative and 
parameters for the rest of payment vehicles are positive, albeit close to zero. We also find 
that parameters are larger for the double-bounded model than for the single-bounded 
model, with the exception of the variable Bid.   
 
Table 5.5.  Single-bounded and double-bounded models using four payment vehicles 
Attribute 
Single-bounded Double-bounded 
Parameter Parameter 
Intercept 
2.9776
***
 
               (0.3050) 
              3.9990
***
 
                (0.2906) 
Fund1 
             -0.1347
 
                (0.2679) 
             -0.0795
 
               (0.2175) 
Fund2 
              0.1240 
                (0.2798) 
              0.1458 
              (0.2324) 
Tax1 
              0.0089 
                (0.2856) 
              0.0971 
              (0.2294) 
Bid 
-0.0791
***
 
                (0.0085) 
             -0.1126
***
 
               (0.0634) 
n                 596               596  
Log-likelihood              -309.73              -624.13 
Adj. Mc Fadden ρ2               0.1394  
 
Note: We use a dummy-coding where the reference level is Tax 2. Standard errors are shown in brackets; n: 
number of observations; asterisks (e.g.,***,**,*) denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
The WTP values reveal that differences between the four payment vehicles are not relevant. 
The complete combinatorial test also indicates that we cannot reject the hypothesis of 
statistically indistinguishable WTP in all cases (HE, HF, HG, HH, HI and HJ) (Table 5.6). 
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All the same, the higher WTP is reached by the contribution to a guarantee fund, 
followed by increased income tax, referendum for an increased income tax and contribution 
to a fund, respectively.  
 
Table 5.6.  Mean willingness to pay (WTP) values from the single-bounded and double-
bounded models using four payment vehicles 
Payment vehicle 
Single-bounded Double-bounded 
WTP WTP 
Fund1 
36.00 
[31.79 – 40.65] 
34.79 
[32.55 – 37.09] 
Fund2 
39.21 
[34.69 – 44.16] 
36.85 
[34.28 – 39.35] 
Tax1 
38.83 
[34.32 – 43.76] 
36.38 
[34.01 – 38.70] 
Tax2 
37.56 
[33.41– 42.75] 
35.59 
[33.05 – 37.88] 
Complete combinatorial test p-value p-value 
HE:WTPFund1=WTPFund2 0.198 0.156 
HF:WTPFund1=WTPTax1 0.229 0.209 
HG:WTPFund1=WTP Tax2 0.344 0.339 
HH:WTPFund2=WTPTax1 0.463 0.412 
HI:WTPFund2=WTPTax2 0.333 0.279 
HJ:WTPTax1=WTPTax2 0.369 0.356 
 
Note: lower and upper bounds of the confidence interval (95%) are shown in brackets. 
 
When payment vehicles are grouped into two categories, the variable Fund is not 
significant in any case (Table 5.7). Only the variables Intercept and Bid are significant and 
slightly larger than in the scenario with four payment vehicles.  
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Table 5.7.  Single-bounded and double-bounded models using two payment vehicles 
Attribute 
Single-bounded Double-bounded 
Mean parameter Mean parameter 
Intercept 
3.0036
***
 
         (0.2761) 
4.0361
***
 
            (0.2708) 
Fund 
       -0.0541
 
         (0.1979) 
          -0.0192
 
           (0.1613) 
Bid 
       -0.0786
***
 
         (0.0084) 
          -0.1124
***
 
          (0.0063) 
n         596            596 
Log-likelihood        -310.22           -624.68 
Adj. Mc Fadden ρ2         0.1381  
 
Note: standard errors are shown in brackets; n: number of observations; asterisks (e.g.,***,**,*) denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
The WTP values reveal that differences between the two payment vehicles have narrowed, 
while contribution to a fund is preferred over increased income tax. The complete 
combinatorial test also indicates that we cannot reject the hypothesis (HK) that payment 
vehicles derive similar WTP estimates (Table 5.8). The double-bounded model offers lower 
WTP values compared to the single-bounded model. 
Overall, our results show that the four payment vehicles do not differ from one another. 
Similarly, there are no differences when including only two payment vehicles. Thus, in the 
following analyses we work with a data-enriched model that pools the payment vehicles 
datasets. That is, we do not differentiate between payment vehicles, treating all of them as 
having the same effect on WTP. 
Table 5.8.  Mean willingness to pay (WTP) values from the single-bounded and 
double-bounded  models using two payment vehicles 
Payment vehicle 
Single-bounded Double-bounded 
WTP WTP 
Fund 
37.68 
[34.38 – 41.53] 
36.21 
[32.37 – 39.83] 
Tax 
38.23 
[35.07 – 42.00] 
35.96 
[34.21 – 37.61] 
Complete combinatorial test p-value p-value 
HK:WTPFund=WTPTax 0.369 0.356 
 
Note: lower and upper bounds of the confidence interval (95%) are shown in brackets. 
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Our estimates of payment vehicle effects differ from previous papers comparing payment 
vehicles in contingent valuation studies, which found mostly divergences. The only 
exception can be found in Kontoleon et al. (2005). They find that there are no differences 
between a product tax and a tax reallocation. Most of the papers mentioned in section 5.1.1 
conclude that respondents tend to prefer taxes rather than donations or entrance fees. The 
only paper including referendum as payment vehicle finds that it offers the higher value 
(Champ et al., 2002). Still, it is difficult to make consistent comparisons between these 
papers and our results, as almost none of them conduct surveys in Spain, with the exception 
of Campos et al. (2007). However, this study focuses on forest recreation and not on 
biodiversity conservation. The remaining papers valuing biodiversity preservation or a 
particular species (Johansson, 1996; Jakobsson and Dragun, 2001; Aoun, 2015) do not 
value the Iberian Lynx.  
 
5.3.3. Multiple preference orderings for the conservation of the Iberian Lynx 
  
Models show that the parameters from the single-bounded and double-bounded models are 
all significant, with the exception of the variable Homo in the model HEP and the variable 
HPsh in the model HSSFR (Table 5.9). The former result implies that the variable Homo is 
no longer significant when there is no strategic behavior. As expected, the variable Bid 
offers a negative sign, which means that the probability of participating in the program 
decreases for higher payments. When comparing the variables HPso, HPsh and FR, results 
indicate that, contrary to what theory predicts (Nyborg, 2000), HPsh offers a higher value 
than HPso and FR, respectively. The value of Intercept is larger in the model HSSFR than 
in the model HEPFR. This may be caused by the fact that it collects those individuals who 
behave as HE, while it does not take into account those individuals with a strategic 
behavior. The double-bounded model is better adjusted than the single-bounded model. 
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Table 5.9.  Models HEPFR, HEP and HSSFR using the single-bounded and double-bounded models 
 MODEL HEPFR MODEL HEP MODEL HSSFR 
Attribute 
Single-
bounded 
Double-
bounded 
Single-
bounded 
Double-
bounded 
Single- 
bounded 
Double- 
bounded 
Parameter Parameter Parameter Parameter Parameter Parameter 
Intercept 
 2.8017
***
 
  (0.2701) 
2.9964
***
 
 (0.1925) 
2.9768
*** 
  (0.2972) 
3.1297
*** 
   (0.2116) 
3.2398
***
 
   (0.2932) 
3.3898
***
 
 (0.2067) 
Homo  
   (Homo Economicus = 1, Homo Politicus = 0) 
  0.3784
*
 
  (0.2005) 
 0.4300
**
 
 (0.1526) 
  0.2306 
  (0.2174) 
   0.2653 
   (0.1630) 
  
Homo Politicus with sole responsibility (HPso) 
   (=1 and 0 otherwise) 
  
   -0.4379
*
 
  (0.2481) 
 0.4439
**
 
 (0.1934) 
Homo Politicus with shared responsibility (HPsh) 
   (=1 and 0 otherwise) 
  
     0.0601 
   (0.2817) 
-0.0233 
 (0.2075) 
Homo Strategicus (FR) 
   (=1 and 0 otherwise) 
  
    -0.7839
**
 
   (0.3045) 
 0.5445
**
 
 (0.2406) 
Bid 
 -0.0784
***
 
 (0.0084) 
-0.0951
***
 
 (0.0046) 
 -0.0790
***
 
  (0.0090) 
  -0.0954
***
 
   (0.0050) 
-0.0802
***
 
   (0.0086) 
0.0953
***
 
 (0.0046) 
n    596    596    522    522     596   596  
Log-likelihood  -308.46  -732.49   -262.84    -637.63   -305.57   -731.84 
Adj. McFadden ρ2   0.1430     0.1478      0.1510  
 
Note: standard errors are shown in brackets; n: number of observations; asterisks (e.g.,***,**,*) denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
HEPFR refers to the model that differentiates between Homo Economicus and Homo Politicus. HEP refers to the model that differentiates between Homo 
Economicus and Homo Politicus, while excluding the free-riding effect. HSSFR refers to the model that differentiates between Homo Economicus, Homo 
Politicus with shared responsibility, Homo Politicus with sole responsibility and Homo Strategicus.  
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As regards the WTP values, there are significant differences between types of individuals 
(Table 5.10). FR is willing to pay the lowest value and, contrary to what might be expected, 
HPso offers the next lower value, followed by HP. This is true for the single-bounded and 
double-bounded models. HE and HPsh provide the highest values, although the order of 
listing them varies depending on whether we consider the single-bounded model or the 
double-bounded model. In any case, differences between the two types of individuals are 
minimal. The double-bounded model gives lower values in the three models, while the 
difference for FR is practically non-existent. 
 
Table 5.10.  Mean willingness to pay (WTP) values from the single-bounded and double-
bounded models using the models HEPFR, HEP and HSSFR 
Attribute 
Single-bounded Double-bounded 
Mean WTP Mean WTP 
Model HEPFR 
Homo Economicus (HE) 
40.77 
[37.04 – 45.24] 
36.02 
[34.08 – 38.04] 
Homo Politicus (HP) 
35.74 
[32.87 – 39.05] 
31.57 
[29.66 – 33.43] 
Model HEP 
Homo Economicus (HE) 
40.79 
[36.83 – 45.56] 
35.54 
[33.53 – 37.70] 
Homo Politicus (HP) 
37.67 
[34.54 – 41.38] 
32.84 
[30.79 – 34.80] 
Model HSSFR 
Homo Politicus with sole responsibility (HPso) 
34.99 
[30.92 – 39.28] 
30.90 
[28.26 – 33.65] 
Homo Politicus with shared responsibility (HPsh) 
41.15 
[36.23– 46.67] 
35.38 
[32.33 – 38.40] 
Homo Strategicus (FR) 
30.64 
[25.65 – 35.84] 
29.88 
[26.34 – 33.29] 
 
Note: lower and upper bounds of the confidence interval (95%) are shown in brackets. HEPFR refers to the 
model that differentiates between Homo Economicus and Homo Politicus. HEP refers to the model that 
differentiates between Homo Economicus and Homo Politicus, while excluding the free-riding effect. HSSFR 
refers to the model that differentiates between Homo Economicus, Homo Politicus with shared responsibility, 
Homo Politicus with sole responsibility and Homo Strategicus. 
 
What is relevant in this context, as compared with Nyborg (2000), is the existence of free-
riding. This leads us to ask about the role that the strategic behavior adopts when 
comparing the dichotomy HE/HP between the model HEPFR and the model HEP. When 
the free-riding effect is eliminated, WTP for HP is larger than before, while the effect over 
WTP for HE is less limited or even nil. Therefore, the WTP value for these two types of 
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individuals move significantly closer to each other. This is because HP is more prone to 
strategic behavior than HE. 
The complete combinatorial test indicates that we cannot reject the hypothesis of 
statistically indistinguishable WTP between HE and HP in the model HEPFR in the single-
bounded model (HM) and between HPso and HPFR in the model HSSFR single-bounded and 
double-bounded models (HP). However, this is rejected for the rest of hypothesis (see Table 
5.11 and Table 5.12). 
  
Table 5.11.  Complete combinatorial test result from the single-bounded and double-
bounded models using models HEPFR, HEP and HSSFR 
 Single-bounded 
(p value) 
Double-bounded 
(p value) 
Model HEPFR 
HL: WTP HE = WTP HP    0.049
**
   0.003
***
 
Model HEP 
HM: WTP HE  = WTP HP   0.173            0.056
*
 
Model HSSFR 
HN: WTP HPsh = WTP FR      0.008
***
            0.023
**
 
HP:  WTP HPso = WTP FR 0.136            0.349 
HQ: WTP HPso = WTP HPsh   0.057
*
            0.032
**
 
 
Note: standard errors are shown in brackets; N: number of observations; asterisks (e.g.,***,**,*) denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. HEPFR refers to the model that differentiates 
between Homo Economicus and Homo Politicus. HEP refers to the model that differentiates between Homo 
Economicus and Homo Politicus, while excluding the free-riding effect. HSSFR refers to the model that 
differentiates between Homo Economicus, Homo Politicus with shared responsibility, Homo Politicus with 
sole responsibility and Homo Strategicus. 
 
In short, our results reveal that respondents who behave strategically are willing to pay less 
than the rest of individuals, which is a logical result. By contrast, individuals identified as 
HE and HPsh provide the highest WTP values, and, contrary to expectations, respondents 
defined as HPsh offers a larger WTP than HPso. We also find that ‘citizen’ behavior is more 
likely to have a strategic behavior than the ‘consumer’ behavior.   
As there is no data available that offer information on the mean WTP values for the 
conservation of the Iberian Lynx, we may compare the WTP values from Table 5.10 with 
the values estimated in recent studies valuing biodiversity conservation or a set of species 
in Spain and in other countries. Martín-López et al. (2007a,b) offer a mean WTP of €28.03 
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and €29.70 (updated to 2008 Euros), respectively, for biodiversity conservation services in 
the Doñana NPA, so our estimations are in the upper bound of this range. Martín-López et 
al. (2007b) take into account the financial contribution that different users would be willing 
to pay for the conservation of 15 species, including the Iberian Lynx. They also analyze the 
attitude of respondents towards these species and the economic value placed on each 
species. Results show that the highest value is attached to the Iberian Lynx.   
Other studies have been conducted in different countries in order to estimate the WTP 
for specific species, such as the Eurasian otter (Lutra lutra) in Britain, Leadbeater’s possum 
(Gymnobelideus leadbeateri) in Australia and Gray wolf (Canis lupus) in the United States 
(White et al., 1997; Jakobsson and Dragun, 2001; Chambers and Whitehead, 2003). They 
offer a mean WTP between €18.23 and €52.92 (updated to 2008 Euros), so our estimations 
are within the range of values offered by these studies. In particular, Jakobsson and Dragun 
(2001) estimate WTP values for the Leadbeater’s possum in Australia, differentiating 
between two payment vehicles: tax and donation. They offer a WTP mean of €18.23 and 
€52.92, respectively (updated to 2008 Euros). White et al. (1997) provide a WTP value of 
20.77 for the conservation of the Eurasian otter in Britain (updated to 2008 Euros). 
Chambers and Whitehead (2003) evaluate a plan for protecting the Gray wolf in Minnesota, 
conducting surveys in two locations: one is located on the heart of the wolf habitat, while 
the other is outside of this area. They find that ‘locals’ are willing to pay a lower amount 
(€6.23) in comparison with residents living far away from the area of habitat for the gray 
wolf (€28.97) (updated to 2008 Euros). An interesting study for a protection program of the 
Alaskan Steller sea lion (Eumetopias jubatus) can be found in Giraud et al. (2004). 
However, we have not included it in our comparison, as it offers a very wide range, 
depending on the sample chosen (from €26.82 to €105.56 updated to 2008 Euros). 
 
5.3.4. Results about the clarity, credibility and certainty of the scenario 
 
Before presenting the results for the models HEPFR, HEP and HSSFR, including three new 
explanatory variables (Clarity, Credibility and Certainty), let us look at the number of 
respondents answering to each of these three questions (Table 5.12).  
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Table 5.12.  Number of respondents answering questions related to the clarity, credibility 
and certainty of the contingent valuation scenario 
 1 2 3 4 5 n Mean 
Clarity question  
  Homo Economicus (HE) including FR 4 9 32 88 146 279 4.30 
  Homo Politicus (HP) including FR 6 14 59 134 104 317 3.99 
  Homo Economicus (HE) excluding FR 4 8 29 77 129 247 4.29 
  Homo Politicus (HP) excluding FR 3 13 54 110 95 275 4.02 
  Homo Politicus with sole       
responsibility (HPso) 
2 4 32 65 52 155 4.04 
Homo Politicus with shared 
responsibility (HPsh) 
1 9 22 45 43 120 4.00 
  Homo Strategicus (FR) 3 2 8 35 26 74 4.07 
Credibility question 
  Homo Economicus (HE) including FR 44 78 100 37 20 279 2.68 
  Homo Politicus (HP) including FR 51 105 100 39 22 317 2.61 
  Homo Economicus (HE) excluding FR 41 71 92 26 17 247 2.62 
  Homo Politicus (HP) excluding FR 43 87 88 35 22 275 2.66 
  Homo Politicus with sole       
responsibility (HPso) 
32 46 52 16 9 155 2.51 
  Homo Politicus with shared 
responsibility (HPsh) 
11 41 36 19 13 120 2.85 
  Homo Strategicus (FR) 11 25 20 15 3 74 2.65 
Certainty question 
  Homo Economicus (HE) including FR 3 3 27 66 180 279 4.49 
  Homo Politicus (HP) including FR 5 8 38 137 129 317 4.19 
  Homo Economicus (HE) excluding FR 3 3 26 58 157 247 4.47 
  Homo Politicus (HP) excluding FR 5 6 33 125 106 275 4.17 
  Homo Politicus with sole       
responsibility (HPso) 
5 3 16 74 57 155 4.13 
Homo Politicus with shared 
responsibility (HPsh) 
0 3 17 51 49 120 4.22 
  Homo Strategicus (FR) 0 2 6 20 46 74 4.49 
 
Note: n indicates the number of observations 
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As shown, the majority of respondents found the contingent valuation question very clear, 
did not doubt very much when answering it and believed that it was not plausible that the 
program could be implemented using these payment vehicles. When differentiating 
between types of individuals, HE and FR were the most confident and found the contingent 
valuation question clearer. HE is also more convinced than HP. The latter was confident, 
albeit less than the rest of individuals and found the question a little bit complicated. In the 
case of HPso and HPsh, there are hardly any differences between them and with HP with 
respect to the credibility question, while HPsh is more convinced than HPso.  
Concerning the models HEPFR, HEP and HSSFR, including the Clarity, Credibility 
and Certainty questions, the parameters from the single-bounded and double-bounded 
models are all significant, except for the variable Homo in the model HEP in the single-
bounded and double-bounded models, the variable HPsh in the model HSSFR in the single-
bounded and double-bounded models, the variable HPso in the model HSSFR for the single-
bounded model, and the Clarity and Certainty questions in all cases (Table 5.13). The 
variable Bid offers a negative sign, and parameters for the Credibility question are higher in 
comparison to the ones for the other two questions. The parameters of the double-bounded 
model are larger than the parameters of the single-bounded model.  
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Table 5.13.  Models HEPFR, HEP and HSSFR using the single-bounded and double-bounded models and questions related to the 
clarity, credibility and certainty of the contingent valuation scenario 
 Model HEPFR Model HEP Model HSSFR 
Attribute 
Single-
bounded 
Double-
bounded 
Single-
bounded 
Double-
bounded 
Single- 
bounded 
Double- 
bounded 
Parameter Parameter Parameter Parameter Parameter Parameter 
Intercept 
  2.2651
***
 
  (0.6496) 
  2.4109
***
 
  (0.4373) 
  2.3695
*** 
  (0.6927) 
  2.6506
*** 
  (0.4599) 
  2.6370
*** 
  (0.6615) 
2.9171
***
 
 (0.4627) 
Homo  
    (Homo Economicus = 1, Homo Politicus = 0) 
  0.3497
*
 
  (0.2027) 
  0.4107
**
 
  (0.1544) 
  0.2250 
  (0.2198) 
  0.2663 
  (0.1645) 
  
Homo Politicus with sole responsibility (HPso) 
    (=1 and 0 otherwise) 
  
   -0.4120 
  (0.2509) 
 -0.4484
**
 
  (0.1955) 
Homo Politicus with shared responsibility (HPsh) 
    (=1 and 0 otherwise) 
  
    0.0405 
  (0.2850) 
 -0.0193 
  (0.2089) 
Homo Strategicus (FR) 
    (=1 and 0 otherwise) 
  
   -0.7799
*
 
  (0.3073) 
 -0.5431
**
 
  (0.2410) 
Clarity 
    (=1 if answer was 3,4 or 5 and 0 otherwise) 
  0.0988 
  (0.4372) 
  0.0654 
  (0.3334) 
  0.2343 
  (0.4774) 
  0.2982 
  (0.3643) 
  0.1578 
  (0.4354) 
  0.2187 
  (0.3226) 
Credibility 
    (=1 if answer was 3,4 or 5 and 0 otherwise) 
  0.6196
**
 
  (0.2019) 
  0.4144
**
 
  (0.1560) 
  0.6518
**
 
  (0.2120) 
  0.4130
**
 
  (0.1678) 
  0.6124
**
 
  (0.2031) 
  0.4154
**
 
  (0.1549) 
Certainty 
    (=1 if answer was 3,4 or 5 and 0 otherwise) 
  0.1516 
  (0.5643) 
  0.3444 
  (0.3819) 
  0.0616 
  (0.6126) 
  0.0550 
  (0.4071) 
  0.1436 
  (0.5657) 
  0.2751 
  (0.3979) 
Bid 
 -0.0784
***
 
  (0.0086) 
 -0.0957
***
 
  (0.0047) 
0.0789
***
 
  (0.0092) 
 -0.0962
***
 
  (0.0051) 
 -0.0800
***
 
  (0.0087) 
-0.0953
***
 
  (0.0047) 
n    596   596    522    522    596   596  
Log-likelihood   -303.49   -728.51   -258.02   -633.69   -300.67  -731.35 
Adj. McFadden ρ2   0.1568     0.1634     0.1646    
 
Note: standard errors are shown in brackets; n: number of observations; asterisks (e.g.,
***
,
**
,
*
) denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
HEPFR refers to the model that differentiates between Homo Economicus and Homo Politicus. HEP refers to the model that differentiates between Homo 
Economicus and Homo Politicus, while excluding the free-riding effect. HSSFR refers to the model that differentiates between Homo Economicus, Homo 
Politicus with shared responsibility, Homo Politicus with sole responsibility and Homo Strategicus. 
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Previously to introduce the results for the WTP values, let us explain how these values 
have been estimated for each type of individuals and each of the three questions 
analyzed in this section. If the clarity question took value 1 and the credibility and 
certainty questions took value 0, we would be assuming that only respondents who 
considered the contingent valuation question easy, answered it with some difficulties 
and though that there was a low possibility of implementing the program were 
included
113
. As it would not make much sense to estimate WTP in this way, we define 
WTP as follows: 
certain
Bid
certain
credib
Bid
credib
clarity
Bid
clarity
Homo
Bid
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INntercept
clarityHE Xβ
β
X
β
β
X
β
β
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β
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β
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where the clarity question takes value 1, and the credibility and certainty questions take 
their mean value from the sample. The same procedure has been followed for the 
remaining questions.  
The WTP values, in general terms, are slightly higher than those estimated in Table 
5.10, especially for the Credibility question (Tables 5.14 and 5.15). The latter result 
may be explained by the fact that the few respondents who found the possibility of 
implementing the conservation program more feasible would pay a very high amount of 
money. However, we may also be dealing with a hypothetical bias (Cumming et al., 
1995, 1997, 1998; Bjornstad et al., 1997), as those who are not convinced that the 
conservation program can be put into practice may have tended to state that they are 
willing to pay a higher amount of money than that they would actually pay if the 
program were implemented in the real life. Additionally, WTP values obtained for the 
Clarity and Certainty questions do not differ greatly from the results of Table 5.10, 
above all when all individuals are included. When the free-rider is excluded, differences 
are a little bit higher. The single-bounded model provides larger values than the double-
bounded model in the three models. These differences are larger for the model HEP and 
lower for the model HSSFR. Still, the difference between the two models is smaller 
than that in Table 5.10. Comparing between types of individuals, HE is willing to pay 
more than HP in all models, and the same is true for HPsh in comparison with HPso and 
FR. The difference between them is reduced in the double-bounded model.  
                                                          
113
 If the three questions took value 1, only respondents who considered the contingent valuation question 
easy, answered it without difficulties and though that it was possible to the program were included.  
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Table 5.14 Mean willingness to pay (WTP) values from the single-bounded and double-
bounded models using models HEPFR and HEP and questions about the clarity, 
credibility and certainty of the contingent valuation scenario 
WTP 
Model HEPFR Model HEP 
Single-bounded Double-bounded Single-bounded Double-bounded 
Homo Economicus (HE) 
Clarity 
40.78 
[36.92 – 45.26] 
35.98 
[34.10 – 37.86] 
41.13 
[36.97 – 46.06] 
35.77 
[33.76 – 37.78] 
Credibility 
44.44 
[39.81 – 49.63] 
37.96 
[35.78 – 40.19] 
44.86 
[41.01 – 50.60] 
37.58 
[35.27 – 39.98] 
Certainty 
40.77 
[36.90 – 45.31] 
36.06 
[34.15 – 37.99] 
41.01 
[36.80 – 45.90] 
35.60 
[33.60 – 37.63] 
Homo Politicus (HP) 
Clarity 
36.33 
[33.26 – 39.77] 
31.63 
[29.60 – 33.61] 
38.29 
[34.93 – 42.12] 
32.93 
[30.78 – 35.06] 
Credibility 
39.99 
[36.13 – 44.38] 
33.60 
[31.25 – 35.92] 
42.02 
[37.83 – 46.83] 
34.74 
[32.26 – 37.19] 
Certainty 
36.32 
[33.19 – 39.69] 
31.70 
[29.67 – 33.66] 
38.16 
[34.73 – 41.85] 
32.76 
[30.59 – 34.87] 
 
Note: lower and upper bounds of the confidence interval (95%) are shown in brackets. HEPFR refers to the 
model that differentiates between Homo Economicus and Homo Politicus. HEP refers to the model that 
differentiates between Homo Economicus and Homo Politicus, while excluding the free-riding effect. 
 
 
Table 5.15.   Mean willingness to pay (WTP) values from the single-bounded and double-
bounded models  using the model HSSFR and questions about the clarity, 
credibility and certainty of the contingent valuation scenario 
WTP 
Model HSSFR 
Single-bounded Double-bounded 
Homo Politicus with sole responsibility (HPso) 
Clarity 
36.99 
[32.58 – 41.29] 
34.22 
[30.82 – 37.71] 
Credibility 
39.03 
[34.03 – 43.96] 
35.35 
[31.48 – 39.26] 
Certainty 
36.96 
[32.67 – 41.35] 
34.21 
[30.78 – 37.70] 
Homo Politicus with shared responsibility (HPsh) 
Clarity 
42.73 
[37.55 – 48.38] 
38.73 
[35.16 – 42.44] 
Credibility 
44.77 
[39.40 – 50.72] 
39.86 
[35.90 – 44.07] 
Certainty 
42.07 
[37.67 – 48.43] 
38.72 
[35.19 – 42.34] 
Homo Strategicus (FR) 
Clarity 
32.39 
[26.85 – 38.05] 
33.18 
[29.15 – 37.15] 
Credibility 
34.43 
[28.63 – 40.24] 
34.32 
[29.92 – 38.66] 
Certainty 
32.36 
[26.87 – 38.00] 
33.17 
[29.19 – 37.14] 
 
Note: lower and upper bounds of the confidence interval (95%) are shown in brackets. HSSFR refers to the 
model that differentiates between Homo Economicus, Homo Politicus with shared responsibility, Homo 
Politicus with sole responsibility and Homo Strategicus. 
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The complete combinatorial test indicates that we cannot reject the hypothesis of 
statistically indistinguishable WTP: (i) between HE and HP for the Credibility question 
in the model HEPFR and for the three questions in the model HEP in the single-
bounded model (HR), (ii) between HPso and HPFR for the three questions in the single-
bounded and double-bounded models (HT), and (iii) between HPso and HPsh for the 
Credibility question in the single-bounded model (HU). However, this is rejected for the 
rest of hypothesis (see Table 5.16 and Table 5.17). 
 
Table 5.16.   Complete combinatorial test result from the single-bounded and double-bounded 
models using models HEPFR and HEP and questions about the clarity, 
credibility and certainty of the contingent valuation scenario 
WTP 
Model HEPFR Model HEP 
Single-bounded Double-bounded Single-bounded Double-bounded 
HR:WTP HE = WTPHP  
Clarity 0.079
*
 0.004
***
 0.207 0.056
*
 
Credibility 0.127
*
        0.011
**
 0.253 0.082
*
 
Certainty 0.079
*
 0.005
***
 0.206 0.056
*
 
 
Note: standard errors are shown in brackets; N: number of observations; asterisks (e.g.,***,**,*) denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. HEPFR refers to the model that differentiates 
between Homo Economicus and Homo Politicus. HEP refers to the model that differentiates between 
Homo Economicus and Homo Politicus, while excluding the free-riding effect.  
 
 
Table 5.17.   Complete combinatorial test result from the single-bounded and double-bounded 
models using the model HSSFR and questions about the clarity, credibility and 
certainty of the contingent valuation scenario 
WTP Model HSSFR 
Single-bounded Double-bounded 
HS:WTP HPsh = WTPFR 
Clarity 0.012
**
  0.045
**
 
Credibility 0.017
**
                           0.062
*
 
Certainty 0.011
**
  0.044
**
 
HT: WTP HPso = WTPFR 
Clarity                      0.143 0.380 
Credibility                      0.163 0.393 
Certainty                      0.144 0.381 
HU: WTP HPso = WTPHPsh 
Clarity 0.084
*
  0.063
*
 
Credibility                       0.104  0.088
*
 
Certainty 0.084
*
  0.063
*
 
 
Note: standard errors are shown in brackets; N: number of observations; asterisks (e.g.,***,**,*) denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. HSSFR refers to the model that differentiates 
between Homo Economicus, Homo Politicus with shared responsibility, Homo Politicus with sole 
responsibility and Homo Strategicus. 
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Overall, our results show that there are differences between HE and HP when all 
respondents – including FR – are considered. However, there is less divergence between 
these two types of individuals when taking out the strategic behavior. When it comes to 
the WTP values, the highest value is obtained for the Credibility question in regard to 
Clarity and Certainty questions.  
 
5.3.5. Aggregated values 
 
For aggregation purposes, we estimate the number of individuals involved in the 
program for the conservation of the Iberian Lynx by considering the population from 
each of the provinces in our stratified sample
114
. The Spanish Statistical Office 
estimates 15,420,870 inhabitants in 2008 for these provinces.  
To obtain aggregated values (in 2008 Euros), we work with models HEPFR and 
HSSFR, as the variable Homo is only significant in these two models. Results reveal 
that the single-bounded model offers higher mean WTP and aggregated values for the 
CV calculation than the double-bounded model in all cases (Table 5.18). The resulting 
price for the SEV scenario, p
*
, and aggregated values are lower than mean WTP and 
aggregated values for the CV calculation. As shown, the percentage of individuals who 
are willing to take part in the program is clearly lower for the SEV calculation. 
Specifically, if all respondents were considered as HE, only 62.60% of them would be 
willing to participate and therefore to pay p
*
. In the case of HP, this percentage dropped 
to 59.20%. For HPso, HPsh and FR, percentages are 58.80%, 63.95% and 55.24%, 
respectively (we shall return to this issue in due course).  
If we compare the five types of individuals, HPsh offers the higher aggregated value 
for the CV and SEV calculations in the single-bounded model. This is not the case in the 
double-bounded model, as HE offers the highest aggregated value for the two measures. 
Either way, values for these two types of respondents are very similar. As expected, FR 
provides the lowest values in all cases.  
                                                          
114
 We realize that payment vehicles have been described in a hypothesis of fund raising so that it would 
be possible to collect the entire consumer surplus through the establishment of two payment vehicles: 
increased income tax and contribution to a fund. However, for simplicity and because it is clearly a more 
realistic scenario, in this case we do not differentiate between these payment vehicles and assume that a 
‘price’ to be compulsory paid to conserve the Iberian Lynx is set.  
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Table 5.18. Aggregated values of compensating variation (CV) and simulated exchange 
value (SEV) of a conservation program for the Iberian Lynx in Spain  (year 
2008) 
Measure 
Single-bounded Double-bounded 
€ per 
person 
Population 
Aggregated € per 
person 
Population 
Aggregated 
€ € 
Compensating Variation 
Homo Economicus 40.57 15,420,870 625,624,696 36.03 15,420,870 555,613,946 
Homo Politicus  35.75 15,420,870 551,296,102 31.51 15,420,870 485,911,614 
  With sole 
responsibility 
34.94 15,420,870 538,805,198 30.91 15,420,870 476,659,092 
  With shared 
responsibility 
41.15 15,420,870 634,568,800 35.33 15,420,870 544,819,337 
 Strategicus  30,62 15,420,870 472,187,039 29.86 15,420,870 460,467,178 
Simulated Exchange Value 
Homo Economicus  34.00 9,653,464 328,217,776 29.50 10,029,734 295,877,153 
Homo Politicus 31.00 9,129,155 283,003,805 27.00 9,338,879 252,149,733 
   With sole  
responsibility 
30.50 9,067,471 276,557,865 26.50 9,308,037 246,662,980 
  With shared 
responsibility  
34.00 9,861,646 335,295,964 29.00 9,966,508 289,028,732 
 Strategicus  28.00 8,518,488 238,517,664 26.00 9,112,192 236,916,992 
 
Coming back to Table 5.13, results indicate that only the variable Credibility is 
significant. As the potential population taking part in our valuation scenario is better 
represented by those individuals who really think that it is possible to carry out this 
program, we use this question in order to know whether results change with respect to 
the previous scenario.   
Results shown that mean WTP and p
*
 are higher than average values in Table 5.18 
in all cases (Table 5.19). Still, differences are slightly higher in the single-bounded 
model than in the double-bounded model and for the CV measure. The percentage of 
individuals participating in the program under the SEV measure is also larger than in the 
previous scenario for the single-bounded and double-bounded models. However, if each 
type of respondent represented the whole population, the percentage of HE who would 
be willing to participate would rise to 65.67%. For HP, HPso, HPsh and FR, percentages 
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are 60.39%, 61.94%, 65.75% and 58.88%, respectively. These percentages are higher 
than in the previous case. Thus, aggregated values are also higher than before.  
Table 5.19. Aggregated values of compensating variation (CV) and simulated exchange value 
(SEV) of a conservation program for the Iberian Lynx in Spain  (year 2008) using 
the question related to the credibility of the contingent valuation question 
Measure 
Single-bounded Double-bounded 
€ per 
person 
Population 
Aggregated € per 
person 
Population 
Aggregated 
€ € 
Compensating Variation 
Homo Economicus  44.31 15,420,870 683,298,750 37.97 15,420,870 585,530,434 
Homo Politicus  39.82 15,420,870 614,059,043 33.65 15,420,870 518,912,275 
 With sole 
responsibility  
39.06 15,420,870 602,339,182 33.11 15,420,870 510,585,006 
 With shared 
responsibility  
44.62 15,420,870 688,079,219 37.13 15,420,870 572,576,903 
 Strategicus  34.47 15,420,870 531,557,389 31.95 15,420,870 492,696,796 
Simulated Exchange Value 
Homo Economicus 36.50 10,126,885 369,631,302 30.50 10,307,309 319,526,579 
Homo Politicus  36.50 9,312,663 339,912,199 30.50 9,360,468 290,174,508 
 With sole 
responsibility  
33.00 9,551,687 315,205,671 28.00 9,838,515 290,236,192 
 With shared 
responsibility  
36.50 10,139,222 370,081,603 30.50 10, 336,609 335,939,792 
 Strategicus 30.00 9,079,808 272,394,240 27.00 9,840,057 280,441,624 
 
In a nutshell, market simulation implies lower aggregated values for implementing the 
conservation program for the Iberian Lynx for the single-bounded and double-bounded 
models and for different types of individuals.  
As explained in the fourth chapter, our estimations must be taken carefully, as the 
survey was conducted in 2008, so the estimated economic values may have varied.  
 
5.4. Intermediate summary 
 
In this chapter, we have presented a contingent valuation study for valuing multiple 
preference orderings in a biodiversity conservation context. We have gone beyond the 
model set out by Nyborg (2000) due to the inclusion of the free-rider problem.  
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Based on this survey, and considering that payment vehicles are not significant, we 
have first built a pooled model to differentiate between two types of individuals: Homo 
Economicus and Homo Politicus. According to this model, and, as expected, the former 
is willing to contribute with a larger amount of money than the latter when it comes to 
implementing a program to conserve the Iberian Lynx. Homo Economicus is more 
committed to supporting it and it is not concerned with the attitude of the rest of 
individuals. By contrast, the behavior of Homo Politicus considers the program 
necessary but at the same time it cares about what other respondent do.  
We also identify individuals who behave strategically within these two types of 
respondents. Thus, if we eliminate this effect from the previous dichotomy Homo 
Economicus/Homo Politicus, results show that Homo Politicus tends more towards a 
strategic behavior than Homo Economicus. While the WTP value for Homo Economicus 
changes almost nothing when excluding the free-rider problem, Homo Politicus offers a 
clearly higher WTP, so WTP values for both types of individuals converge more.  
In the third model presented in this chapter we have divided Homo Politicus into 
Homo Politicus with sole responsibility, Homo Politicus with shared responsibility and 
Homo Strategicus. Contrary to the theoretical result pointed out by Nyborg (2000), our 
model indicates that respondents considered as Homo Politicus with shared 
responsibility are willing to pay a higher amount of money to conserve the Iberian 
Lynx. The WTP value for the latter individual is, indeed, similar to that obtained for 
Homo Economicus, especially when free-riding is eliminated. 
We also analyze whether respondents found the contingent valuation easy, the 
certainty with which they answered it and the credibility of the conservation program. 
There are an important number of respondents who think that it is unlikely to launch the 
above program, but instead results have indicated that WTP values for the credibility 
question are higher than those for questions inherent to the conduct of a survey, such as 
the clarity and certainty questions. This result may be tackled in a two-fold manner: on 
the one hand, the WTP of those respondents who are really convinced is very high. On 
the other hand, those who think that the implementation of the conservation program is 
unrealistic may have offered a higher hypothetical WTP than what they would actually 
be willing to pay. The fact that they consider the possibility of conducting the program 
as being somewhat remote may lead them to think that it is a good idea to protect the 
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Iberian Lynx, but that they will not have to pay for this. In any case, both options are 
not contradictory, as the two attitudes point in the same direction: most of respondents – 
both those who consider possible to carry out the program as well as those who do not – 
find the program to conserve the Iberian Lynx in Spain an interesting proposal.  
Concerning the aggregated values, our results confirm that CV estimates offers 
higher values than the SEV method. Furthermore, under a scenario of multiple 
preferences ordering in an environmental valuation exercise, differences between types 
of individuals are larger with the CV estimate than with the SEV method. In other 
words, there is closer convergence between types of individuals when using the 
simulated scenario, so the SEV measure minimizes the bias of distinct preference. By 
contrast, the different roles adopted by individuals affect welfare measures most. 
Moreover, the fact of not integrating the free-rider problem, as other papers do, may 
make aggregated values be overestimated or underestimated, so this effect is relevant 
and should be borne in mind, especially in the valuation of public goods such as the one 
analyzed in this chapter.    
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The research work developed in this dissertation has mainly involved analyzing how 
non-market ecosystem services can be incorporated into the national accounts in a 
consistent way with market goods and services.  
As explained throughout the dissertation, there are different perspectives from 
which this issue has been pursued: accounting, theoretical and valuation. However, we 
have shown that there is a gap between them when it comes to valuing ecosystem goods 
and services without observable market prices. Hence, one primary goal of the present 
reseach has been to bring these differing viewpoints together under a common 
methodology: the Simulated Exchange Value. We have combined a theoretical optimal 
control model with two applied studies focused on the valuation of the recreational use 
in two types of Spanish forests, on the one hand, and on the conservation of the Iberian 
Lynx in Spain, on the other hand. This combination has proven to be successful for 
including non-market ecosystem services in the national accounts consistently with the 
rest of goods and services, regardless of the technique applied.  
From a theoretical point of view, we have set out the main findings for the forestry 
sector obtained by the theoretical literature on green national accounting. In this regard, 
we have shown that non-market ecosystem services can be integrated into the Net 
National Product calculation at their (simulated) exchange values. This result is 
perfectly consistent with the proposals of the national accounting systems, as the latter 
indicate that valuation should be based on exchange values whenever possible.  
Specifically, we have developed an optimal control model in which the utility 
function to be maximized does not depend entirely on consumption of market goods and 
services, but also on services provided by forests because they contribute to current and 
future well-being of individuals. In order to be able to estimate the value that these 
services would have if they were incorporated into national accounting, we have 
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employed the Simulated Exchange Value method. We have focused on forest 
recreational use and assumed that the payment of an entrance fee to gain access to the 
forest would be set. In this way, this payment would be equivalent to the price that 
would be paid for consuming a market good or service. The demand of the 
aforementioned service would therefore depend on the price of such entrance fee and 
the offer would be determined by the number of visitors to whom the forest owner 
permits accessing. In any case, this method could be applied to any other services by 
following the same procedure, which represents an advantage over other methodologies. 
From an empirical point of view, we have demonstrated that the Simulated 
Exchange Value method can be equally applied in order to calculate monetary values of 
public recreation in Spanish stone pine and cork oak forests, on the one hand, and of the 
conservation of the Iberian Lynx in Spain, on the other. As this method requires the 
estimation of the demand function, we have employed a choice experiment and a 
contingent valuation survey, respectively, to do so. In spite of the fact that we have used 
different tools from those of the theoretical approach, the application of the Simulated 
Exchange Value method remains valid and affords a series of advantages over the 
welfare measures commonly used by most of studies within the cost-benefit analysis.  
In particular, we have compared compensating variation (a type of Hicksian 
variation) with the results obtained when applying the SEV method in order to obtain 
the aggregated economic values for both services. The two measures rely on the 
assumptions about the demand curve (WTP distribution) implicit in the discrete choice 
model used. However, while the simulated exchange value uses only a specific area 
under the demand function, the compensating variation covers the whole area under this 
function and is therefore more sensitive to changes to the assumptions about its shape. 
Meanwhile, the simulated exchange value approach is sensitive to the inclusion of 
substitute alternatives in the simulated market as this conditions the probability 
function. This is not the case for the compensating variation estimate, which directly 
uses the estimated parameters of the utility function.  
Another relevant implication of the Simulated Exchange Value method, especially 
in the case of forest recreational use, is that the simulated market would have 
distributional consequences on current visitors. The relative effort (in monetary terms) 
needed to keep accessing the forest will be different depending on the characteristics of 
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the visitors and their families. In fact, a proportion of current visitors will be left out of 
the forest as they would not be willing to pay the price set. This type of analysis would 
require additional models with explanatory variables that allow us to identify the 
characteristics of those respondents that are more affected by the simulated market. 
However, this analysis goes beyond the scope of our dissertation, although we 
acknowledge its interest for future research.  
In addition to the above-mentioned, the study on forest recreational use has 
addressed the issue concering the validity of choice experiments. We have conducted 
two convergent validity tests. On the one hand, we have obtained similar results from a 
choice and from a ranking recoded as a choice in an exercise involving three 
alternatives plus the status quo. This reinforces the idea that people make consistent 
choices in these experiments and it allows the practitioner to use ranking formats, with 
the knowledge that the first rank can be analyzed as a standard choice and that 
additional information from subsequent ranks can be used. On the other hand, we have 
ascertained that respondents are willing to pay €2.7 more as increased trip expenditures 
for each additional euro paid as an entrance fee. While these additional payments would 
have the same effect on the disposable income of forest recreationists, they do not seem 
to have the same effect on their utility. We believe that these differences may be 
explained by the perception of some forest recreationists that they have the right to 
freely access the forest and by the strategic behavior of some respondents who try to 
avoid the establishment of fees for accessing current free access areas.  
As regards the study on the conservation of the Iberian Lynx in Spain, we have 
analyzed the role adopted by different respondents when facing a payment scenario to 
allow the conservation program to be implemented. Given that we are dealing with a 
public good, not all individuals act as consumers, but can judge this matter from 
society’s point of view. In our study, we extend this dichotomy in order to take into 
account a new type of individual who stands out for his/her strategic behavior. In fact, 
this behavior is key to better understanding the preferences adopted. As expected, they 
are the ones who are willing to pay the lower amount to preserve the Iberian Lynx. 
Likewise, results show that most of respondents though that it was not plausible that the 
program could be implemented. This may lead us to conclude that it is relevant to make 
efforts to provide scenarios that may be understood as credible. Otherwise, we might 
face hypothetical bias.  
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Hence, this dissertation shows that the challenge faced by non-market valuation 
techniques for valuing non-market ecosystem services goes beyond the application of 
the method itself – it also includes how to integrate willingness to pay values in an 
extended analysis that intends to incorporate the economic value of these services. 
Further research should explore additional assumptions about this integration as well as 
alternative scenarios that might more closely resemble how the potential market for 
these services would work.    
Apart from the conclusions drawn so far, another important contribution of this 
dissertation is the treatment of net accumulation of forest capital. In accordance with 
previous literature, the theoretical model explained above has shown that the current-
value Hamiltonian and Green Net National Product can be valued by using only values 
of the current year, which clearly facilitates the analysis. However, this assumption is 
far-fetched, as it assumes that there is a single species, among other assumptions. We 
have extended this model to allow different species growing differently to exist, thus 
showing that it is no longer possible to use only values of the current year, as Green Net 
National Product includes future values. To that end, we have utilized a Volterra 
integral equation, which had not been applied within a green national accounting 
framework until now. In this way we show that it is also possible to use this type of 
tools within this approach.  
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CONCLUSIONES 
 
El trabajo de investigación desarrollado en esta tesis doctoral ha consistido 
fundamentalmente en el análisis de cómo los servicios de los ecosistemas de no 
mercado pueden ser incorporados a la contabilidad nacional de forma consistente con 
los bienes y servicios de mercado.  
 Como se ha explicado a lo largo de la tesis, existen diversas perspectivas desde las 
que se ha venido abordado esta cuestión: contable, teórica y de valoración. No obstante, 
hemos mostrado que existe una brecha entre ellas en lo que se refiere a la valoración de 
los bienes y servicios proporcionados por los bosques para los que no existen precios de 
mercado. Por lo tanto, un objetivo primordial de la presente investigación ha sido aunar 
estas perspectivas en torno a una metodología común: el Valor de Cambio Simulado. 
Para ello, hemos combinado un modelo teórico de control óptimo con dos estudios 
aplicados orientados a la valoración del uso recreativo en dos tipos de bosques 
españoles, por un lado, y de la conservación del lince Ibérico, por otro.  Esta 
combinación ha demostrado que, independientemente de las técnicas que apliquemos, 
los servicios de los ecosistemas de no mercado pueden ser incluídos en la contabilidad 
nacional consistementemente al resto de bienes y servicios.  
Desde un punto de vista teórico, hemos presentado las principales conclusiones 
obtenidas para el sector forestal por la literatura teórica en torno a la contabilidad 
nacional verde. En este sentido, hemos mostrado que los bienes y servicios de los 
ecosistemas de no mercado pueden ser integrados en el cálculo del Producto Nacional 
Neto estimando sus valores de cambio (simulados). Este resultado es perfectamente 
compatible con la propuesta realizada por los sistemas de cuentas, ya que éstos indican 
que la valoración debe hacerse utilizando valores de cambio siempre que sea posible.  
En concreto, hemos desarrollado un modelo de control óptimo en el que la función 
de utilidad a maximizar no depende únicamente del consumo de bienes y servicios ‘de 
mercado’ sino también de los servicios ofrecidos por los bosques dado que éstos 
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contribuyen al bienestar presente o futuro de los individuos. Para poder estimar el valor 
que estos servicios tendrían si se incorposen a la contabilidad nacional, hemos empleado 
el Valor de Cambio Simulado. Nos hemos centrado en el uso recreativo de los bosques, 
asumiendo que se establecería el pago de una entrada para poder acceder al bosque. De 
este modo, este pago sería el equivalente al precio que se pagaría por consumir un bien 
o servicio comercial. Así, la demanda del mencionado servicio dependerá del precio de 
dicha entrada y la oferta vendrá determinada por el número de visitantes a los que el 
propietario del bosque permita el acceso. En cualquier caso, este método podría 
aplicarse a cualquier otro servicio siguiendo el mismo procedimiento, lo cual representa 
una ventaja respecto a otras metodologías.  
Desde una perspectiva aplicada, hemos demostrado que el método del Valor de 
Cambio Simulado puede ser igualmente utilizado para calcular los valores monetarios 
del uso recreativo público en bosques de pino piñonero y alcornoque en España, por un 
lado, y la conservación del lince Ibérico en España, por otro. Dado que este método 
requiere estimar la función de demanda, hemos empleado para ello un experimento de 
elección y una encuesta de valoración contingente, respectivamente. Pese a que hemos 
utilizado otras herramientas diferentes a las del modelo teórico, se puede observar que la 
aplicación del método del Valor de Cambio Simulado sigue siendo válida y reporta una 
serie de ventajas frente a las medidas de bienestar que comúnmente utilizan la mayoría 
de los estudios dentro del análisis coste-beneficio. 
En particular, hemos comparado la variación compensatoria (un tipo de variación 
Hicksiana) con los resultados obtenidos de aplicar el método de Valor de Cambio 
Simulado para calcular los valores agregados de ambos servicios. En cualquier caso, las 
dos medidas se basan en los supuestos implícitos sobre la curva de demanda (la 
distribución de la disposición a pagar) en los modelos de elección discreta utilizados. 
Sin embargo, mientras que el método de Valor de Cambio Simulado usa únicamente un 
área específica debajo de la función de demanda, la variación compensatoria cubre el 
área completa debajo de esta función y, por lo tanto, es más sensible ante cambios en los 
supuestos sobre su forma. Mientras tanto, el enfoque de simular valores de cambio es 
más sensible a la inclusión de alternativas que puedan ser sustitutivas en el mercado 
simulado, ya que esto condiciona la función de probabilidad. Esto no es el caso de la 
variación compensatoria, la cual utiliza directamente los parámetros estimados de la 
función de la utilidad.  
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Otra importante implicación del método del Valor de Cambio Simulado, 
especialmente para el caso del uso recreativo, es que el mercado simulado tendría 
consecuencias distributivas sobre los visitantes actuales. El esfuerzo relativo en 
términos monetarios que se necesitaría para seguir pudiendo acceder al bosque variará 
dependiendo de las características de los visitantes y sus familias. De hecho, una 
proporción de los visitantes actuales no podría disfrutar de este servicio ya que no 
estaría dispuesta a pagar el precio establecido. Este tipo de análisis requeriría desarrollar 
modelos adicionales con variables explicativas que nos permitiesen identificar las 
características de aquellos encuestados que se ven más afectados por el mercado 
simulado. No obstante, este análisis va más allá del objetivo de la tesis, si bien 
consideramos que sería un tema interesante a tratar en el futuro. 
Además de lo ya mencionado, en el estudio aplicado al uso recreativo hemos 
abordado la cuestión relativa a la validez de los experimentos de elección. Para ello, 
hemos llevando a cabo dos análisis de validez convergente. Los resultados muestran 
convergencia entre un formato de elección y otro de ordenación recodificado como una 
elección en un experimento con tres alternativas más el status quo. La principal 
implicación de este resultado es que los encuestados realizan elecciones consistentes en 
estos experimentos y los evaluadores obtienen informacion adicional de usar un formato 
de ordenación sin perder los resultados de un ejercicio de elección equivalente.  Por otro 
lado, hemos constatado que los encuestados están dispuestos a pagar 2,7 euros más 
como incremento en los gastos de viaje por cada euro adicional pagado como entrada. 
Aunque estos pagos adicionales tendrían el mismo efecto en la renta disponible de los 
recreacionistas, no parece que tengan el mismo efecto en su utilidad. Creemos que estas 
diferencias pueden ser explicadas por la percepción por parte de los recreacionistas de 
que tienen derecho de acceder libremente al bosque y por un comportamiento 
estratégico de algunos encuestados que tratan de evitar el establecimiento de entradas 
para acceder a zonas actuales de libre acceso. 
En lo concerniente al estudio sobre la conservación del lince Ibérico en España, 
hemos analizado el rol adoptado por los diferentes entrevistados cuando se enfrentan a 
un escenario de pago para implementar un programa de conservación. Al tratarse de un 
bien público, no todos los individuos actúan como consumidores, sino que pueden 
juzgar esta cuestión desde el punto de vista de las preferencias sociales. En nuestro 
estudio, ampliamos esta dicotomía para incorporar una nuevo tipo de individuo que 
Chapter 6. Conclusiones 
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destaca por su comportamiento estratégico. De hecho, este tipo de comportamiento es 
clave para entender las preferencias adoptadas. Como se esperaba, son los que están 
dispuestos a pagar una menor cantidad de dinero para preservar el lince ibérico. 
Asimismo, los resultados muestran que la mayoría de los encuestados no ven factible 
que se pueda poner en marcha el programa. Esto nos lleva a concluir que es relevante 
esforzarse por elaborar escenarios que puedan resultar creíbles para los encuestados 
porque, de lo contrario, podríamos encontrarnos con un problema de sesgo hipotético. 
Por lo tanto, esta tesis muestra que el reto al que se enfrentan las técnicas de no 
mercado para valorar los servicios de los ecosistemas de no mercado va más allá del la 
aplicación del método en sí mismo. También incluye cómo integrar los valores de la 
disposición a pagar en un análisis extendido que busca incorporar el valor económico de 
estos servicios. Sería necesario explorar los supuestos adicionales sobre esta 
integración, así como escenarios alternativos que podrían parecerse más a los mercados 
potenciales de estos servicios. 
Al margen de lo concluido hasta ahora, otra contribución relevante de la tesis es la 
estimación de la acumulación neta del capital forestal. En el modelo teórico 
anteriormente mencionado hemos mostrado que, en consonancia con la literatura 
anterior, el Hamitoniano valor descontado y el Producto Nacional Neto Verde pueden 
ser valorados únicamente con valores del año en curso, lo cual facilita enormemente el 
análisis. No obstante, este supuesto está alejado de la realidad, ya que, entre otros 
supuestos, asume que existe una única especie. Si extendemos este modelo para permitir 
que existan distintas especies que crecen de forma diferente, mostramos que ya no es 
posible utilizar valores del año en curso porque el Producto Nacional Neto Verde 
incluiría valores a futuro. Para ello, hemos aplicado una integral de Volterra, integral 
que hasta el momento no había sido empleada en ningún estudio de contabilidad 
nacional verde. De este modo, mostramos que es posible utilizar este tipo de 
herramientas también dentro de este enfoque.   
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APPENDIX A: NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR THE BENCHMARK MODEL 
 
From equations [3.1] and [3.6], we can rearrange the Social Planner’s problem as: 
 
   
                 dtetRAthtitPthtKYU rt
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
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0
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,,,max    [A.1] 
 
subject to [3.2], [3.3] and [3.4]. The current-value Hamiltonian [3.7] can be defined as: 
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  [A.2]   
   
The Pontryagin’s maximum principle provides the necessary conditions that must be 
fulfilled by the optimal control problem. On the one hand, there is the requirement that 
the current-value Hamiltonian be maximized with respect to the control variables at 
every point of time such that: 
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where u is the control variable. Thus, the necessary conditions for our benchmark model 
are calculated as follows: 
 
 Control variable i(t): 
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         where we can obtain  t1 : 
 
 
  
 
        tptptitp
ti
ti
t i


 '1 

         [A.3] 
 
Appendix A 
 
206 
 
 Control variable h(t): 
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         Following the same procedure as above,  t2  is: 
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Defining (to simplify)  
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[A.4] is now: 
 
        ttptpt hw 32        [A.5] 
 
On the other hand, the maximum principle also requires the following necessary 
condition to be met:  
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  [Equation of motion for  t ] 
 
where y is the state variable of the model. Hence, the only condition needed to solve our 
problem is: 
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  [Equation of motion for  t1 ]  [A.6] 
 
Noting [A.3] and assuming that prices are constant over time, [A.6] is equal to 0, so: 
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From this equation, we can derive  t1  such that:  
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Considering [A.3], it is easy to obtain  t3 : 
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Using equation [A.5] we can directly obtain ( )tλ2 : 
 
        tBtptpt hw 12        [A.10] 
 
where ( )tB1  is defined as in [3.16].  
In order to estimate the ‘linearized’ current-value Hamiltonian and GNNP, we 
can rewrite [A.2] as: 
 
                  
               
             
 
  
                 
             tPthtRgtKet
thtRgttKtittRA
tRA
tU
thtitPthtKY
tU
thtitPthtKY
tRAthtitPthtKYStH c














3
21
,,
,,
,,,
   [A.11] 
 
Taking out consumer surplus, [A.11] is 
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








3
21
,,
,,ˆ
    [A.12] 
 
Rearranging and replacing  t1 ,  t2  and  t3  by [3.10], [3.11] and [3.12], we obtain 
[3.18]. 
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APPENDIX B. NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR THE MODEL INVOLVING A 
SINGLE SPECIES AND A CONSTANT DECAY EXPONENTIAL GROWTH 
FUNCTION 
 
We follow the same procedure as that for the benchmark model, albeit with a few 
modifications. From equations [3.22] and [3.24], we can rearrange the Social Planner’s 
problem as: 
   
                 dtetRAtxtitPtxtKYU rt
txti


 
0
,
,,,max         [B.1] 
 
subject to [3.2], [3.25], [3.26] and [3.27]. The current-value Hamiltonian is: 
 
                         
                    tbGtxttPtGtKettGt
tKtittRAtxtitPtxtKYUtH c


432
1,,,


  [B.2] 
 
The necessary conditions are: 
 
 Control variable i(t): 
 
The result is the same as in the benchmark model, i.e. [A.3]. 
 
 Control variable x(t):  
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
  
 
  0
,,
4 


















t
tx
tx
tC
tU
tx
tPtxtKY
tC
tU
tx
tHc 

     [B.3] 
 
        where we can now easily obtain  t4 : 
 
 
      
 
 
  
 
 










 tp
tx
tx
tp
tx
tPtxtKY
t


,,
4                 [B.4] 
 
 Defining (to simplify)  
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      
 
 
xF
ptp
tx
tPtxtKY


 ,,
and 
  
 
   tptp
tx
tx
x


        [B.5] 
[B.4] is now: 
 
     tptpt xFx 4                              [B.6]  
  
Furthermore, the equations of motion needed to solve the problem are:  
 
 
 
 
 tr
tK
tH
t c 11  




  [Equation of motion for  t1 ] 
 
where 
 
 
 
 
      
 
   
  
 
 tr
tK
tKe
tt
tK
tPtxtKY
tC
tU
t 1311
,,
 














 [B.7] 
 
Considering equation [A.3], [B.7] is equal to 0, so we can obtain  t1 : 
 
 
 
      
 
   
  
  











tK
tKe
ttp
tK
tPtxtKY
r
t 31
,,1


   [B.8] 
 
Using equation [A.3], we can directly derive  t1 : 
 
 
 
  
 
      
 
  
 
 tp
tK
tKe
tK
tPtxtKY
ti
ti
r
t





















,,
3


    [B.9] 
 
The following equation of motion needed is: 
 
 
 
 
 tr
tG
tH
t c 44  




  [Equation of motion for  t4 ] 
 
where  
 
        rbtttt 

4324        [B.10] 
                   
Considering equation [B.6]: 
           rbtptpttt xFx 

 324       [B.11] 
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  04 

t  because prices are assumed to be constant over time, so we can obtain  t2 : 
 
         rbtptptt xFx   32        [B.12] 
 
Substituting [B.9] into [B.12]: 
 
         rbtptptBt xFx   22            [B.13] 
 
where  tB2  is defined as in [3.34]. 
In order to estimate the ‘linearized’ current-value Hamiltonian and GNNP, we 
can re-write [B.2] as: 
 
                  
               
             
  
 
  
          
                tbGtxttPtGtKet
tGttKtit
tRA
tU
tRA
txtitPtxtKY
tU
txtitPtxtKY
tRAtxtitPtxtKYStH c









43
21
,,
,,
,,,





  [B.14] 
 
Taking out consumer surplus, replacing  t1 ,  t2 ,  t3  and  t4  by [3.10], [3.29], 
[3.30] and [3.31], respectively, and rearranging, we obtain [3.35]. 
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APPENDIX C:  NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR THE MODEL INVOLVING 
DIFFERENT TYPES OF SPECIES  
  
As explained in the text, in this case we are using the Hamiltonian, rather than the 
current-value Hamiltonian because it greatly facilitates the derivation of the necessary 
conditions. Note that we now have a state equation defined as a Volterra integral 
equation, so these conditions must differently be calculated (Vinokurov, 1969; Kamien 
and Schwartz, 1991). 
From equations [3.39] and [3.41], we can rearrange the Social Planner’s problem 
as: 
     
                   dtetRAtxtitPtbtxtKYU rt
tbtxti


 
0
,,
,,,,max      [C.1] 
                     
subject to [3.2], [3.42], [3.43] and [3.44]. The Hamiltonian is now: 
 
                    
                    
            dsetxtbstxt
tPtGtKettGttKtit
etRAtxtitPtbtxtKYUtH
tstb
t
rt






44
321
,,,,



            [C.2] 
 
From [C.2], the necessary conditions are: 
 
 Control variable i(t): 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  01 







 te
ti
ti
tC
tU
ti
tH
rt 

 
 
where we can now obtain  t1 : 
 
 
  
 
         rti
rtrt etpetptietp
ti
ti
t  


 '1 

        [C.3] 
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 Control variable x(t): 
 
 
 
 
 
        
 
 
 
  
 
        
0
,,,
44
































t
tstb
rtrt
dsestbt
e
tx
tx
tC
tU
e
tx
tPtbtxtKY
tC
tU
tx
tH


    [C.4] 
Defining (to simplify) 
 
        
 
   tptp
tx
tPtbtxtKY
bF


 ,,,
           [C.5] 
 
and considering [C.4]: 
 
             rtxrtFbtstb
t
etpetpdsestbt 

  44                   [C.6] 
 
 Control variable b(t): 
  
 
 
 
 
        
 
       0
,,,
4 
















t
tstbrt dsestxe
tb
tPtbtxtKY
tC
tU
tb
tH
     [C.7] 
 
Defining (to simplify) 
 
        
 
   tptp
tb
tPtbtxtKY
b

 ,,,
         [C.8] 
 
[C.7] can be rewritten as: 
 
    
 
 tx
etp
dses
rt
b
t
tstb

  4           [C.9] 
 
Substituting [C.9] into [C.6], we can obtain  t4 : 
 
       
 
  




 
tx
tp
tbtptpet bFbx
rt
4       [C.10] 
 
Furthermore, the maximum principle also requires the following conditions to be met:  
 
 
 
 tK
tH
t


1     
  
where 
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 
        
 
   
  
  










 
tK
tKe
tetp
tK
tPtbtxtKY
t rt 31
,,,
1
1


   [C.11] 
and 
 
 
 
 tG
tH
t


4  
 
where  
      ttt 324          [C.12]
  
From [C.11] and taking into account [C.3], we can obtain  t3 : 
 
 
 
  
 
        
 
  
 
  rtetp
tK
tKe
tK
tPtbtxtKY
ti
ti
t 





















,,,
1
3


     [C.13] 
         
Using [C.10] and [C.13]: 
 
 
     
 
 
 
  
 
        
 
  
 
 
rt
b
Fbx
e
tp
tK
tKe
tK
tPtbtxtKY
ti
ti
tb
tp
tbtptp
t 






























 ,,,12

     [C.14] 
 
 
where ( )tB3  is defined as in [3.52].                        
In order to estimate the Hamiltonian and GNNP, we can rewrite [C.2] as: 
 
                    
                 
               
 
  
             
                      dsetxtbstxttPtGtKet
tGttKtitetRA
tRA
tU
e
txtitPtbtxtKY
tU
txtitPtbtxtKY
etRAtxtitPtbtxtKYStH
tstb
t
rt
rt
rt
--
443
21
,,,
,,,
,,,,



















   [C.15] 
 
Taking out consumer surplus, replacing  t1 ,  t2 ,  t3  and  t4   by [3.46], [3.47], 
[3.48] and [3.49], respectively, and rearranging, we obtain [3.53]. 
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APPENDIX D. MODEL INVOLVING A SINGLE SPECIES, A CONSTANT 
DECAY EXPONENTIAL GROWTH FUNCTON AND FELLING  
 
As explained in the text, the optimal control model developed in section 3.2.1 may also 
be developed if trees are felled. However, the mathematical complexity is unavoidable.  
Let us now suppose that after T years (exogenous) all trees are taken out, so they do 
not grow anymore. This means that the accumulated growth in wood of each tree at the 
time of felling is defined by:  
 
    MdsebTMsbtM
T
bs  

0
,,,           
    [D.1] 
 
because we still assume that 1=0G . As T is exogenous, M is a constant parameter 
determined by the growth function. The growth of all vintages at time t, G(t), is 
therefore given by: 
     dsesxtG
t
Tt
stb


                    [D.2] 
 
and the function that accumulates all the past growth, R(t), is: 
 
        
 











t
Tt
z
Tt
szb
t
Tt
dzdsesxdzzGtR                    [D.3] 
  
 
The Social Planner’s problem is [3.22] subject to [3.2], [D.2], [D.3], the appropriate 
transversality conditions, and a modified version of [3.4]: 
 
        tPtRtKetP  

          [D.4] 
 
 
The economy’s total production at time t is defined as: 
 
              txtitCtPTtxtKY   ,,                    [D.5] 
 
 
We can take the time derivatives of [D.2] and [D.3]: 
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       
             tbGeTtxtxdsesxbeTtxtx
dsesxbeTtxtxtG
bTstb
t
Tt
bT
t
Tt
btbsbT










        [D.6] 
where the three terms of this expression are: (i) the growth added by the additional 
plantations (which add one unit of growth because  10 G ), (ii) the growth ‘taken out’ 
by felling the trees that reached their maturity (after T years), and (iii) the decay in the 
growth of all the active vintages because they are now one period older.  
And: 
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Considering [D.1], [D.7] can be rewritten as: 
 
     MTtxtGtR 

      [D.8] 
 
because 
 
  Mdzedze
T
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t
Tt
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

0
  
 
so [D.4] can now be defined as: 
 
           tPMTtxtGtKetP  

      [D.9] 
 
 
The Social Planner’s problem is no longer a conventional optimal control model, as 
there are variables at time t and time-delayed variables. This changes the way of solving 
the problem and the current-value Hamiltonian, as we now have a time-delayed 
Hamiltonian (Frankena, 1975; Kamien and Schwartz, 1991), so we cannot only use 
current values (see Caparrós (2009) for an application to carbon sequestration). We thus 
confirm that making a minimum change, such as the one shown here, the conventional 
model begins to be modified and becomes more complex. Only if there had not been the 
possibility of felling, the optimal control model would have remained unchanged.  
We can rewrite the Social Planner’s problem as before, while replacing [D.2] by 
[D.6] and [D.3] by [D.8]. The current-value Hamiltonian of this problem is: 
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As shown, [D.10] depends now on two points in time.  
Unlike previous cases, necessary conditions for an optimal control model involving 
a time-delayed response are different (Frankena, 1975; Kamien and Schwartz, 1991): 
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tu
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11 ≤≤- ttτt ]               [D.14] 
 
where y is the state variable and u the control variable. By adapting these conditions to 
our problem, 0=0t , ∞=1t   and Tτ = , so we would only need to use [D.11] and 
[D.12].  
Nevertheless, the derivation of this problem is so complex that we found no 
reasonable expressions for  t1 ,  t2 ,  t3  and  t4 . In any case, it is to be 
expected that if we would apply the two necessary conditions indicated above, GNNP 
would also be defined in two points in time.  
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APPENDIX E. NET ACCUMULATION OF NATURAL CAPITAL
115
 
 
We noted above that the term           thtRgtptp hw   in [3.18] does not 
adequately reflect the change in the value of natural capital (forest biomass in our case). 
This is because the model assumes that there is a single species and does not take into 
account the age-class structure and assumes that there is a single species. As explained 
in the second chapter of this dissertation, Vincent (1999a) calculates net accumulation 
of natural capital as the physical variation in stocks multiplied by the shadow price 
expressed in terms of future returns to the natural capital stock. This price is therefore a 
proxy for the marginal ‘net price’. He also analyzes the different existing proposals in 
order to include net investment of net accumulation in national accounts. It follows that 
from a forest where felling in done once at time T there are two methods: El Serafy 
variation
116
 and net-price method (see chapter 2). Caparrós et al. (2003) propose an 
alternative approach that confirms the results of El Serafy variation method, which is a 
particular case when all trees are cut down upon reaching age T. Let us see this 
approach by following the simplification of this model made by Caparrós (2010). 
 
Capital balances 
 
The capital value of a forest, W, is: 
 
     dseswtW tsr
t


                [E.1] 
 
                                                          
115
 Note that some subindexes in this appendix differ from those used throughout the dissertation. They 
use facilitates the analysis.  
116
 Net accumulation in the year of the felling is approximately equal to the current rent (with negative 
sign). The rest of years, there is positive net accumulation, as forests are approaching the time of felling.  
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where w is the capital income obtained by the forest owner  (it may, for example, 
include capital income from timber, grazing, hunting, recreational services and carbon, 
among others). That is, capital reflects the discounted stream of future net benefits, 
where t is the valuation year. Estimating this value at the beginning and at the end of the 
period and calculating the difference is the same as multiplying the change in the 
physical stock of natural capital by its costate variable (Caparrós et al., 2003), which is 
expressed in terms of future returns to the stock, as in Vincent (1999b).  
To make the explanation easier, let us assume that wood is the only source of profit. 
This definition is closely related to that given by the SNA: "The value of a fixed asset to 
its owner at any point of time is determined by the present value of the future capital 
services (that is, the sum of the values of the stream of future rentals less operating 
costs discounted to the present period) that can be expected over its remaining service 
life. Consumption of fixed capital is measured by the decrease, between the beginning 
and the end of the current accounting period, in the present value of the remaining 
sequence of expected future benefits" (ISWGNA, 2008: para. 6246). 
Caparrós et al. (2003) apply the AAS method explained in the second chapter of 
this dissertation. According to this methodology, the capital balance of a forest (or an 
agroforestry system) is divided into two balances: (i) the production in progress (forest 
stands
117
) balance, PP, and (ii) the fixed capital balance (in our case only land as we 
assume that there is no man-made capital in the forestry sector), L. Hence, and taking 
out any source of time-dependence: 
 
LPPW               [E.2] 
 
Fixed capital balance: Land value is defined as remnant: 
 
  PPdsweL
t
tsr  


             [E.3]  
 
Products in progress balance: As the only product in progress considered is standing 
timber, its value can be estimated by the stream of future net returns:  
 
   dseqppPP tsrhs
T
t
hswst

     [E.4] 
 
                                                          
117
 That is, the standing timber at the present time. 
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where 
hsq
 indicates the quantity of timber felled.  
However, trees are often cut selectively, at least in most European forests, so we 
can only estimate the probability that a living tree of the diametric-age d (at which we 
would have to associate an age) is felled in the diametric-age s, where j > d 
118
. This 
would imply knowing future forestry for each of the species available, which may be 
complex if selective felling processes are completed. However, this probability may be 
determined on the basis of historical extraction data, thus determining the conditional 
probability, πjd, that a living tree of the diametric-age d is felled at the diametric-age j: 
 









n
Ndt
ht
hj
jd
q
q
d
j
Pr            [E.5] 
 
where Nd is the number of diameter-ages d, arranging all classes from small to large. 
The price for not felled standing timber,
p
p , is, for each diameter class, the 
mathematical expectation formed with the prices that the timber will have at the future 
time of felling, consequently discounted 
 
     
 dt ssN
Ndj
jdhjwjhpd rpppEp


  1         [E.6] 
 
where N is the total number of diameter classes, arranged by age, 
js  is the average age 
of class j; and ds  is the age of the present diameter class d. 
Using the calculated not felled timber prices, the production in progress is valued at 
the beginning, PPi, and at the end, PPf, on the accounting period, with the following 
expression: 
 



n
j
pjtpjtt qpPP
1
  fij ,             [E.7] 
 
where [E.7] aggregates the estimated values for each diameter-class ( pjtq is the not 
felled timber for each diameter-class). 
                                                          
118
 As described above, the forestry analyzed by Vincent (1999b) when describing the El Serafy variation 
method is a particular case in which the probability of harvesting is zero until the moment trees reach the 
diametric-age associated with age T when the probability of felling is one. 
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Used products in progress, PPu, i.e. the timber extracted from the forest, is valued 
at the present market price for the different age classes: 
 


n
j
hjhjwju qppPP
1
              [E.8] 
 
Being 
hj
q annual commercial gross growth of the diameter-class j that has not been 
extracted, total stock entrance, PPe, or equivalently natural gross commercial growth
119
, 
is valued according to the expression:  
 



n
j
pjpje pgPP
1
               [E.9] 
 
This expression multiplies (for each age class) the growth which has occurred over 
the period by its price, considering whether new timber growth is felled in the same 
year or remains standing (assuming that extraction occurs at the end of the period). 
According to the above, the revaluation of timber during the period is estimated as 
remainder: 
 
euifrem
PPPPPPPPPP            [E.10] 
 
The main source of revaluations is the change in the value of standing timber when 
changing from the diameter-class d to the diameter-class (d+1), if the price of (d+1) is 
larger than that of d. That is, the growth occurred in the forest not only increases the 
existing biomass, but also the value of the existing timber at the beginning of the period. 
This effect can only occur when the timber price varies according to the diameter, or it 
is necessary to wait until the time of felling, as otherwise PPrem = 0. This is not the case 
in the general equilibrium models described above, they conclude that it is sufficient to 
subtract extractions to gross growth of the year (valued by the single price of timber). In 
our benchmark model we showed that the following expression should be added to 
GNNP:  
 
      hppRgpp hwhw               [E.11] 
 
                                                          
119
 Natural gross commercial growth equals total stock entrance as the only production in progress 
considered in this paper is timber. 
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The first term of [E.11] represents gross natural growth valued at the stumpage 
price (a single price for all diameter-classes) such that: 
 
   RgppPP hwe             [E.12] 
 hppPP hwu           [E.13] 
 
because in this case 
 

j
pjgg    [E.14] 

j
jjqh    [E.15] 
   hjwjpjhwp pppppp    [E.16] 
 
It makes no sense to distinguish among diameter-classes if all of them have the same 
price and it is not necessary to wait for the time of felling. The difference between the 
final value and the initial value, is given in the methodology proposed by Caparrós et al. 
(2003) as: 
 
Ueremif
ppPPPPPPPP             [E.17] 
 
If we assume that there is a single price of timber and that forests grow 
instantaneously, 0remPP , so expression [E.17] is equivalent to the bracket shown in 
[E.11]. Vincent (1999a) already indicates that the result that the only change to be made 
in GNNP is to include [E.11] depends critically on the assumption of a single type of 
forest and a single price for standing timber (and we should also assume that forest 
grow instantaneously). For the more realistic case that there are various types of forests 
and that the price of timber depends only on the diameter he suggests directly working 
with discounted future returns ( if PPPP  ). The proposal of Caparrós et al. (2003) is 
similar, albeit with the addition of specifications for different sources of change in the 
value between the initial time and the final time over the accounting period. Indeed, inn 
this chapter we have shown that, when there are different types of species we cannot 
obviate the future.  
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APPENDIX F: NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR THE MODEL INVOLVING NON-
MARKET GOODS AND SERVICES 
  
From [3.54] and [3.55], we can rearrange the Social Planner’s problem as: 
 
     
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t
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
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subject to [3.2], [3.3] and [3.4]. The current-value Hamiltonian is: 
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The only difference with respect to the necessary conditions obtained for the 
benchmark model is that there is a new control variable  t  so that a new condition for this 
variable is needed: 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
    
    
 
0
,
,


















t
tRtA
tRtA
tU
t
t
tC
tU
t
tH c





   
            
  
 
 
 
    
    
 
 tp
t
tRtA
tRtA
tU
tp
t
t
A










 ,
,
             [F.3] 
 
In order to estimate the Hamiltonian and GNNP, we can re-write [F.2] as: 
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Taking out consumer surplus, replacing  t1 ,  t2  and  t3  by [3.10], [3.11] and [3.12], 
and rearranging, we obtain [3.60]. 
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APPENDIX G. BOOKLET 
 
 
 
 
 
The Iberian Lynx (Pictures 9 and 10) is an endemic species from the Iberian Peninsula and, 
according to the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), it is the most 
endangered feline species on Earth together with the Bengali Tiger. 
 
The census performed for this species in 1990 
estimated that the population consisted of 1,100 
specimens. 
 
The last census pointed out that current 
population did not exceed 200 specimens (a 
82% fall in 15 years). 
 
Picture 9: Iberian Lynx 
 
It is considered that population in 1990 (1,100 specimens) is the minimum threshold for the 
preservation of this species. If adequate measures are not put into place, this feline might 
disappear.  
 
Although there are currently no captive breeding programs, results are still uncertain and do 
not imply the species’ recovery in its natural habitat.  
 
 
          Picture 10: Iberian Lynx 
 
 
The main threats for the Iberian Lynx are the lack 
of its basic prey (rabbit), the mortality caused by 
man, the destruction and alteration of the habitat 
and the isolation and fragmentation of their 
populations, as there are no ways of exchanging 
individuals.  
 
THE IBERIAN LYNX 
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In what follows, we will ask you some questions about possible recreational visits to forests 
that you may make in the future. Take into account the potential visits we present: 
 
These visits may solely be made to stone pine forests 
(previously described) or cork oak forests. 
 
Cork oak is a native species that shares the same 
ecosystem than the Stone pine. In fact, these species 
are mixed in the southwest and northwest of Spain. 
Cork oak forests are also located in Extremadura. 
Flora and fauna are also abundant in cork oak 
forests.  
 
Cork oak 
These visits may be made to recreational areas and/or 
trails in which there are (or not) infrastructures 
(tables, benches, toilets and swings). 
 
These visits may be made to recreational areas and/or 
trails in which there is the possibility of picking 
mushrooms (for example, saffron milk cap)    
 
These visits may be made to recreational areas and/or 
trails in which there is the possibility of seeing 
domesticated animals (cows, horses, sheeps…).   
 
 
Moreover, your visit would include a total expenditure derived from GASOLINE COSTS 
and from the hypothetical ENTRANCE FEE that the owner of the natural area would set 
for the Access.  
 
 
Please, indicate to the interviewer that you have already finished and answer the 
question he/she will ask you. Thank you.  
 
 
FOREST RECREATIONAL USE  
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APPENDIX H: ORIGINAL SURVEY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Survey No.:                              Type: 1 
Please indicate your level of agreement/ disagreement with 
the following statements (1 means ‘Completely disagreement 
’ and 5 ‘Full agreement’) 
 
 
1. The conservation of the Spanish forests is important for me 
because they are places I like to visit with recreational 
purposes. 
 
     1            2            3            4            5 
Complete disagreement                                  Full agreement 
 
 
2. The conservation of the native forests is important for me 
because it gives us the possibility of seeing beautiful 
landscapes. 
 
     1            2            3            4            5 
Complete disagreement                                  Full agreement 
 
 
3. I would like to know that the conservation of the Spanish 
forests will be retained in its current state, even if I knew that 
I and my family would never visit them with recreational 
purposes. 
 
     1            2            3            4            5 
Complete disagreement                                  Full agreement 
 
4. Although I have never thought about traveling there, I think 
that we must do our utmost to halt deforestation in the 
Amazon. 
 
     1            2            3            4            5 
Complete disagreement                                  Full agreement 
 
5. Forest fires must be avoided at all costs, as the landscape that 
remains after a fire is very ugly. 
 
     1            2            3            4            5 
Complete disagreement                                  Full agreement 
 
6. Could you indicate to us which of the following forests you 
like best? (MARK JUST ONE): 
 
       STONE PINE                    SCOTS PINE 
       HOLM OAK                      EUCALYPTUS  
       CORK OAK                       EUROPEAN BEECH 
       I do not distinguish between one forest and another 
       Other (specify): 
 
7. Did you know that tree plantations (reforestations) have been 
carried out over the last 15 years in Spain by means of 
subsidies granted by the Spanish public administration and by 
the European Union?   
 
                   Yes                                          No 
 
8. Do you know where the main masses of stone pine forests are 
located in Spain? 
 
                   Yes                                          No 
 
9. Could you tell us what your opinion is in regards to the 
implementation of a reforestation with STONE PINE in the 
southwest of Spain?  
     1            2            3            4            5 
Strongly negative                                  Very positive 
 
Please read the booklet that we will provide to you as follows 
carefully in order to be able to answer the following questions 
with more information about the Iberian Lynx.  
 
SHOW BOOKLET (Iberian Lynx) 
THIS SURVEY IS CONDUCTED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF A RESEARCH PROJECT BY THE SPANISH 
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD 
RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY AND THE COMPLUTENSE UNIVERSITY OF MADRID. 
 
WE ARE VERY GRATEFUL FOR YOUR COOPERATION. THIS SURVEY IS COMPLETELY ANONYMOUS. 
KEEP THEFOLLOWING INFORMATION IN MIND WHEN IT COMES TO ANSWERING: 
 
1) THERE ARE NEITHER GOOD NOR BAD ANSWERS.  WE ONLY WANT TO KNOW YOUR OPINION. 
2) TRY TO ANSWER ALL THE QUESTIONS OF THE SURVEY. SOMETIMES, THE LACK OF A 
CONCRETEDATA SERIOUSLY DAMAGES THE UTILITY OF THE SURVEY. 
3) TAKE THE TIME TO DO IT.  
 
OUR INTERVIEWER WILL ASK YOU THE QUESTIONS AND GUIDEYOU IN FILLING OUT THE SURVEY.  
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The following questions will vary depending on the type of survey chosen
120
 
Type 1 
15. Suppose that a conservation fund to ensure that the Iberian 
Lynx population is back to the 1990 levels (1,100 specimens) is 
established. Consider that it is the minimum threshold necessary 
to ensure its preservation. This fund would be managed by a 
NGO which would be subject to government auditing. The 
money would only be allocated for the described purpose.  
 
Would you be willing to contribute 10 EUROS to this fund (this 
year alone)? 
                Yes (question16)                            No (question 17) 
 
16. (If you answered YES to the question15). Would you be 
willing to contribute 30 EUROS? 
                 Yes                                                No 
 
17. (If you answered NO to the question 15). Would you be 
willing to contribute 5 EUROS? 
                  Yes                                                No 
  
18. What would be the MAXIMUM AMOUNT of money you 
would be willing to contribute to the fund? 
 
                            EUROS (question 23 if zero) 
       N/A (question 23 if the answer to questions 15 and 17 were 
also NO) 
 
 
19. Which of the following affirmations explain better what you 
thought while answering questions 15 to 18: 
 
a) I pay because I consider SOCIALLY CORRECT 
(adequate from society’s point of view) to guarantee the 
preservation of the Iberian Lynx.  
b) I pay because the preservation of the Iberian Lynx is 
important for ME. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20. Which of the following affirmations explain better what 
you thought while answering questions 15 to 18: 
 
a) I thought that if I paid the REST OF SPANISH 
CITIZENS (contributors) would pay the same quantity.  
b) I thought that if I paid REST OF SPANISH 
CITIZENS (contributors) would pay, but not 
necessarily the same quantity. 
c) I thought that if I paid even a small quantity, this could 
be COMPENSATED by the PAYMENT OF OTHER 
CONTRIBUTORS.  
d) I DID NOT take into account the quantity that others 
would pay. 
 
21. In short, which of the following affirmations explain better 
what you thought while answering questions 15 to 18: 
 
a) I pay because I consider SOCIALLY CORRECT that 
ALL SPANISH CITIZENS (contributors) PAY to 
guarantee the preservation of the Iberian Lynx. 
b) I pay because preserving the Iberian Lynx is 
SOCIALLY CORRECT and it justifies this EFFORT 
ON MY PART, even if others pay less. 
c) I pay because preserving the Iberian Lynx is important 
for ME and it justifies this EFFORT ON MY PART, 
even if others pay less.  
d)  None of the above, explain your reasons: 
 
22. If you had the guarantee that ALL SPANISH CITIZENS 
(contributors) would pay the same amount as YOU do, then: 
 
a) I would pay MORE; please, indicate the quantity: 
……………….. 
b) I would pay LESS; please, indicate the quantity: 
………………… 
c) I would pay THE SAME. 
    
(Go to question 26) 
 
                                                          
120
 Questions from 10 to 14 were designed to be used as a choice experiment for the implementation of 
reforestation processes in the southwest of Spain. These questions therefore correspond to a different 
study and are not reported here. 
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[Questions for those who did not accept paying any amount of 
money in questions 15-18] 
 
23. Could you tell us the reason why you did not accept paying 
any amount of money to contribute to the conservation fund for 
the Iberian Lynx?: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24. Which of the following affirmations explain better what you 
thought while answering questions 15 to 18: 
 
a) I thought that if I did not pay the REST OF SPANISH 
CITIZENS (contributors) would pay.  
b) I thought that if I did not pay the REST OF SPANISH 
CITIZENS (contributors) would not pay either. 
c) I DID NOT take into account the quantity that others 
would pay. 
 
25. If you had the guarantee that ALL SPANISH CITIZENS 
(contributors) would pay the same amount as YOU do, then: 
 
a) I would continue without paying. 
b) I WOULD PAY; please, indicate the quantity: 
………………… 
 
 
26. On a scale of 1 to 5, you found the content of question 15 
(show it again): 
 
     1            2            3            4            5 
It is very unclear                                  Very clear 
 
 
27. On a scale of 1 to 5, do you think it is possible to implement 
the proposal of establishing a fund introduced in question 15? 
 
     1            2            3            4            5 
         Impossible                                  Very possible  
 
  
28. On a scale of 1 to 5, to what degree of security did you 
answer question 15? 
 
     1            2            3            4            5 
          I very much doubted                    I am very sure 
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Type 2 
15. Suppose that a conservation fund to ensure that the Iberian 
Lynx population is back to the 1990 levels (1,100 specimens) is 
established. Consider that it is the minimum threshold necessary 
to ensure its preservation. This fund would be managed by a 
NGO which would be subject to government auditing. The 
money would only be allocated for the described purpose.  
 
If the contributions obtained proved insufficient to finance the 
project, funds would be reimbursed to those who paid. If more 
funds than were needed were collected, surplus would also be 
reimbursed to those who paid in proportion to their contribution. 
 
Would you be willing to contribute 30 EUROS to this fund (this 
year alone)?                      
                 Yes (question16)                     No (question 17) 
 
16. (If you answered YES to the question15). Would you be 
willing to contribute 45 EUROS? 
                 Yes                                          No 
 
17. (If you answered NO to the question 15). Would you be 
willing to contribute 15 EUROS? 
                  Yes                                        No 
  
18. What would be the MAXIMUM AMOUNT of money you 
would be willing to contribute to the fund? 
 
                            EUROS (question 23 if zero) 
       N/A (question 23 if the answer to questions 15 and 17 were 
also NO) 
 
 
19. Which of the following affirmations explain better what you 
thought while answering questions 15 to 18: 
 
a) I pay because I consider SOCIALLY CORRECT 
(adequate from society’s point of view) to guarantee the 
preservation of the Iberian Lynx.  
b) I pay because the preservation of the Iberian Lynx is 
important for ME. 
 
 
 
 
 
20. Which of the following affirmations explain better what 
you thought while answering questions 15 to 18: 
 
a) I thought that if I paid the REST OF SPANISH 
CITIZENS (contributors) would pay the same quantity.  
b) I thought that if I paid REST OF SPANISH 
CITIZENS (contributors) would pay, but not 
necessarily the same quantity. 
c) I thought that if I paid even a small quantity, this could 
be COMPENSATED by the PAYMENT OF OTHER 
CONTRIBUTORS.  
d) I DID NOT take into account the quantity that others 
would pay. 
 
21. In short, which of the following affirmations explain better 
what you thought while answering questions 15 to 18: 
 
a) I pay because I consider SOCIALLY CORRECT that 
ALL SPANISH CITIZENS (contributors) PAY to 
guarantee the preservation of the Iberian Lynx. 
b) I pay because preserving the Iberian Lynx is 
SOCIALLY CORRECT and it justifies this EFFORT 
ON MY PART, even if others pay less. 
c) I pay because preserving the Iberian Lynx is important 
for ME and it justifies this EFFORT ON MY PART, 
even if others pay less.  
d)  None of the above, explain your reasons: 
 
22. If you had the guarantee that ALL SPANISH CITIZENS 
(contributors) would pay the same amount as YOU do, then: 
 
a) I would pay MORE; please, indicate the quantity: 
……………….. 
b) I would pay LESS; please, indicate the quantity: 
………………… 
c) I would pay THE SAME. 
    
(Go to question 26) 
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[Questions for those who did not accept paying any amount of 
money in questions 15-18]  
 
23. Could you tell us the reason why you did not accept paying 
any amount of money to contribute to the conservation fund for 
the Iberian Lynx?: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24. Which of the following affirmations explain better what you 
thought while answering questions 15 to 18: 
 
a) I thought that if I did not pay the REST OF SPANISH 
CITIZENS (contributors) would pay.  
b) I thought that if I did not pay the REST OF SPANISH 
CITIZENS (contributors) would not pay either. 
c) I DID NOT take into account the quantity that others 
would pay. 
 
25. If you had the guarantee that ALL SPANISH CITIZENS 
(contributors) would pay the same amount as YOU do, then: 
 
a) I would continue without paying. 
b) I WOULD PAY; please, indicate the quantity: 
………………… 
 
 
26. On a scale of 1 to 5, you found the content of question 15 
(show it again): 
 
     1            2            3            4            5 
It is very unclear                                  Very clear 
 
 
27. On a scale of 1 to 5, do you think it is possible to implement 
the proposal of establishing a fund introduced in question 15? 
 
     1            2            3            4            5 
         Impossible                                  Very possible  
 
  
28. On a scale of 1 to 5, to what degree of security did you 
answer question 15? 
 
     1            2            3            4            5 
          I very much doubted                    I am very sure 
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Type 3 
15. Suppose that the government proposes an income tax increase 
in order to finance a project aimed exclusively at ensuring that 
the Iberian Lynx population is back to the 1990 levels (1,100 
specimens). Consider that it is the minimum threshold necessary 
to ensure its preservation. The money would only be allocated for 
the described purpose. 
 
Would you be willing to pay an additional 30 EUROS to the 
income tax already imposed (this year alone) in order to finance 
this project? 
                 Yes (question16)                    No (question 17) 
 
16. (If you answered YES to the question15). Would you be 
willing to contribute 45 EUROS? 
                 Yes                                         No 
 
17. (If you answered NO to the question 15). Would you be 
willing to contribute 15 EUROS? 
                  Yes                                         No 
  
18. What would be the MAXIMUM AMOUNT of income tax 
increase you would be willing to contribute to the fund? 
 
                            EUROS (question 23 if zero) 
       N/A (question 23 if the answer to questions 15 and 17 were 
also NO) 
 
 
19. Which of the following affirmations explain better what you 
you thought while answering questions 15 to 18: 
 
a) I pay because I consider SOCIALLY CORRECT 
(adequate from society’s point of view) to guarantee the 
 preservation of the Iberian Lynx.  
b) I pay because the preservation of the Iberian Lynx is 
 important for ME. 
 
 
 
20. Which of the following affirmations explain better what 
you thought while answering questions 15 to 18: 
 
a) I thought that if I paid the REST OF SPANISH 
CITIZENS (contributors) would pay the same quantity.  
b) I thought that if I paid REST OF SPANISH 
CITIZENS (contributors) would pay, but not 
necessarily the same quantity. 
c) I thought that if I paid even a small quantity, this could 
be COMPENSATED by the PAYMENT OF OTHER 
CONTRIBUTORS.  
d) I DID NOT take into account the quantity that others 
would pay. 
 
21. In short, which of the following affirmations explain better 
what you thought while answering questions 15 to 18: 
 
a) I pay because I consider SOCIALLY CORRECT that 
ALL SPANISH CITIZENS (contributors) PAY to 
guarantee the preservation of the Iberian Lynx. 
b) I pay because preserving the Iberian Lynx is 
SOCIALLY CORRECT and it justifies this EFFORT 
ON MY PART, even if others pay less. 
c) I pay because preserving the Iberian Lynx is important 
for ME and it justifies this EFFORT ON MY PART, 
even if others pay less.  
d)  None of the above, explain your reasons: 
 
22. If you had the guarantee that ALL SPANISH CITIZENS 
(contributors) would pay the same amount as YOU do, then: 
 
a) I would pay MORE; please, indicate the quantity: 
……………….. 
b) I would pay LESS; please, indicate the quantity: 
………………… 
c) I would pay THE SAME. 
    
(Go to question 26) 
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[Questions for those who did not accept paying any amount of 
money in questions 15-18] 
 
23. Could you tell us the reason why you did not accept paying 
any amount of money as increased income tax to finance the 
preservation of the Iberian Lynx? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24. Which of the following affirmations explain better what you 
thought while answering questions 15 to 18: 
 
a) I thought that if I did not pay the REST OF SPANISH 
CITIZENS (contributors) would pay.  
b) I thought that if I did not pay the REST OF SPANISH 
CITIZENS (contributors) would not pay either. 
c) I DID NOT take into account the quantity that others 
would pay. 
 
25. If you had the guarantee that ALL SPANISH CITIZENS 
(contributors) would pay the same amount as YOU do, then: 
 
a) I would continue without paying. 
b) I WOULD PAY; please, indicate the quantity: 
………………… 
 
 
26. On a scale of 1 to 5, you found the content of question 15 
(show it again): 
 
     1            2            3            4            5 
It is very unclear                                  Very clear 
 
 
27. On a scale of 1 to 5, do you think it is possible to implement 
the proposal of establishing a fund introduced in question 15? 
 
     1            2            3            4            5 
         Impossible                                  Very possible  
 
  
28. On a scale of 1 to 5, to what degree of security did you 
answer question 15? 
 
     1            2            3            4            5 
          I very much doubted                    I am very sure 
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Type 4 
15. Suppose that the government would put forward a referendum 
in order to finance a project aimed exclusively at ensuring that 
the Iberian Lynx population is back to the 1990 levels (1,100 
specimens). Consider that it is the minimum threshold necessary 
to ensure its preservation. The endorsement of this referendum 
would imply an income tax increase. The money would only be 
allocated for the described purpose. 
 
The project would only be launched if a majority voted for it.  
 
Would you vote in favor in this national referendum if the 
proposed increase implied the payment of an additional 10 
EUROS to the income tax already imposed (this year alone)? 
                Yes (question16)                     No (question 17) 
 
16. (If you answered YES to the question15). Would you be 
willing to contribute 30 EUROS? 
                 Yes                                         No 
 
17. (If you answered NO to the question 15). Would you be 
willing to contribute 5 EUROS? 
                  Yes                                        No 
  
18. What would be the MAXIMUM AMOUNT of income tax 
increase at which you would vote in favor in the referendum? 
 
                            EUROS (question 23 if zero) 
       N/A (question 23 if the answer to questions 15 and 17 were 
also NO) 
 
 
19. Which of the following affirmations explain better what you 
thought while answering questions 15 to 18: 
 
a) I pay because I consider SOCIALLY CORRECT 
(adequate from society’s point of view) to guarantee the 
 preservation of the Iberian Lynx.  
b) I pay because the preservation of the Iberian Lynx is 
 important for ME. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20. Which of the following affirmations explain better what 
you thought while answering questions 15 to 18: 
 
a) I thought that if I paid the REST OF SPANISH 
CITIZENS (contributors) would pay the same quantity.  
b) I thought that if I paid REST OF SPANISH 
CITIZENS (contributors) would pay, but not 
necessarily the same quantity. 
c) I thought that if I paid even a small quantity, this could 
be COMPENSATED by the PAYMENT OF OTHER 
CONTRIBUTORS.  
d) I DID NOT take into account the quantity that others 
would pay. 
 
21. In short, which of the following affirmations explain better 
what you thought while answering questions 15 to 18: 
 
a) I pay because I consider SOCIALLY CORRECT that 
ALL SPANISH CITIZENS (contributors) PAY to 
guarantee the preservation of the Iberian Lynx. 
b) I pay because preserving the Iberian Lynx is 
SOCIALLY CORRECT and it justifies this EFFORT 
ON MY PART, even if others pay less. 
c) I pay because preserving the Iberian Lynx is important 
for ME and it justifies this EFFORT ON MY PART, 
even if others pay less.  
d)  None of the above, explain your reasons: 
 
22. If you had the guarantee that ALL SPANISH CITIZENS 
(contributors) would pay the same amount as YOU do, then: 
 
a) I would pay MORE; please, indicate the quantity: 
……………….. 
b) I would pay LESS; please, indicate the quantity: 
………………… 
c) I would pay THE SAME. 
    
(Go to question 26) 
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[Questions for those who did not accept paying any amount of 
money in questions 15-18] 
 
23. Could you tell us the reason why you would not vote in favor 
of the proposed referendum to finance the preservation of the 
Iberian Lynx? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24. Which of the following affirmations explain better what you 
thought while answering questions 15 to 18: 
 
a) I thought that although I did not vote in favor the REST OF 
SPANISH CITIZENS would vote in favor. 
b) I thought that if I did not vote the REST OF SPANISH 
CITIZENS (contributors) would not vote either. 
c) I DID NOT take into account what others would vote.  
 
25. If you had the guarantee that ALL SPANISH CITIZENS 
(contributors) would pay the same amount as YOU do, then: 
 
a) I would continue without paying. 
b) I WOULD PAY; please, indicate the quantity: 
………………… 
 
 
26. On a scale of 1 to 5, you found the content of question 15 
(show it again): 
 
     1            2            3            4            5 
It is very unclear                                  Very clear 
 
 
27. On a scale of 1 to 5, do you think it is possible to implement 
the proposal of establishing a fund introduced in question 15? 
 
     1            2            3            4            5 
         Impossible                                  Very possible  
 
  
28. On a scale of 1 to 5, to what degree of security did you 
answer question 15? 
 
     1            2            3            4            5 
          I very much doubted                    I am very sure 
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The following questions are shared by the four types of surveys 
 In what follows, we will ask you some questions about your 
visits to forests in Spain. 
SHOW BOOKLET (recreation) 
 
29. Have you made RECREATION VISITS to natural forests 
areas at least once in the past 12 months? 
 
                 Yes                                 No (question 43) 
 
30. Would you know if there were stone pine forests within these 
areas?  
 
                 Yes (question 31)           No (question 32) 
 
31. How many days did you visit these natural stone pine forest 
areas in the last 12 months? 
 
 
 
32. Which NATURAL AREA did you visit in your LAST 
RECREATIONAL VISIT to a forest (of each type) and HOW 
MANY DAYS?  
 
             - Natural area: 
             - Number of days: 
        
33. How much MONEY did the VISIT cost you and/or your 
family in:?  
 
             - Gasoline  or public transport                       € 
             - Tolls:  € 
             - Parking:  € 
 
34. Could you tell us if this MONEY already calculated WAS 
SPENT?: 
 
               Only in YOUR visit 
                In YOUR visit and in the visit of YOUR FAMILY and   
or FRIENDS (specify the number of people you paid 
for, including yourself):  
35. Could you indicate us the MEAN OF TRANSPORT you 
used in this visit? 
 
 
 
36. Was the APPROACH ROUTE another attraction to this 
visit? 
 
                      Yes                           No 
                      Only part, specify: …………………… 
 
37. Was the practice of hiking, biking, climbing or any other 
similar activity the MAIN REASON for your visit? 
 
                      Yes                           No 
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Think now about the recreational visits you make to Spanish forests and consider 
your gas expenditures and the possibility of the establishment of an entrance fee 
for forest access instituted by the landowner (this would be valid whether it is a 
public institution or a private party, since both have the right to exclude access).  
 
We ask you to imagine that in your next recreation visit to a forest you have the 
opportunity to decide only among the alternatives shown in the following cards 
(OPTIONS A, B, C). In addition, you would have the option to stay home 
(OPTION D). Please, indicate in each set which of the alternaitves put forward 
WOULD YOU CHOOSE (ONLY ONE).  Bear in mind that if you chose to pay, 
you could not spend that money on other things.  
 
 
39. Only if you chose OPTION D in both cases:  
Could you tell us why you would stay at home? 
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Please indicate your level of agreement/ disagreement with 
the following statements (1 means ‘Completely disagreement 
’ and 5 ‘Full agreement’) 
 
 
43. Nature conservation is important because I enjoy visiting 
natural areas. 
 
     1            2            3            4            5 
Complete disagreement                            Full agreement 
 
 
44. I would like to contribute to causes such as nature protection 
and, when I can afford it, I contribute my time and/or money: 
  
     1            2            3            4            5 
Complete disagreement                            Full agreement 
 
45. I am delighted to hear that a new National Park has been 
created, as I think that both my children and I can visit it: 
 
      1            2            3            4            5 
Complete disagreement                            Full agreement 
 
46. When I see a beggar on the street, I cannot resist giving alms:  
 
1            2            3            4            5 
Complete disagreement                            Full agreement 
 
47. Although I and my family can in no way observe the Iberian 
Lynx in its natural habitat, I get great satisfaction from knowing 
that the preservation of this species will be ensured. 
 
     1            2            3            4            5 
Complete disagreement                            Full agreement 
 
48. I feel very good about myself when giving money on a 
donation campaign for a good cause. 
 
     1            2            3            4            5 
Complete disagreement                            Full agreement 
 
49. Although I had not heard before of a certain bird species, it 
pains me to know that this species has become extinct: 
 
     1            2            3            4            5 
Complete disagreement                            Full agreement 
 
 
 
50. If a volunteer approaches me asking for some money on 
the street for a recognized organization such as the Red Cross, 
I donate something:  
 
1            2            3            4            5 
Complete disagreement                            Full agreement 
 
 
51.  Despite the fact that neither my family nor I can see the 
black vulture in the natural habitat, I am pleased to know that 
the Spanish legislation protects these birds: 
 
1            2            3            4            5 
Complete disagreement                            Full agreement 
 
 
52.  There are some fundraising/donation campaigns to which 
I feel very close and I do not hesitate to support with a 
donation, regardless of which organization promoted the 
campaign: 
 
1            2            3            4            5 
Complete disagreement                            Full agreement 
 
To conclude, we would like to ask you some personal 
questions. We remind you that this questionnaire is 
anonymous.  
 
53. Year of birth 
 
54. Municipality of the habitual residence  
 
 
55. Marital status (it is not read): 
                       Single                                     Married 
                       Divorced                                Widowed 
 
 
56. Level of education (it is not read):  
                        No schooling                          Primary studies 
                        Secondary school                   Diploma 
                        Bachelor                                 Other (specify) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix H 
 
243 
 
57. Occupation (it is not read):  
                       Salaried employee 
                       Entrepreneur and self-employed worker                      
                       Unemployed 
                       Household tasks 
                       Student 
                       Retired 
                       Other (specify) 
 
58. Do you work in a profession related to the forestry sector? 
                       Yes                                           No 
 
59. Would you say that the average NET TOTAL INCOME PER 
MONTH of your family is included in one of these tranches? 
Remind that this questionnaire is totally anonymous and that we 
will only use this information for statistical purposes. Show:  
 
I do not have any direct income  
Less than €1,000  
Between €1,001 and €2,000  
Between €2,001 and €3,000  
More than €3,001  
N/A  
 
60. ¿How many members are in the family unit (including 
yourself) to whom you referred in the previous question? 
 
 
61. ¿How many members of this group (including yourself) bring 
in income to the family unit? 
 
 
62. Would you have any inconvenience in giving us your 
telephone just in case we were to make you some additional 
question? (Record the name, if he/she agrees to give it) 
 
 THANK YOU AND HAVE A NICE DAY 
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63. Interviewer: 
 
64. Date: 
 
65. Location of the interview: 
            
 
 
 
66. Start time:  
 
67. Finish time: 
 
68. Respondent’s attitude 
              Reluctant       Indifferent        Good 
      
69. Degree of understanding 
              Low                Middle             High 
 
70. In your opinion, what part of the survey has been  
poorly understood  by the interviewee? 
            None 
            Booklet 
            Reforestations section 
            The Iberian Lynx section 
            Recreational use section 
            Other (specify):  
 
 
 
 
71. From what question do you consider that the interviewee 
was fatigued? 
 
 
72. Did the interviewee have difficulty understanding the 
type  of tax/fund that he/she would have to pay in  
question15?  
             Yes                              No 
 
 
 
 
75. Comments: 
 
 
 
 
73. Gender of the interviewee  
              Male                           Female  
 
74. In your opinion, the survey has become long: 
               Yes                              No 
     
TO BE COMPLETED BY THE INTERVIEWER 
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APPENDIX I: THE SIMULATED EXCHANGE VALUE METHOD WITH TWO 
AND THREE ALTERNATIVES 
 
The revenue function is: 
 
   jjjjj qcpqpR              [I.1] 
 
and considering that  
 
  0' jqc                                                                                                              [I.2] 
 
and that 
 
   jjj pQpq Pr                                                                                                  [I.3] 
 
where Q  represents current visits.  
 
SEV-2: PRICE AND REVENUE MAXIMIZATION  
The probability of the alternative j is: 
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where 
 
jpjj pβαV j ×+=               [I.5] 
 
so, 
 
jpj
βV ='                  [I.6] 
 
The derivative of [I.4] with respect to is: 
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The derivative of [I.1] with respect to  is: 
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Equivalently: 
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Alternatively: 
 
 
jj pjpjjj
ppV   1ln                      [I.10] 
 
so, 
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Instead of estimating price and revenue maximization by taking the derivative with 
respect to , as we have done above, it would also be possible to derive the same 
results by taking the derivative with respect to ( )
jj pq . From [I.4], we know that: 
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Substituting [I.13] in [I.1] and calculating the derivative with respect to : 
 
   
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pq
pqQ
Q
pq
pR















ln         [I.14] 
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SEV-3: PRICE AND REVENUE MAXIMIZATION  
The probability of the alternative j is: 
 
 
 
1
Pr


yj
j
VV
V
jj
jj
ee
e
Q
pq
p         [I.15] 
 
or equivalently, 
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where 
 
jpjjj
pV      and   
ypyyy
pV           [I.17] 
 
so, 
 
jpj
V '              and    
ypy
V '          [I.18] 
 
The derivative of [I.15] with respect to  is: 
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The derivative of [I.1] with respect to  is: 
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Alternatively: 
j
yj
pj
VV
pee  1              
 
j
y
j pj
V
pjjj pepV   1ln         [I.21] 
jp
jp
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so, 
 
j
j
y
p
pj
V
j
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p



1ln
           [I.22] 
 
As before, it would also be possible to estimate price and revenue maximization by 
taking the derivative with respect to ( )
jj pq . From [I.16], we know that: 
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so, 
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         [I.24] 
 
Given [I.17], we obtain that [I.24] is now: 
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Taking napierian logarithm, noting that 
( )jαj eα ee ln=  and that ( ) j
α
αe j =ln , we get that: 
 
         
j
pjy
pjjjj
p
jj ppqQepq 


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Considering that: 
 
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we derive [I.26] as: 
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As: 
       
j
jjpyy
pjjj
p
jj pQeepqepq 
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
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[I.29] is now: 
 
        pjjjpjj pepqQeepq jjpjy    ln1lnln       [I.30] 
 
Note that: 
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and that 
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Then: 
 
 
  
           jjjyjjyjjjjjjjj
p
jj
jjp
j
pqQpqpqpqQpq
epqee
pq
Q
p jjy
ln2
1
lnln
1
22























      [I.33] 
 
Considering that ( )( ) ( )jjα αe
j eeα ln=ln=
ln  and rearranging, [I.33] is now: 
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According to [I.31] and [I.32]: 
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As both are equal: 
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Substituting [I.36] in [I.1] and calculating the derivative with respect to : 
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APPENDIX J: RESULTS FROM THE SINGLE-BOUNDED AND DOUBLE-
BOUNDED MODELS FOR HOMO STRATEGICUS  
 
We extend the dichotomy between individuals who act as free-riders and those who do 
not follow a strategic behavior, regardless of whether they are willing to pay or not.  
Thus, total sample is now made up of 657 individuals (596 individual who pay and 61 
who do not definitely pay – excluding protest responses), as shown in Table 5.2. Once 
classified, the variable FR is dummy-coded (1 if respondent is not FR and 0 if 
respondent is FR).  
Mean parameters from single-bounded and double-bounded models are not 
significant (Table J.2) for FR. While theory predicts the free-rider problem, it seems that 
when respondents face a real scenario, they prefer not to reveal their behavior. The 
variable ASC-REC shows a positive sign, meaning a preference for contributing in order 
to ensure the preservation of the Iberian Lynx. The variable Bid also offers negative 
sign. The variable FR has positive sign, so respondents are more likely to show a 
preference for not being a free-rider rather than for having a strategic behavior.  
 
Table J.1.  Results from the single-bounded and double-bounded models for Homo 
Strategicus 
Attribute 
Single-bounded Double-bounded 
Mean parameter Mean parameter 
Intercept 
2.0291
***
 
         (0.3094) 
2.2802
***
 
             (0.2365) 
Homo Strategicus (FR) 
         0.3760 
         (0.2602) 
             0.2018 
             (0.2232) 
Bid 
        -0.0685
***
 
         (0.0076) 
-0.0797
***
 
             (0.0366) 
Log-likelihood         -382.10             -850.45 
Adj. McFadden ρ2          0.1081  
n 657 
 
Note: standard errors are shown in brackets; n: number of observations; asterisks (e.g.,***,**,*) denote significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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When including Clarity, Credibility and Certainty, results indicate that only Credibility 
is significant in the single-bounded model (Table J.2). FR offers a negative sign.  
Table J.2.  Results from the single-bounded and double-bounded models for Homo 
Strategicus using the questions related to the clarity, credibility and 
certainty of the contingent valuation scenario 
Attribute 
Single-bounded Double-bounded 
Mean parameter Mean parameter 
Intercept 
        1.9137
***
 
         (0.6144) 
2.0266
***
 
                 (0.4337) 
Homo Strategicus (FR) 
        -0.4041 
         (0.2630) 
               -0.2342 
                 (0.2234) 
Clarity 
         0.3731 
          (0.3731) 
               0.3394 
                 (0.2936) 
Credibility 
         0.6344
***
 
          (0.1806) 
               0.4499
***
 
                 (0.1474) 
Certainty 
        -0.1682 
          (0.5486) 
               0.0084 
                 (0.3871) 
Bid 
        -0.0674
***
 
          (0.0078) 
              -0.0819
***
 
                 (0.0038) 
Log-likelihood         -367.51              - 830.03 
Adj. McFadden ρ2          0.1208  
n 657 
 
Note: standard errors are shown in brackets; n: number of observations; asterisks (e.g.,***,**,*) denote significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
